Consciousness: the explanatory gap

April 11th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Some of the papers on psychology and consciousness might be interesting. This from the abstracts:

This paper will build on work done by McGinn (1989) and others since, in identifying the explanatory gap that exists not between any proposed mechanism for consciousness and an adequate method for demonstrating the factual status of this proposal, but the gap between any such claim, however well authenticated, and the extent to which this explanation is experienced as ’satisfactory’. The philosopher of science JBS Haldane, speaking of certain aspects of 20^th century physics, famously remarked that ‘The universe may not only be queerer than we think, but queerer than we can think’.In making this remark, Haldane was not indicating that data could not be collected, hypotheses developed, tests carried out, and progress made in these difficult areas.Rather he was referring to the inherent difficulties in understanding the results of such processes in a way which was ’satisfactory’ or which had ‘intuitive appeal’. A significant amount of scientific knowledge that has accumulated in the last 100 years has been exactly of this nature, and it is an accepted fact of life that advanced theories in quantum science, astronomy, etc are likely to be non-visualisable, disembodied, and often counter-intuitive.Such theories and models Given this as a condition of advanced knowledge it seems extremely likely that any description of the mechanisms of consciousness are similarly disembodied.

McGinn, C. (1999). The mysterious flame: conscious minds in a material world. New York, Basic Books.

Haldane, J. B. S. (1927). Possible Worlds: And Other Essays. London, Chatto and Windus.

I was glad I made the effort to hear this one.

Posted in Conference Abstract, Consciousness, Haldane, J.B.S., Knowledge, McGinn, Colin, Philosophy, Physics | No Comments »

Believing things that are not true

June 29th, 2006 Fred McVittie

In order to perform efficiently it may sometimes be necessary to behave as if one believes in things that are not objectively true, (but may nevertheless be subjectively ‘real’). For example, there is no good evidence for the existence of ‘the self’, in fact there is a good deal of evidence from psychology and neuroscience, as well as less scientifically from certain branches of cultural theory, that the self-concept is a fiction or fabrication. Nevertheless, it would be suicidal to live one’s life in accordance with this belief and immoral to regard others as similarly lacking. A more extrapolated example of this might that of belief in the existence of the human soul. There is clearly no evidence for the existence of a soul, yet a belief in the concept of a soul is a useful tool for optimising performance in key areas associated with the arts, morality, ethics, relationships, etc. It is hard to imagine how soul and gospel music could have developed without this totally groundless, but nevertheless useful belief.

This approach reflects that suggested by Hans Vaihinger in his Die Philosophie des Als Ob (1911; The Philosophy of “As If”), and later taken up by the American Pragmatist philosophers.

Posted in Belief, Fiction, Performance, Philosophy, Self, Soul, Vaihinger, Hans | No Comments »

The Changing Status of ‘Psychology’

July 14th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The history of psychology as a science is very brief. It is usually thought to have begun being considered as a body of material knowledge, apprehensible by scientific means, with the work of William James. The status of psychology as a science, whilst subject to great debate and much fluctuations in esteem, continued throughout the 20th century. Prior to its embrace by science, any consideration of those entities and processes we now think of as the subject of psychology; identity, consciousness, dreams, rapture, mental illness etc.; were part of the discourse of philosophy and/or religion. Even throughout psychology’s time in the light of science there have been elements of psychological theory and practice, the work of Wilhelm Reich for example, and some would say all of psychoanalysis, which have been distinctly non-scientific. Because of the ill-defined, and largely non-experimental nature of psychology however, these practices have never been completely excluded from discourse in the way that heretical physics or heretical chemistry would be. Instead, psychology has been a bastard science, drawing information and knowledge from where it can, even if some of these places would be off-limits to scientists following more stringent maps to knowledge. As these practices continue into the 21st century there seems to be some evidence that psychology as a term is losing some of the scientific patina of respectability that it acquired post-William James, and is rediscovering its roots in philosophy and mysticism. University college courses and institutions are finding that ‘psychology’ is not a good recruiter of those students who want to study serious science, so we see college departments sprouting schools of ‘brain science’ and quietly losing the ‘p’ word. Also, there is an increasing use of the word ‘psychology’ to be used in contexts or to refer to concepts where it would not have been used previously. The writer Ken Wilbur for example, refers to his theories as ‘integral psychology’. This work, exemplifying as it does an ambition to pull together knowledge from across the disciplines of science, religion, and philosophy (east and west), and give this bastard knowledge a good name, would in all likelihood not have been able to qualify as ‘psychology’ without the reversion in meaning that the term has had. In fact, in earlier works outlining broadly the same ideas, Wilbur tended to call these ideas ‘philosophy’ and avoided the use of the other ‘p’ word.

Posted in History, James, William, Philosophy, Psychology, Reich, Wilhelm, Wilbur, Ken | No Comments »

How Philosophy Captures the Mind

December 7th, 2007 Fred McVittie

It is said that a good question in science is one that is posed in such a way that the answer is easily found, whereas a good question in philosophy is one for which the answer is never found. Scientific questions, formalised in the conventions of the hypothesis, ideally constrain the field of inquiry to within clearly determined limits well-defined terms. The location of the answer to such a question, even if such answer be unexpected or disappointing, is tightly identified and focused upon. Philosophical questions on the other hand tend to focus less on the location or even the identification of possible answers than on the conceptual space opened up by the question. Good philosophical questions are ones which do not point to a specific answer/location but that extend the field of possible questions. This ability of questions in philosophy to capture the imagination and hold it in contemplation of the (possibly) unanswerable is one of the pleasures, if not consolations, of philosophy.

It seems likely that this feature of the ‘big questions’ to provoke extended contemplation, often by hundred of scholars over many centuries, is related to the ‘cognitive imperative’ identified by Newberg and D’Aquili and others, in which the human mind/brain irresistibly seeks out problems and ambiguous stimuli. Further, there may be a relationship with the tendency in babies and small children to give preferential attention to events which are unusual or which contravene their innate understandings of how the world works.

Posted in Attention, Cognition, Knowledge, Philosophy, Problem | No Comments »