Spurious Constructions

July 23rd, 2006 Fred McVittie

Organised theoretical edifices, including scientific theories, metaphysical systems, and belief complexes, often contain entities which we may have no direct evidence of, but which must be posited to exist if the theory/belief is to maintain coherence. Such entities may be inferred circumstantially and may eventually turn out to be valid and ‘real’, or may be found to be purely fictitious. Non-real historical examples of such entities include epicycles, luminiferous ether, caloric, and ‘muelos’. An example of such a postulated entity which was subsequently acquired reality status is the planet Uranus, discovered not by observation but by inference, based on perturbations in the orbits of other heavenly bodies. It is tempting to assume that scientific progress and the dominance of rational physics in formulating evidence about the real world would reduce the reliance on such speculative entities, or at least that once an entity was found to be fictional that it would cease to appear in discourse (in the way that caloric does not routinely appear). However, this is not entirely the case, sometimes such fictions are allowed to survive in the language and in conception because they provide a particular human function related to the embodied nature of subjective being, as opposed to the disembodied nature of objective knowledge. Examples of such fictional entities might include: energy (as a substance or force), colours (as distinct, bounded entities), weight (as a property of substances and objects).

Routine discourse which includes reference to abstract concepts which can only be understood through the use of these spurious constructions, which function largely through the application of metaphors.

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Impetus and Energy

August 11th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Naive Physics cannot handle abstract (non-embodied) concepts (in that sense Naive Physics is an organised system of embodied metaphors). Therefore a concept such as ‘energy’ cannot figure with Naive Physics as it does within rational physics, as a purely mathematical or other abstraction. Instead it is conceived of as a SUBSTANCE; a limited resource which provided motive power and which, in common with physical substances, can be transformed, transferred, accumulated, depleted, much as a fuel is conceived in engineering. The Impetus Theory of energy and motion, which is part of the Naive Physics perplex, (and was a part of mainstream ‘rational’ physics from Aristotle onwards) makes explicit use of this ENERGY=FUEL metaphor. This historical correspondence between naive and rational physics was only broken in the 17th century by Newton in his formulation of the laws of motion. In Newton’s schema, motion is conceived not as an unusual state of matter requiring a fuel or impetus to maintain, but as a natural relative state or property. The only ‘energetic’ principle that is required within the Newton paradigm is during acceleration and deceleration, and this cannot be conceived as the transfer of a limited fuel resource into the body of the moving object.

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Ectoplasmic Mind Stuff

September 12th, 2006 Fred McVittie

In addition to the three metaphors for mind identified elsewhere which depend upon spatial extension and location; central point, focal point, and totality of space; there is one additional key metaphor which is frequently used. This fourth concept imagines mind as a gaseous/liquid extrusion, a kind of ectoplasm that extends into space from the body (usually the head) and may even leave the body entirely. This is the most literal and visualisable of the metaphors even though (because) it is also the least rationally valid. Whilst it has been cogently argued that mind and space may be connected (McGill 1995), the strength of that argument relies, ironically, on the deeply unscientific nature of its claim. McGill’s proposal that mind (consciousness) and space are linked via some pre-big-bang form of dimensionless spatial ordering is unverifiability defined. McGill’s hypothesis is non-viable because it is untestable. Any hypothesis which proposes the existence of an ‘ectoplasmic’ mind on the other hand, (and traces of this are found in Sheldrake, etc), are easily testable and inevitably found to be scientifically and objectively invalid. This does not prevent such models of the mind existing within folk science and as a pattern on the fabric of language.

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Metaphors of Mind: Object, Substance, Space

September 12th, 2006 Fred McVittie

  • Because of the limitations of an embodied cognition, all abstract thought is inherently metaphorical in nature.
  • Mind is a deeply abstract concept, as Claxton says, ‘ you can’t put it up against the wall and take a photo of it’, therefore mind can only be thought of (and spoken of) in metaphorical terms.
  • There are a large number of metaphors for the mind and particular mental functions, and these can be grouped into three general categories (which sometimes co-exist, as for example the metaphor of mind as a cloud).

  • Object metaphors (machine, body, book, computer etc),
  • substance metaphors (solid, gas, liquid)
  • spatial metaphors. This last set of metaphors variously imagines mind as existing as a point phenomenon at the centre of lived experience (core, essence etc), a focal point experience associated with the contents of consciousness, a ‘global’ phenomenon in which mind is synonymous with the totality of space.

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Metaphors of Mind

September 18th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The use of metaphor to describe and conceptualise mind is inevitable because of its inherently abstract nature. As Guy Claxton puts it (referring specifically to the unconscious), ‘you can’t put it up against the wall and photograph it.” This use of metaphor in cognition and in natural language is not only a feature of ‘commonsense’ descriptions of the mind (Barnden), but also structures academic and scientific thought on this subject. As has been noted by Barnden, Pasanek, Lakoff, and others, there are a large number of metaphors for mind and mental processes including, animals, architecture, garden features, war, weather, and writing. (Pasanek); for the purposes of this writing, this list will be collated into three key groups; objects, substances, and spatial metaphors. It can be demonstrated that all of the metaphors listed can be allocated to one or more of these three groups, or derived from combinations of the groups.

Posted in Barnden, J. A., S. O’Nuallain, et al, Claxton, Guy, Lakoff, George, Metaphor, Object, Panasek, Brad, Space, Substance | No Comments »

Spirituality as a Metaphor

September 28th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Spirituality - The application of the substance metaphor to feelings of unity, awe, and selflessness. Since feelings are inherently abstract, and can only be conceptualised through the use of concrete metaphor, such application is typical. In this case, these feelings (which Newberg and D’Aquili refer to as absolute unity of being), are conceptualised as a vaporous or liquid substance; one that moves between evansence and flow, much as a chemical spirit might behave. This substance metaphor is often combined with an anthropomorphic sense of agency applied to that substance such that the spirit is given intention and human-like attributes.

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Substance Metaphors

August 25th, 2007 Fred McVittie

One of the most extensive groups of conceptual metaphors that we use to structure and organise our thoughts about phenomena which would otherwise be incomprehensible and inexpressible is that set of metaphors which use SUBSTANCE as their source. Sometimes the substance used is quite specific, as for example when we talk about the abstract concept of genetic inheritance by using the metaphor of blood. In other instances we use more generic substances to stand for abstract concepts and exploit the general properties of substances to think and talk about concepts about which we would otherwise have to remain mentally and actually silent. A clear example of this latter type of generic substance metaphor is that of the type MIND IS A LIQUID which is explored in detail elsewhere and which shows itself in our use of such terms as flow, absorb, stream of consciousness, oceanic awareness, etc, all of which describe mental states or processes through the application of the one substance metaphor. It is inevitable that our use of such metaphors is based on our vernacular embodied understanding of substances, and not on an understanding of substance which requires specialist, non-embodiable knowledge. There is unlikely to be a metaphor group relating particularly to the halide elements for example, or to substances which form salts in the presence of acids. In other words, the ways in which substances are used as sources for metaphor is not dependent upon technical knowledge, of chemistry for example, but on the experiential knowledge of handling different substances and encountering different substances directly with the sensorimotor system. At this level of analysis, the body is the template for categorisation, not the chromatograph or the tunneling electron microscope. Unsurprising, the primary categories that the body forms are those familiar to all of us from Primary School science class, the categories of solids, liquids, and gases, and it is from this threesome that most of our substance metaphors are drawn. (Please note the inclusion of the caveat ‘most’ in the preceding sentence. I will be arguing that on special occasions we do invent, postulate, or imagine, a fourth state of matter outside of the big three.)

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The Fourth State of Imaginary Matter

September 12th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Matter, historically, was divided into the intuitively sensible categories of earth, air, fire, and water. To the medieval mind, this division was sufficient to cover the major distinctions in the properties of the stuff of the world, and associated conveniently with other quaternary distinctions, the bodily humours, the platonic solids etc. at a time when such correspondences were seen as significant evidence for the logical organisation of the world. The development of chemistry and physics replaced this intuitively satisfying but practically useless division with the period table of the elements and atomic theory which together reveal much more fundamental relations between substances and allows for vastly greater prediction and control of the chemical universe.

Outside of chemical practice however, we do still tend to use simpler systems of dividing the substances of the world into broad categories, regardless of their chemical constitutions. We do not usually use the earth, air, fire, water, classification but rather tend to think of ’stuff’ as being either solid, liquid, or gas. This trinity covers all of the material experience we are likely to run into in our daily lives, and maps thoroughly onto the sensorium in which we live. (Plasma has occasionally been referred to as the ‘fourth state of matter’ but since it is never encountered outside of high-energy physics it does not feature in our vernacular or intuitive understanding of the material world.)

Obviously, this classification of substance does not describe all aspects of the world, since much of our experience is not substance-based. We routinely engage with such entities as locations, forces, relationships, processes etc. which have no substantive existence but clearly are as real as the matter which we can see and touch. When we are engaging with substances however, we routinely expect it to fall into one of the three categories or solid, liquid, or gas, and if we learned of a substance which was outside of this classification (as opposed to a mixture for example) we would be hard pressed to find a way to conceive of it.

Let us assume for a moment that such a substance exists. We cannot talk about it easily since our language of substances is restricted to the big three, and even thinking about it ties us in knots. The extent to which we can think or talk about it at all is only the extent to which we can say it is like one of the existing known substances. We can say it is ‘a bit like a liquid’ or ’something like a gas’, or ‘ it has some of the qualities of a solid’. Yet even while we do this, we know that we are not really talking about the substance at all, such expressions are ‘a finger pointing at the moon’. This imaginary substance is neither solid, liquid, nor gas, and yet we can use the properties of these substances to speculate what the 4th state of matter might be like. This substance may be neither more solid than solid, nor more gaseous than gas, but at the same time we can think of it being both these things. Inasmuch as solidity and gaseousness seem to define a spectrum, the ’solidity’ spectrum we might say, then we can imaginatively place substance four on this spectrum, and if we do this we find that it is both more solid than solid and more gassy than gas. On the one hand, the fact that it makes no impression on the sense seems to place it beyond a gas. The spectrum of solidity from solid to liquid to gas seems to indicate a gradual dropping off of the availability of the different substances to sensory awareness; we can touch, taste, smell, hold, and see a solid; a liquid may be less visible, less easy to handle and contain; a gas is more evanescent still and may barely register on the senses at all. This journey from solid to gas is one of increasing removal from sensory contact and a hypothetical fourth substance, given that it does not appear at all, if we are to continue with this logic, must inevitably be placed beyond the gaseous.

On the other hand, we could possibly conceive of this substance taking up a position at the other end of the spectrum of solidity. When we look around at the solid matter of the world, we may be impressed by its apparent solidity, but we are also aware of it ultimate impermanence and transience. A Keats put is, ‘things fall apart’, and this goes for the most seemingly permanent. We see the breakdown of bodies, buildings and coastlines and know in our hearts that all things must pass. We also know that the most solid and fixed of matter that we see around us and inside us does not stay in the same place but is in constant motion. From the stars to our own eyeballs, all the stuff of the world is constantly jiggling and shifting. And while this jiggling seems to be most acute with gasses, and is least in evidence with solids, even the largest rocks fly around the Sun at a thousand miles an hour. Surely there should be state of matter does not perform this wild dance, but is genuinely solid; not just hard to the touch but firm and reliable in its fixity. The logic of the gradient from gas to solid, when extrapolated onward, seem to lead to such a substance. Truly permanent, truly unchanging, truly still.

We could, at this point conjecture on the existence of not only a fourth, but also a fifth state of imaginary matter, one which exists outside the ephemerality of gas and another which is inside the glacially shifting surface of solids. It may be more interesting to consider to what extent these apparent opposites can be reconciled into a single substance. And if such conflation proves to be impossibly paradoxical, we may find that we can learn something from the attempt.

Posted in Liquid, Matter, Metaphor, Sense, Substance | No Comments »

Heart of Stone, Feet of Clay

October 5th, 2007 Fred McVittie

You are standing on the shore of an ocean, possibly a beach in some Northern English seaside town: Whitley Bay maybe, or Tynemouth, and since we are in the North of England and it is Midsummer, there is a persistent drizzle and a pale grey mist hangs heavily over a slightly darker grey sea. The horizon is indistinct, and there is no clear division between water and air, and because of the thickness of the fog there is scarcely any line between sea and sand.

Beneath your feet you feel the firmness of the Earth. Solid as Earth can be, which is only less presently certain in its permanence that the feet which stand upon it. These feet are, in turn, assured of their place in the temporal order of objects by the feltness of the body for which they act as pedestal. Here is solidity, this body, this rock, this anchor for the world. A heart of living eternal stone and guarantor of all the verities. If we can simply say ‘here is my heart’ then all else follows.

From heart to body to feet firmly planted on the sands of Whitley Bay is a small journey, but we may feel in the making of it a small softening, a catching of the time of the world in which the body at its Southernmost extremity slips slightly away. The feet are less certain than the heart, and may stumble or slip where the heart remains still.

And under the toes, the sand, shifting with the wind and taking imprint from every foot that passes. The sea, oceanic beyond the sand, and above it, and below it, and washing over and through it, has little resistance, even the stupidest fish can pass between. A rock thrown against the water encounters no resolve. It is there and it is not there, moving and waving like disappearing dancers boarding a train.

Sky above, grey as remembered sleep. There is nothing to say about the sky. There is just nothing to say.

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The Matter Delusion

October 8th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In the talk that Richard Dawkins presented as part of the Tedtalks series in 2006 he referred to physical matter as a ‘convenient fiction’. Our experience of the apparently solid table in front of us and the apparently solid wall around us is, he claims, a product of our brains interpreting the relationship between our (middle sized) bodies and the (middle sized) objects of the world. Physics determines that the relationship between two medium sized objects is generally one of non-penetrability, we cannot routinely walk through walls or pass our hand through the surface of a table. If we wish to avoid repeatedly banging into walls and other matter then the survival imperative of an evolutionarily determined brain requires that interpretation of this relationship dramatises this non-penetrability. We see and feel walls and similar objects as ‘hard’. This general principle applies to all substances, resulting in the various grades of hardness and softness we encounter without a second thought to their provenance. All matter, in this understanding, is a story told to us by our brain so that we might better navigate the world of the medium-sized.

This seems straightforward enough; ‘the world is’, to paraphrase JBS Haldane, ‘queerer than we can suppose without making up imaginary entities like solid matter’. This raises the question of what the ontological difference might be between the convenient fiction of matter and the equally fictional (although possibly less convenient) god? Why is believing in god a delusion whereas believing in matter is simple common sense? A posting on the Richard Dawkins website forum noted that the distinction is not between god and matter, but between god and the experience of matter that we call ‘hardness’. Whilst this refinement does shift both entities more clearly into the realm of abstractions, it does not explain the very different attitude we have to these concepts. ‘Hardness’ is one of a range of human interpretations of the properties of the universe; it is qualia familiar as common sense to (apparently) everyone and hardwired from birth. God, on the other hand, whilst it is also a human interpretation of the workings of the universe, and whilst some variation of the god concept seems to be a human universal and therefore also approaches the status of common sense, possibly even hardwired, seems to be less resistant to disbelief. Although god, as a concept, in some cases ‘won’t go away’, the presence of atheists in the world (and even in foxholes) demonstrates that he, she, or it can indeed be banished by an act of educated will. As Dawkins goes on to mention in the same presentation, the most determined efforts my Major Albert N. Stubblebine of US Military Intelligence failed to dissolve the hardness of matter by a similar act of will. A failure of organised disbelief that caused him to repeated crash into the wall he was trying to walk through.

These two delusional entities, the hardness of matter and being of god, may mark two points on a continuum of embodied imagination in which the impact of the delusion is felt to greater or lesser extents. The hardness of matter is felt at the surface of the body, the being of god, if it is felt at all, is felt in the mind. Both feelings are, in a sense, interpretations. ‘Hardness’ is an interpretation by the sensorimotor system of certain enduring and consistent laws of physics related specifically to the properties of substances; god seems to be an interpretation of a supposed unification of the big questions of life, the universe, and everything.

Posted in Dawkins, Richard, Evolution, God, Haldane, J.B.S., Sense, Substance | No Comments »

The Substance of Knowledge

October 12th, 2007 Fred McVittie

One of the ways in which we conceptualise different types (or strengths) of knowing is through mapping apparent differences in forms of knowledge onto our embodied experience with different types (or strengths) of substance. In this, knowledge which is felt and which we conceive as proximal to the body is also conceptualised as solid. When we are describing this knowledge we may use terms like ‘hard’, ‘concrete’, ‘firm’, etc. words which indicate that it is close enough to us that we can touch and hold it, and assess its strength using the sense of touch. As knowledge becomes less closely held, and as it moves through other sensory modes, it loses this felt solidity and becomes, initially, more malleable or fluid, then it acquires something of the properties of a gas, or even of light, such that we might feel that we have only the most remote and barely tangible evidence of its existence, like the shadows cast by knowledge that we find in experimental data for example.

As this knowledge is disappearing from the radar of the senses, losing its ability to be described metaphorically by touch, then by smell, taste, sound, and finally by sight, its substantive quality becomes less and less available to sense until it slips away entirely, and even our most potent metaphors are incapable of containing it or bringing it home. At this point, when the object (sic) of our knowing is infinitely remote from us and is outside the range of all sensation, then we cannot conceive it as solid, liquid, or gas. If we give it substantial existence at all, which metaphorically we almost invariably do, we must conceive it as a substance which lies outside this material trinity in some fourth state of imaginary matter, a kind of ‘quadressence’: a possibly volatile ’spirit’.

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The Weight of Stuff

December 30th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Items of knowing are often awarded the metaphorical status of ‘objects’ and have a schematic ontology mapped from the concrete ontology of objects in the real world of embodied experience. One aspect of real world objects which may feature as an entailment within an understanding of knowledge objects is that different objects are made of different ’stuff’. These differences, and the ways these differences in materiality affect the functioning of the object, are metaphorically mapped as structure.

The first of these properties of stuff is the weight that objects seem to have. Weight is experienced as a resistance to being lifted, or alternatively (niavely) as a ‘desire’ or tendency for the object to move downwards. Whilst we know (after Galileo) that all objects of whatever weight all have this tendency in equal amounts, this is not the intuitive impression one has when holding objects of different weights; it is usually felt that the heavier object ‘wants’ to get to the ground first. Whilst this impression is demonstrably wrong, it is still a compelling illusion and feeds into our intuitive understanding of objects. The apparent correspondence between weight and the tendency to move to a low point in the vertical dimension suggests that there will be a similar correspondence in the use of weight and height metaphors. When we look at the use of these metaphors in action we find that this relationship is indeed suggested. As noted elsewhere, high points in the vertical dimension are associated with knowledge, omniscience, enlightenment, ‘raised’ consciousness etc. and these phenomena are usually also associated with condition of lightness in weight. Chesterton is attributed with saying that ‘angels can fly because they take themselves lightly’. Conversely, low points are associated with heaviness, immovability, and the inertia that comes with weight.

The second property of objects that may serve as a structuring entailment of the use of objects as metaphors for knowing is the substance quality of different object; to what extent an object is solid, hard, soft, liquid, or gaseous. These different substantive qualities allow different affordance relationships to be established; hard objects can be grasped, held, built upon, stacked, used as foundations, treated as permanent etc. whereas softer objects are malleable, change their shape with contact, and can be smushed together. Liquid objects can be felt but not held, adopt the shape of the container in which they are placed, and disappear when they are not contained. Gaseous objects, clouds for example, barely exist as ‘objects’ at all, they disappear on close scrutiny, make no impact on the body, are often co-terminous with the space in which they appear, and may move inside the body unseen at every breath. These differences in substance that objects have are available as entailments of the knowledge object metaphor. Like real substances, knowledge might be hard or soft, it may be regarded as foundational and permanent or more socially malleable, it may only appear solid and bounded when placed at a distance (like a cloud) but disappear into evanescence when approached, it may seep into the body and become part of the chemistry of being.

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Sublimation

April 9th, 2008 Fred McVittie

In chemistry, a substance is said to undergo the process of sublimation if, on heating, it changes state from a solid to a gas without passing through an intermediate state of liquidity. Observing sublimation in action is a relatively rare experience, confined primarily to chemistry students or, historically, to alchemists, and a prototypical experimental demonstration might proceed as follows:

A small amount of a solid substance is placed in the bottom of a test tube and the test tube is then held over the flame of a bunsen burner. For a few moments nothing happens, then a thin vapour may be seen issuing from the substance (or maybe not). This vapour may be seen to rise up the tube and, when it reaches the cooler regions at the top, deposits itself as a solid on the glass sides of the tube (1). With some substances there is not even the telltale trace of vapour to mark the passage of the substance through the intermediate space; it may appear to simply diminish in presence at one location and accumulate in another, higher place. This is the literal, ‘embodied’ sense in which the term ’sublimation’ can be experienced, and as noted is not an experience that many will have had. Nevertheless, this process of sublimation has extensive use as a metaphor and the structure of this metaphor links it to the wider imaginary landscape within which knowledge makes sense (and the senses make knowledge). The relationship between this particular metaphor to the wider imagination, and indeed why such an apparently arcane experience is appropriate in this case, can be revealed by an analysis of the various uses of the term outside of its specific scientific or alchemical context (2).

The term ’sublimation’ appears in Freudian psychoanalysis, and is most usually applied to the practices of artists. He writes that “Among the instinctual forces which are put to this [civilizing] use the sexual impulses play an important part; in this process they are sublimated.” (Freud, S. 1966. 27). This “process” “consists in the sexual trend abandoning its aim of obtaining a sexual component or a reproductive pleasure and taking on another which is related genetically to the abandoned one but is itself no longer sexual and must be described as social. We call this process ‘sublimation’, in accordance with the general estimate that places social aims higher than the sexual ones, which are at bottom self-interested.” (Freud, S. 1966. 429)

Note the use in this passage of terms indicating differences in elevation, and the unstated values associated with different ‘levels’. The originating substance of sublimation is placed ‘at bottom’ and is narrowly concerned with the self and the sexual body. The products of sublimation however are given the wider and more lofty perspective of the social. The metaphorical schema underpinning this image, in addition to its narrative of alchemical transformation, also makes use of the UP IS GOOD association discussed elsewhere. The view from the top of the test tube or alembic vessel takes in the houses and gardens of one’s neighbours.

The particular goodness of this sublime position, particularly when it becomes the precipitator of art, is, for Freud, not unclouded with potential problems. For Freud the libidinous and thanatoid drives of the ego, constantly under the whip of id and superego, ideally found release in the delights of sex and the void of death. But for those of us who are wedded to either celibacy or self-preservation these drives must send their energy elsewhere and the destination of choice for artists, writers, and other creative inadequates, is to exhaust them upward in the vaporous evanscences of art, the social function of which, for Freud, is questionable. He describes the artist as “…originally a man who turns away from reality because he cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction which it at first demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious wishes full play in the life of phantasy.” (Freud, S. 1911. 24). This is an image of creativity in the arts as the steam above the factory; energy lost to the environment as uncontainable and useless gas. This unruly, and possibly even toxic, waste is deposited as solid accumulations on our gallery walls and the shelves of our libraries without even passing through the hydraulically practical liquid stage of useful procreation or of turning the wheel of life into the mulch of death. As is evident from the tone of these sentences, to Freud (as to Plato before him (3)) the product of arts practice was a deviation from the intended use of these drives. It is interesting to note that Freud, in keeping with the necessity of maintaining consistency in the utilisation of his image schema, (although he may not have thought of it in those terms) described the alternative to sublimation as ‘repression’. The workings of the steam-driven psyche act upon the unwanted desires such that instead of being evacuated to the air they are pushed underground. The verticality of the psychic dimension is retained, along with a notional position of the self, in the form of the ego, at ground zero. Repressed material enters the confines of the dark, whereas the sublime expands upward into the light.

This characterisation of sublimation as the cause of, at best, harmless vapourware, is obviously not one that tends to be shared by artists and those in the art industry more generally. For the cognescenti, the alchemical transformation that marks the change from the solid and indeed stolid experiences of this fallen world into the elevated condition of high art is little short of miraculous. This process, including the airy gap across which the substance disappears and reappears, bears the marks of the magickal, reminiscent of an earlier, more theological age. As Peter Harrison reminds us “Some of the practitioners of alchemy also wished to claim much more for their chemical experiments that that they merely signified Divine activities or theological doctrines. Thomas Tymme, the English translator of Calvin’s commentary on Genesis, believed that God had actually used alchemical processes to create the world, bringing it forth from an elemental chaos ‘by his Halchemicall Extraction, Separation, Sublimation, and Coniunction’”. (Tymme, 1605 in Harrison, 2001). As the base material of God writ small, the paint diminishes from the palette and recongeals in angelic form on the canvas; inconsequential ink evaporates from the pen and rises unseen to trace the shape of sounds across the page. The dull and profane solidity of matter passes invisibly upward to become a second solid, a bright and sacred work of art permanently glimmering in the empyrean of the cultural imagination. This is the alternative take on sublimity favoured, and most clearly exemplified, in the work of the Romantic poets; Wordsworth for example, uses the term ’sublime’ or its derivations twenty times in his ‘Prelude’, each usage referring to some kind of elevated state which, it seems fair to say, he never articulates well, which is probably the point, since almost by definition the Romantic sublime is forever an inarticulable idea beyond expression in the charnel-house language of fallen flesh.

For Edmund Burke, whose Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and for Kant in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (1790), the sublime finds its place within the glossary of formal aesthetics, and this place illuminates the intuitions of the Romantic poets and those painters of the period who similarly aspired to this transcendent position. Interestingly, the sublime of Burke is aspirationally more lofty even than the social overview suggested by Freud. He distinguishes the sublime in art from that which is merely ‘beautiful’. The judgment of beauty, he claims, “has its origin in our social feelings, particularly in our feelings toward the other sex, and in our hope for a consolation through love and desire.” http://www.britannica.com/eb/topic-570785/sublime

The production of the sublime, on the other hand, may require the mobilisation of cthonic forces which one would be hard-pressed to consider social;

“Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.” (Burke, E. 1757/1998. 50)

What is more, the view from the ground, when looking up into the eyes of this sublime horror is similarly enlarged. To feel oneself the object of that terrible subject is not the detached aestheticism one feels in the presence of beauty. The height of beauty is merely that of the pedestal, whereas sublimity touches the void, and the only appropriate response, as Burke notes is one of astonishment.

“Astonishment, as I have said, is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence and respect.” (ibid. 53)

It is irresistable at this point to note in passing that one, ideosyncratic etymology of the term sublime traces it to the latin super limas, which means ‘above the slime or mud of this world’. (Beattie, J. in Monk, H. 1935. 129), although Monk does comment that Beattie’s contribution is “chiefly memorable” for its “etymological aberrations.”

To return to the ground on which we began, this term ’sublimation’ has its technical origins in the laboratory and marks this odd and counter-intuitive transformation in which the intermediate stage is invisible. Instead of seeing physical change one sees upward motion, disappearance and reappearance. This chemical act is not the first use of the term however, and if we are to get to grips with the meaningfulness of the concept in its full embodiment we may need to go further back. Without wishing to evoke etymology as explanation, it is worth noting that the origins of the word ’sublime’ lie in the Latin ’sub lintel’, indicating a metaphor to do with thresholds, entrances and exits, passage across, through, or under a significant boundary. To ’sublime’, in what may seem an overly literal sense of the phrase, would mean to pass from one location to another, very different type of location; leaving the cell in which one has been confined, stepping out of the darkness into the light. The identification of the metaphor in which STATES are understood as LOCATIONS has been well explored (Lakoff & Turner. 1989. 3) and this use of the concept of the physical threshold, a transition zone in which there is no perceptible and identifiable space in which change can be observed, merely the demarcation of a line of difference, is evidently an entailment of that overall metaphor.

It seems to be a consistent theme in much writing, unfortunately beyond the scope of this piece, that part of the human condition is to be a dweller on the threshold, without definition other than as a liminal interface between the inside and the outside, the fallen and the risen, the sublimated and the repressed, the day and the night. As Samuel Beckett put it:

“Perhaps that’s what I feel, an outside and an inside and me in the middle, perhaps that’s what I am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the one side the outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin as foil, I’m neither one side nor the other, I’m in the middle, I’m the partition, I’ve two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that’s what I feel, myself vibrating, I’m the tympanum, on the one hand the mind, on the other the world, I don’t belong to either.” (Beckett, S. 170. 34)

(1) Almost all gasses, if frozen, will pass from solid to gas without passing through a liquid phase if the atmospheric pressure is kept very low. There are some substances however which are solid at room termperature and that undergo sublimation at atmospheric pressure. These include include phthalic anhydride (1,2-benzenedicarboxylic acid anhydride), which is widely used for making paint resins. Another is terephthalic acid (1,4-benzenedicarboxylic acid), which is used form making polyester. The most common substance is probably napthalene, which is the active ingredient in mothballs. Some substances, iodine for example, appear to undergo sublimation but this is actually a different process involving an oxidation and reduction reaction.

(2) Thomas Timme, in his epistolary to Duchesne’s 1605 ‘Practise of chymicall and hermeticall physicke’, wrote, “Then shall yee see the sublimated substances clinging to the sides of the glasses”

(3) In Plato’s ideal and noble Republic, poetry and the arts were to be banned, partly because of their status as imitations (and therefore further distancing man from the light of ideal forms), but also because they cause excessive and unnatural emotions and appetites to be aroused, that is, to ‘rise up’. (Republic X.595b-608b).

References

Beckett, S. (1970). The Unnamable. New York, Grove Press.

Beattie, James. (1783) Dissertations Moral and Critical. London, 1783). Quoted in Samuel H. Monk, 1935.

Edmund., B. (1998). A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Freud, S. (1966). The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. . New York, Norton.

Freud, S. (1989). Formulations Regarding The Two Principles in Mental Functioning. The Freud Reader. P. Gay. New York, Norton: 301-306.

Harrison, P. (2001). The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Lakoff, G. and M. Turner (1989). More than cool reason : a field guide to poetic metaphor. Chicago, Ill. ; London, University of Chicago Press.

Monk, S. H. (1935). The Sublime. A study of critical theories in XVIII century England. New York, MLA.

Posted in Light, Matter, Space, Substance, Up | No Comments »

The Object of Knowledge

April 13th, 2008 Fred McVittie

Given that we routinely assign certain structures of perception and cognition to a category we refer to as ‘objective knowledge’ is may be worthwhile considering what processes are at work in this assignation. As we have already claimed, since the concept of ‘knowledge’, the subject of epistemology, is inherently abstract then according to the theories of embodied cognition, and specifically conceptual metaphor, we can only make sense of it through the application of metaphorical mapping processes. Samuel Beckett once stated that ‘We can only talk about nothing as if it were something, in the same way we can only talk about God as if he was a man’. He might have added that we can only talk, or indeed think, about the abstract as if it was concrete. What kind of concrete experience we tend to use to provide analogical structure to the concept of knowledge is revealing. The various metaphors for knowledge used within Knowledge Management have shown that the dominant images are based upon the mapping that suggests that KNOWLEDGE IS STUFF. This stuff includes assets, resources, capital, substances and constructed entities (machines, ships, etc.), but by far the most common subdivision of the overall metaphor is that KNOWLEDGE IS OBJECTS. (Andriessen, 2008).

If we concede that the concept of ‘knowledge’ refers to a category of experience and cognition (and possibly imagination) that is distinguishable from categories such as ‘belief’, ‘phantasy’, ‘hallucination’, etc., which intuition seems to demand that it does, then it is worth considering what kind of a category this might be, and what metaphorical ‘objects’ are confined within the limits of that category or are excluded from it.

Knowledge Management Research & Practice (2008) 6, 5–12. doi:10.1057/palgrave.kmrp.8500169
Stuff or love? How metaphors direct our efforts to manage knowledge in organisations

Daniel G Andriessen

Posted in Knowledge, Object, Objectivity, Substance | 3 Comments »