First Day

April 10th, 2006 Fred McVittie

I arrived too late last night to hear the opening address from …….. Just caught the end of it. There was no room inside the main auditorium so myself and what seemed like hundreds of other delegates had to stand around and watch it on a screen in the foyer. It’s my first time at The Conference, so I didn’t know what to expect, but I got talking to a chap from Calcutta, India, who I was standing next to and he said these opening speeches are always the same. Polite welcoming noises followed by lots of words like ‘deeper’, and ’simpler’, and phrases like ‘going into the light’, and ‘exactly here, precisely now’. These were the exact words that ……… closed with so I guess the chap from Calcutta knows what he’s talking about.

The hotel I’m in is not what I expected at all. I registered with The Conference too late to use one of the suggested hotels to had to pick one pretty much at random from lastminute.com Tiny room, lots of concrete, complete silence.

There are a LOT of parallel sessions here so choices about what to go to are pretty hard to make. This morning I went to hear a paper on Mirror Neurons and Zham Zhong (which is a kind of tai chi meditation practice apparently). I’ll report back on that later when I’ve heard a few more. The next presentation that sounds interesting is something to do with Morality and Quantum Theory. Again, more of this later.

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Quantum Morality

April 10th, 2006 Fred McVittie

This from The Conference Abstracts:

There is a less than happy degree of fit between the concepts of Morality (involving individual responsibility, accountability and the operation of free will), and Causality (with its attendant assumptions of deterministic chains of cause and effect). Given that (according to the laws of causality) all effects must have causes, and that these causes are ultimately physical, then this seems to leave no place for the operation of free will and individual moral responsibility. The criminal must have some cause for his crime; a problematic childhood, a defective gene, an overactive hormone, a socially conditioned response mechanism, a politically constructed inequality etc. This implies that the individual who actually commits the crime has ultimately no responsibility for their actions, but rather are simply a link in the deterministic chain of cause and effect. The implication of this causal chain is that the incarceration or punishment of that person seems a little unfair. Nevertheless, as a society we hedge our bets and assume that there is a measure of culpability and punish accordingly. We also expect the criminal, if they have been properly reformed by the legal process, to accept their guilt, with the feelings of guilt and remorse that accompany this acceptance. But what of a situation in which no crime has been committed and yet damage has most definitely been done by one individual to others, as when the driver has a minor heart attack at the wheel and, losing control of the vehicle, mounts the pavements and kills several pedestrians, a mother and child, a pensioner, a traffic warder. This paper will argue for a sense of shared culpability; an acknowledgement that in such a situation we should feel very bad indeed about it and any remarks that we may make it is not our fault are irrelevant. Determinism and free will, guilt and fatalism are inextricably bound together, along with a less rational, but nonetheless emotionally coherent sense of karma. This human moral and emotional response, and the apparent contradictions it contains, will be reviewed within the context of quantum indeterminacy and a proposal made linking ‘karma’ with a hypothetical ‘quantum morality’.

The presenter didn’t really make the connection between karma and quantum indeterminacy, and I got the impression many people thought this was a classic piece of ‘quantum flapdoodle’ as Murray Gell-Mann put it.

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Good Dualism (other people’s bodies)

January 8th, 2007 Fred McVittie

One of the reasons for the widespread rejection of Cartesian Dualism in the form of the body/mind split is the perceived differences in value which historically have been assigned to body and to mind (or soul). Because there has been a tradition of the body as something ‘fallen’ and corrupt and a corresponding tradition of the soul as transcendent and divine any acceptance of dualism which seems to embrace these traditions is tainted with this difference, which most people today find unacceptable. However, we routinely have a wide range of different relationships with other people’s bodies which do not include such negative evaluation, including relationships of identification and possession, so the dualism inherent in the redefining of oneself as a non-corporeal entity ‘inside’ one’s body does not necessarily lead to alienation, or to a negative value being assigned to the flesh in contrast to a higher more ethereal ’spirit’.

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Evolution, Consciousness, Morality

October 19th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In an debate at Georgetown Univeristy, Christopher Hitchens refutes the claim that morality requires religious underpinnings to provide a basis for its authority by pointing to the possible evolutionary advantages of moral and altruistic behaviour and interpersonal cooperation. This refutation and alternative explanation has also been made by Dawkins and others. Whilst this explanation may be valid, it is unnecessary for a justification or explanation of moral action and leans toward a naturalistic interpretation (c.f. Naturalist Fallacy), which itself contains dangers. Elsewhere in the same debate Hitchens makes the important point that consciousness is humankind’s greatest gift, and it is this consciousness which allows the rational thought and coherent understanding which he rightly applauds. The fact that we are capable of conscious thought, a faculty extended and rendered material through spoken language and written text, allows us uniquely as a species to formulate concepts, including moral concepts, which do not rely solely on primate instincts. Steven Pinker makes a related point in ‘How the Mind Works’ where he notes that, whilst his genes may be coded for reproduction, if he should choose not to have children then his genes can ‘jump in the lake’. This refusal to follow the genetic script is a feature of consciousness and not only allows decisions to be made about reproduction but also to make moral and ethical choices. A morality grounded only in the body of our primate ancestors and not our own 21st Century conscious bodies forces us to support moral ‘realities’ such as the ‘hate your enemies’ script which Hitchens cites and appears to concur with.

This discontinuity between the lauding of rational conscious thought on the one hand and an appeal to a naturalistic, non-conscious, genetic account of morality on the other is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates an inconsistant approach to the treatment of complex human concepts, regarding conscious moral decisions as originating in the bronze-age body and equally complex conscious decisions, in logic for example, as a product of modern consciousness. Secondly, it denies the possibility of cultural moral development: that through education, learning, research, exchange, improved social conditions etc, we might work collectively to formulate codes of moral conduct that do not consign us to a life of primate politics and the naturalistic imperative of ‘hate your enemy’ and similar repulsive laws of nature. (Here I am reminded of the excellent talk by Andy Thompson at the AAI 2007 conference in Washington, D.C. in which he notes the phenomenon of the ‘lethal raid’ as a example of adaptive collective male violence, present in primates and in humans. The difference that makes a difference is that we have a choice whether to continue with this behaviour, and this choice is a consciously-made. Such a choice is an example of the conscious development of morality in spite of the genetic script, rather than as a consequence of it.)

As Pinker has pointed out elsewhere, whatever problems we face today, it is undeniable that from a moral perspective enormous strides have been taken in the last few centuries. Genocide, torture, and brutality have been part of the normal fabric of the human condition throughout most of history, and it is only recently that such things have caused any significant level of moral outrage. It is only just beyond the horizon of living memory that such sports as bear-baiting and cat-burning were completely normal, and today anyone engaged in these activities would suffer severe moral censure. We can only put these changes down to the operation of rational social processes engaged in by conscious agents, not by the functioning of any genetic script.

This is not to deny the calling of the voices from our primate past. We are all the children of violent, scared, painfully young ancestors, and this historical nature is undoubtedly imprinted in our genes. However, we do have the option to tell these genes also to jump in the lake, or at the very least to put them on hold until we really need them. I am reminded of the famous line from the film ‘The African Queen’ spoken by Katherine Hepburn to Humphrey Bogart. ‘Nature, Mr Allnut, is what we are put in the world to rise above.’

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