How Science Lost its Body

April 13th, 2006 Fred McVittie

This paper will describe how scientific knowledge prior to the late 16th and early 17th centuries was constructed and authenticated primarily by practical experimental means, and that this practice-led knowledge gathering process led to a form of knowledge which was inherently human-centred, sensual, and embodied. In fact it could be said that up to this point in history, the project of science was the organised description of human experience. After this point it will be argued that the object of enquiry shifted away from the human being and toward a depersonalised objectivity, a shift facilitated by an increasing tendency for scientific knowledge production to become mathematised (as noted by Kline 1980). This mathematisation of science proceeding to the point where, in cases where mathematical formulation does not agree with experiment, it is considered most likely that the experimental method is at fault.

A corollary of this mathematisation process is that scientific knowledge becomes increasingly disembodied. The truths proposed by much scientific research are beyond the reach of the senses and beyond any imaginative engagement other than in the abstract language of mathematics. Again, in regarding such knowledge, when mathematics does not agree with human sensibility it is the human sensorium which is considered faulty or inadequate. This means that the subjective, embodied knowledge we gain through lived experience is increasingly at a remove from the objective disembodied knowledge described by science. This paper will discuss some of the implications of this division.

Kline, M. (1980). Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty. New York, New York University Press.

Posted in Conference Abstract, Embodiment, History, Kline, Morris, Mathematics, Science | No Comments »

Counting Clover

May 18th, 2006 Fred McVittie

I’ve been thinking about that Clover.

Maybe the reasons why the four-leafed clover is jumping out at me is that I am somehow non-consciously primed to look down at the clover and give it minimal attention, (even though I have no conscious awareness that I am doing this). This primed looking must somehow involve subitizing the number of leaves because if I was counting or estimating the number I would have to be conscious of the act. As far as I know the evidence is pretty conclusive that there are (at least) two ways of perceiving numbers (Kaufman, Pylyshyn, Trick, Dehaene, etc.) and subitizing, which is innate and immediate, is the only one that seems to be able to operate non-consciously.

Posted in Attention, Clover, Consciousness, Mathematics, Story | No Comments »

The Evolutionary Economics of Subitization

June 1st, 2006 Fred McVittie

The ability of humans and most animals to innately recognise the numerosity of small numbers of objects , an ability usually referred to as subitizing, must have its origins in the evolution of perception and the psychology which supports it. This paper will argue that one possible source of such an adaptive pressure is the allocation of resources within social groups, and the need to balance the needs of the individual with the competing needs of others. Prior to the availability of a sophisticated system of numbering (which might be estimating or counting), it will be proposed that resources can be shared between two parties in ways involving three basic schema;

  • Uneven A (in which one party to the sharing receives zero)
  • Even (in which both parties to the sharing receive equal amounts)
  • Uneven B (in which one party to the sharing receives more than the other)

These schema can be represented as:

0|
0|0
0|00

It can be noted that all the variations of equal and unequal distribution can be represented by these three schema, and when these are reduced to groupings:

0
00
000

It is immediately evident whether such groupings lend themselves to a equal or unequal sharing schema. It follows from this that within social situations there would be an adaptive pressure to distinguish such groupings in order to manage the allocation of resources to meet the competing demands on those resources by individual need and the need of the other. Such an adaptive pressure would express itself in abstract terms as an innate ability to recognise these schema without counting or estimating, an ability corresponding to subitizing.

It may be noted in passing that this derivation also creates the concept of the zero, expressed as the absent term in distribution schema uneven A.

Posted in Economics, Evolution, Mathematics, Perception | No Comments »

Universal Physics

July 17th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The development of the science of physics, particularly over the last 400 years, can be seen as the triumph of a particular approach to knowledge gathering. This approach disregards the position of the human being within the scientific process, and attempts to construct an objective position outside of incarnate humanity from which to regard the world. In order to achieve objectivity it is necessary to consciously abandon our embodiment as ‘medium sized objects moving at medium speed’ (Dawkins 2003), and embrace an organised scepticism toward the data of the senses and the common sense which these senses produce. This in turn has required an increasing reliance on the (apparently) disembodied language of mathematics . Alongside this evacuation of the human being from its privileged position at the heart of physics is the corresponding development of a set of protocols for the objective verification and falsification of knowledge, enshrined in the idealisations of the scientific method. This project, the construction of Rational Physics through mathematisation and scientification, has been astonishingly successful, and its creations and discoveries are truly awe inspiring. However, the creation of new conscious knowledge does not necessarily mean the erasure of the old, and even though the findings of physics are as close to factual as we are likely to get, they still may not get us ‘where we live’. Science may have abandoned the body at some point in the late 16th Century, but as functioning humans we still take it around with us everywhere we go. Also, whilst our consciousness may be able to engage with the mathematical abstractions of quantum theory and dark energy, our non-conscious cognition (and actually much of our conscious, in the form of covert metaphors) is still working with the tools provided by an embodied evolution.

Within the system of beliefs, biases, misconceptions, common sense, and generalisations that Brown (1991) identified as ‘Human Universals’ there are a subset which refer specifically to matter, energy, and their interactions. In any formal, rational system of knowledge constructed through the protocols of science, this subset of knowledge would be called ‘physics’. In the context of human universals, which operates without scientific protocols but only with the innate and accumulated knowledge that comes with embodiment, this subset could be referred to as ‘Universal Physics”, a set of general principles and theories about the way the world works that is held by all cultures, and that is a result of a common biology and a common evolutionary history. While Rational Physics is the physics of the disembodied universe of atoms, quarks, membranes, black holes, and quanta. Universal Physics (UP) is the physics of dreams, intuition, emotion, art, God, and human frailty.

(Note: The “Universal Physics” referred to here is in no way connected to that proposed by Ethan Skyler http://www.physicsnews1.com/ or of the ‘commonsense science’ of Barnes, Bergman, Collins and Lucas http://www.commonsensescience.org/ )

Brown, D. E. (1991). Human Universals. New York, McGraw-Hill.
Dawkins, R. and L. Menon (2003). A devil’s chaplain: selected essays. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Posted in Brown, D. E., Dawkins, Richard, Embodiment, Evolution, History, Mathematics, Metaphor, Physics, Universals | No Comments »

How Science got it Body Back

July 29th, 2006 Fred McVittie

As has been described by Kline (1980), Davies (2005), and others, the history of scientifically verified truth took a particular turn around the 16th century. The mathematization of science in which validation processes from experimental hypotheses and procedures moved from being ’self-evident’ (i.e. evidenced by the sense of the embodied self), to being validated axiomatically using the language of mathematics. The authority of this mathematical truth is owing to its being underwritten by a transcendent logic, untainted by human frailty. Maths is/was considered a purely abstract structure of thought, separate from the messy subjectivity of the body, and therefore not only exact, but also disembodied. The 20th century, however, through the work of Godel and others, saw this transcendent logic and coherence of mathematics exposed as fundamentally untrue, which discovery resulted in a ‘loss of certainty’ (Kline: 1980) in maths and a corresponding loss of certainty in the sciences which rest rest on this mythic transcendent coherent logic. This could be interpreted as a crisis for maths and science, as these activities are revealed as ultimately groundless; not based on eternal transcendental, possibly God-given laws, but at best on heuristics which are merely ‘useful’ and ‘effective’. However, recent developments in cognitive linguistics and the development of theories of ‘embodied cognition’ offer a different interpretation. These emerging disciplines suggest that our ability to conceptualise and work with even the most abstract ideas of mathematics or science is throught the use of embodied metaphors, and that even the equations of pure maths, when analysed using the tools of cognitive linguistics, reveal the use of concepts and ideas which are mapped metaphorically from simple actions and responses of the somatosensory body, (Lakoff and Nunez 2000). This implies that ultimately, what logic and coherence maths may possess which allows it to be used to validate science, is due to the logic and coherence of the metaphors used to conceptualise that maths. These metaphors, while they may inevitably be partial, contradictory, and incompatible one with another, are themselves built from the experiential realism of embodiment. The ground of thought is not in the sky, but in ourselves, and the loss of certainty in maths is the regaining of the body in science

Davies, B. (2005). “Whither Mathematics?” Notices of the AMS 52(11): 1350 - 1356.

Kline, M. (1980). Mathematics: The Decline of Certainty. New York, Oxford University Press.

Posted in Cognitive Linguistics, Embodiment, History, Kline, Morris, Mathematics, Science | No Comments »

Levels of Metaphor

August 8th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Although all abstract concepts are rendered comprehensible through the use of embodied metaphor, there is no clear division between the concrete and the abstract. It is more useful to consider metaphor operating at various levels of remove.

  • Functional and operational actions performed by the body are clearly not metaphorical and are the most ‘concrete’
  • Gestures and words which ’stand in’ for these concrete actions are similarly concrete, although there may be an element of metonymy in their isolation of a particular element of a concrete action.
  • Words for concepts or entities which have no physically experienced properties can only be rendered linguistically by using reference to concrete actions/objects, i.e. metaphor.
  • Non-natural languages can be developed to discuss certain abstract concepts based on the systematisation of concrete embodied metaphors, e.g. Mathematics, poetry.

Posted in Abstract, Embodiment, Gesture, Mathematics, Metaphor, Poetics | No Comments »

Embodied Natural Language

August 9th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Natural language contains many terms for concepts which are inherently abstract; justice, love etc. It also contains terms for entities which are beyond the range of human sense; quarks, black holes etc. It also contains terms for entities which are purely theoretical and/or fictitious; ghosts, epicycles, souls, etc. Despite the discorporate nature of these entities, it is apparent that their appearance in language is not discorporate at all. All these concepts, when looked at in the context of their use in sentences and in their definitions expressed in natural language, is made readily embodiable through the application of concrete metaphor. In fact, it might be said that natural language, in its entirety, is a fully embodied system. This contrasts with, for example, the language of mathematics, which is not obviously embodied, (although is it clearly based ultimately on embodied ideas, after Lakoff and Nunez).

Posted in Abstract, Embodiment, Language, Mathematics, Nunez, Rafael | No Comments »

Subitizing and Knowing

August 30th, 2006 Fred McVittie

When a subject is shown a group of objects where the number of objects is small, between one an four, they are able to report on that number within a very short time, and they may accompany this report with a subjective account that their perception of the number of objects is ‘immediate’. When a subject is asked the number of objects there are in groups beyond four items, on the other hand, their response time typically increases by about 250-350 ms for each item, and this increase corresponds to a report by the subject that they are counting the objects, rather than being immediately aware of the number in the group.

The cognitive processes associated with subitizing, the apparently instant recognition of the number of objects in groups up to four, is clearly different to the forms of knowledge gathering processes employed with larger groups of objects, and whatever processes are being used within subitizing they do not appear to be readily accessible to consciousness.

Posted in Knowledge, Mathematics, Perception | No Comments »

The Natural History of Conceptual Art

September 3rd, 2006 Fred McVittie

We are neurologically and psychologically adapted to respond to certain features of the sensory environment in ways which have given us a survival or reproductive advantage in evolutionary history. The development of art, it has been argued (Ramachandran, Zeki), has been the organised identification of these responses and their servicing in what we refer to as ‘aesthetics’. (Pinker makes a parallel case for the development of refined foods). Much of the literature making the case for such a development has focussed on the visual arts, and to a lesser extent music (Mithen), and there has also been a tendency within these arguments to focus on traditional or classical art rather than modern or contemporary practice. One of the reasons given why contemporary work is ignored in this type of evolutionary psychological analysis is that whilst modern work (since, say, the end of the 19th century) undoubtedly still continues the aesthetic practices of its predecessors, its production and function is driven more by other determinants. These are; a restless innovation in which the desire for novelty is prioritised over aesthetics, (the ‘make it new’ of Modernism and the pressure of the marketplace); and an increasing move away from the immediately sensorial qualities of a work, its visual appearance, aural effects etc, toward an overt concern with its conceptual content. This is acknowledged in, for example, Ramachandran, who suggests that as little as 10% of the effects of an artwork can be attributed to (evolutionarily adaptive) aesthetics.

This is perhaps most clearly evident is some works of Conceptual Art which may have little or no obvious aesthetic value, and in some cases almost no existence at all. However, I will argue here that this rendering of certain arts practices as operating outside of the reach aesthetic response is inaccurate, and that those elements of artworks noted above, novelty and concept, are also available for these adaptively facilitated responses. the notion that a concept, theory, or idea might elicit an aesthetic response is not particular to the arts of course. Scientists and mathematicians for example commonly refer to their equations, formulae, and theories as ‘elegant’ or even ‘beautiful’, evidently indicating that these conceptual entities have the same evocative power as physical objects of beauty. This despite the fact that the visual or other sensory evidence of such ideas, the symbols on a page or the experimental equipment in a laboratory, rarely has any obvious aesthetic appeal at all.

Posted in Aesthetics, Art, Beauty, Conceptual, Mathematics, Mithen, S.J., Pinker, Stephen, Ramachandran, Vilayanur, Science, Zeki, Semir | No Comments »

Physics, Maths, and Metaphor

September 8th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The language of both rational and naive physics make extensive use of metaphor in its conceptualisation of abstract entities such as energy, particle etc. A significant difference in the discourse of these two physics (over and above any difference in their application) is that rational physics is underpinned and consequently legitimised by the digital logos of an apparently non-metaphorical transcendent mathematics. However, as Nunez et al (1999, 2004) and Lakoff and Nunez (2000) point out, the apparent transcendent status of mathematics is something of an illusion, and maths is itself ‘grounded’ in embodied metaphor. This does not disturb the significance of rational physics, or undermine the robustness of its findings, but it does indicate that the validity of rational physics is due not to inherent relationship to a transcendent disembodied knowledge. Rather, the coherence and efficacy of rational physics is a result of its referring to and resting on a single limited set of metaphors; those which we use to conceptualise mathematics.

Posted in Mathematics, Metaphor, Nunez, Rafael, Physics | No Comments »

Whither Mathematics?

October 16th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Davies, B. (2005). “Whither Mathematics?” Notices of the AMS 52(11): 1350 - 1356.
Using three of the most celebrated problems in mathematics, (Godel, the Four-Colour Theorem, and the Classification of Finite Simple Groups), Davies makes the case that mathematics does not possess the transcendant truth status it has developed since the 16th century. Rather than providing a unique and totally objective window onto reality “[Mathematics] will be seen as the creation of finite human beings, liable to error in the same way as all other activities in which we indulge. Just as in engineering, mathematicians will have to declare their degree of confidence that certain results are reliable, rather than being able to declare flatly that the proofs are correct.” The article ends with the prediction that the reduction of a difference between mathematics and other disciplines the question of a special truth status awarded to mathematics will cease to be a relevant issue.

Posted in History, Mathematics | No Comments »

Mathematics: The Decline of Certainty.

January 11th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Kline, M. (1980). Mathematics: The Decline of Certainty. New York, Oxford University Press.

This book addresses the history and changing ontological status of mathematics, particularly from the time of Galileo and Newton up to the late 19th century and Poincare. Kline traces a developmental path in which mathematics increasingly becomes the only valid language through which scientific enquiry and the truth of the results of that enquiry might be expressed. This resonates with Galileo’s often quoted comment to the effect that ‘the book of the universe is written in the language of maths’. He traces the twist put on this narrative by recent 20th century developments in maths; godel etc, which undermine the transcendent truth status is has claimed. The implication of this is that a science based on an incomplete and inconsistent maths is itself necessarily incomplete and inconsistent.

Posted in History, Knowledge, Mathematics | No Comments »

Mappa Mundi

June 24th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Medieval and pre-Medieval approaches to knowledge tended to focus on the revelations provided by canonical and theologically approved texts, rather than observation or what we would now think of as scientific experiment. The writings of Aristotle, for example, were a key source of revealed truth for hundreds of years after his death, even when the ‘facts’ he related were self-evidently incorrect. Knowledge in this period was therefore detached from personal experience and existed in a kind of transcendent realm of pure ideation.

Although much has changed, it could be said that much knowledge that we routinely draw upon today is similarly detached, not because of any reliance on received wisdom, but because the knowledge itself has proceeded beyond the point where it can be accessed directly. Much contemporary knowledge, particularly in the sciences, is only able to be comprehended through conceptual tools such as mathematics and metaphor.

For a brief period between then and now however, say the period marked by the birth of Galileo and the death of Newton, knowledge came into brief contact with lived experience. In the 16th century, the burgeoning fields of science began to open up and their key model was that of the mechanism, of medium sized objects moving at medium speed. This is the model Newton refers to in his Principia, a model in which the movement of planets and apples can be described by the same laws, and before the disembodied oddities of galaxies and atoms began to be realised. This is a time before the mathematisation of science, when proof of a concept or theory was demonstrated not by reference to mathematical axioms but by experimental demonstration.

If history is a voyage of discovery, this brief period marks the crossing of an invisible, but nevertheless real, point on the globe. For that moment scientific knowledge and personal experience stood together on the deck and looked out over the waves. No longer transcendent and not yet abstract, the truth of knowledge is the truth of the body, and whilst the distant horizon may be indistinct, here at the centre of human experience all is clarity and light.

EMBO Rep. 2005 April; 6(4): 306–309. doi: 10.1038/sj.embor.7400389.

Posted in History, Horizon, Knowledge, Mathematics | No Comments »

Calculating the Volume of a Hypercube

July 2nd, 2007 Fred McVittie

Imagine a point on the wall in front of you.

Imagine that point extending laterally to a length of about 2 metres. You are imagining a line of 2 metres.

Imagine this line extended upward into a second spatial dimension. Imagine it extending to a height of about 2 metres. You are visualising a square of 4 square metres.

Imagine this figure extended outward into a third spatial dimension. Imagine it protruding from the board about 2 metres. You are visualising a cube of 8 cubic metres.

Imagine this figure extended into a fourth spatial dimension. Imagine it protruding into that dimension about 2 metres. Are you imagining that? Can you imagine that? I can’t.

Although some may claim to be able to visualise such a four dimensional hypercube, I am sceptical about this claim. There is no adaptive reason why we would possess this ability, and the parsimony of evolutionary necessity suggests that this ability would not persist if it did somehow emerge. We are adapted to function in a physical world appropriate to our size, and do not have the physical or mental affordances to manipulate extra-dimensional entities. Just as our fingers are not equipped to handle atoms and molecules directly, so our minds are not equipped to handle concepts beyond the ken of medium sized objects moving at medium speed.

Interestingly, although this shape may be beyond our sensorial imagination, we can ‘imagine’ this hypercube mathematically. Knowing its measurements we can calculate with some degree of certainty what the ‘quadratic volume’ of this unimaginable object might be. Following the logic of the progression from a one-dimensional line to a two-dimensional square and to a three-dimensional cube, in which at each stage we have calculated the length, area, or cubic volume by multiplying the extensions in each dimension together (2 x 2 x 2 etc), so we can calculate the hypervolume in quadratic metres by adding this extension to our multiplication. We can say that the volume of this inconceivable shape is

Posted in Evolution, Imagination, Mathematics, Space | No Comments »

Emotional Maths

July 13th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Imagine you are standing on a tightrope, or if that is too difficult and precarious, imagine standing on a balance beam, four inches wide, three feet above the ground. You have your hands outstretched at each side and you are standing perfectly still. In this position you feel fine: poised, in control, focussed.

Now imagine someone comes along and places two books in the palm of your right hand. These books are not heavy but they do affect your posture and your ability to stand perfectly still. Now your feelings have changed and you no longer feel fine. You feel the precariousness of your position, you feel out of control and anxious. Your poise is under threat. Thankfully, at this moment someone else comes along and places another two books, first one, then another, on the palm of your left hand. Your equilibrium is restored and you feel a wave of positive emotion flowing through you as your control returns and your poise regained.

This type of experience, the fully embodied sensations associated with balance and loss of balance, may form the prototype from which more conceptual notions of balance and equilibrium are drawn. For example, the practice of mathematics, particularly in dealing with formulae and equations, involves a set of parallel operations and may be fueled by similar emotional and somatic responses.

When we are confronted by an equation of the type 1 = 1 we recognise it as ‘balanced’, and whilst we may not consciously feel the same degree of poise and control that we felt on the balance beam we can nevertheless sense the ‘rightness’ of it. We might say that this equation has inherited some of the emotional content of the physical experience it mirrors and we feel fine about it in some small way similar to how we felt as motionless acrobats. When the equation is changed to 1 = 3 however, the sense of rightness disappears and is replaced by the subtle, but nevertheless present, feelings of negativity and ‘wrongness’. Just as maintaining one’s position on the balance beam when one has an uneven distribution of weight is anxiety provoking, so this unbalanced equation conveys the same uneasiness. This felt sense of rightness and wrongness, emerging as it does from a metaphorical mapping of embodied experience onto the abstractions of mathematics, shows that maths, and indeed all abstractions, are rarely free of emotional content. Indeed it is this emotional engagement which is the difference between understanding mathematics and simply wielding symbols according to certain disembodied rules.

Posted in Abstract, Embodiment, Emotion, Mathematics, Metaphor | No Comments »

The Impossible Blog of Borges

September 15th, 2007 Fred McVittie

There is a blog somewhere on the web in which the entries vary enormously in length, but regardless of the number of words each posting is carefully labelled with keywords; search terms that unite the smallest with the largest. One entry, concerning the nature of presence, has over 1000 words and is captured by the three search terms evolution, neuroscience, metaphor. Here is another entry, consisting only of the quotation from Hermes Trismegistus ‘All is One’, yet the number of search terms which lead to these words, the number of ideas which require this phrase to be included in their orbit, is much greater, numbering over 100.

People say (usually those who have read too much Borges) that there are two entries on the blog which no-one should read; which should never have been written, which should not have been possible to write. The first consists of all possible words in all the languages of the planet, arranged in all the orders which could ever be grammatically correct. It is perfectly coherent, perfectly self-contained. The number of labels attached to this entry is zero; there are no ways into the infinite entry because there is nothing outside it. The other impossible entry consists of no words at all. No concepts, ideas, perceptions, sounds, thoughts, feelings, or attitudes mar the perfect surface of this empty space on the screen, and to read it is to be dissolved. The search terms which lead to this space exceed the limits of the spell-checker, and to collate this list would take longer that there are moments left in history.

These two imaginary and unimaginable entries are the pillars between which all the writing is strung. One pillar is labelled ‘Carbon’, and the other is marked ‘Mathematics’.

Posted in Blog, Borges, Jorge Louis, Mathematics, Metaphor, Neuroscience, Writing | No Comments »

Biting the Big One (part 2)

September 21st, 2007 Fred McVittie

When we extend our categorisation outward to its utmost extent, we arrive at a point where everything is contained within this ultimate category. We might call this category ‘the Universe’, or ‘Everything’, or ‘All’, or ‘the One’ (capitalising the word for added emphasis). For Plato this category was ‘Being’, and for the neo-Platonic Christians it was synonymous with the concept of ‘God’ (again capitalised for emphasis). The ultimate category has nothing beyond it and there is no place ‘outside’ it from where it can be regarded. It contains every material entity, every iota of space and every moment of time; past, present, and future. It contains every planet, inhabited and uninhabited, all of the inhabitants of those planets, every cell in the body and electrochemical signal in the brain of those inhabitants, and every thought in the minds supervenient on those brains: real, imaginary, true, false, glorious, pitiable, good, evil, enlightened or dismally dark. Every God that has ever been conceived, and all those that have not, and indeed all those that could not, are contained within the boundless bounds of Everything, along with every scientific hypothesis and theory, including of course, innumerable theories of everything.

Symbolising the ultimate category in the form of a mark, on paper for example, presents certain difficulties. One could, of course, use any arbitrary mark, a word for example, and simply accept that this chicken scratch somehow ’stands in’ for the concept, just as the small geometrical shapes of these letters stand in for the ideas in this writing, or a street sign that shows a number 30 on a white background, indicating the maximum legal speed limit. This ’symbolic’ relation between the mark (the signifier) and the idea (the signified) is fine, provided of course we know the language. This is necessary since the mark and the concept are associated by convention only, and such conventions have to be learned. Without a knowledge of numbers the speed limit sign is meaningless, as indeed is this writing without a knowledge of letters. There is no way you can look at a text written in a language that is unfamiliar to you and guess what it might mean. Words, numbers, and other marks of that kind do make even the vaguest appeal to intuition, to get the meaning you really have to know the language. With symbolic signifiers the lack of a connection between the mark and the idea, the signified, means also that the form of the mark makes no contribution to the understanding of the concept referred to. In order to understand what the mark means you have to already have full knowledge of the referent. Even if you are fully conversant with the English language for example, there is nothing about the word ‘tree’ that adds to your understanding of what a tree is; the mark simply points you to what you already know.

In our search for a mark for the ultimate category it would be nice if we were not so locked in to language and convention, and our choice did not have to appear so random and disconnected from the thing itself. Also, ideally, we would find a mark which more closely mirrored the condition of the category itself, an ‘iconic’ signifier in which the relation between the mark and the idea was one of recognisable similarity, like the drawing of house that shares some features of the actual house (the outline on the page is similar to the perceived outline of the actual house formed on the retina, albeit upside down), or the icon of a folder on the desktop of this computer in some way resembles a real folder, or like the street sign for ‘national speed limit applies’ which (in the UK) shows a black diagonal band on a white background, almost as if someone had taken a large pencil and crossed the number out. This type of signifier, whilst it does have a tendency to calcify into convention, does have a much closer, non-arbitrary relationship to the ideas represented. We do not have to have any specific knowledge to see a drawing of a house as representing an actual house; our familiarity with the use of folders in the real world allows us to understand the folder icon and its use in organising digital information intuitively, we need to learn the convention of the Arabic numeral system to feel the logic of the strike-through mark on a street sign; who amongst us has never crossed out something that no longer applied, or slashed with a machete at a section of redundant foliage?

Our mark for the category of ‘Everything That Is, Ever Was, And Ever Will Be, Real Or Imagined,’ (’Everything’, for short) should be of this type, but since Everything does not, by definition, have an outline, and certainly does not form an image on the retina,we cannot use the same strategy for the making of such a mark as we might when making the mark for a house, or designing an icon for my laptop. The other strategy, that which is used by the sign for ‘national speed limit applies’, is available to use however. Such signs are not pictures of the ideas they signify, nor are they totally arbitrary symbols which only acquire meaning within the language of a particular society, they are instead visual metaphors which capture the way we understand those ideas. We understand the street sign because of the embodied experience we have of removing something which was previously relevant by making a slashing motion through it with our arm. The act of wielding the machete through thick undergrowth, the act of striking out the words on the page with a bold stroke of the pen; both these actions physically perform the function of laying waste the stuff we no longer need, and it is this action, transformed into the visual metaphor of a diagonal line, which we use to stand for the cutting away of the previous thirty mph limit. Even if we had never come across this sign before, with a little bit of thought we could probably make a reasonably good guess at its meaning simply by ‘feeling’ the action it seems to be asking us to make. This guesswork would be even easier in some European countries where many signs are ‘cancelled’ by later signs on the road which duplicate them, but with the addition of a strike-through. The signs announcing the names of towns and villages in Spain which appear on the road into those towns, for example, are duplicated on the roads out but with a cancelling double slash. The signs seem to say that, should we be thinking we are still in that town, we should at this point cross out that redundant idea from our minds. This type of mark differs from arbitrary symbols not only in that it informs us of the idea that is stands in for, but because it also contributes toward the understanding of the idea in a way that symbolic signs cannot. In the UK the national speed limit is seventy mph so the exact same meaning should be conveyed by replacing the strike-through mark with another symbolic sign that simply had the number 70 on it. However, I would suggest that the feel of these two signs would be very different. When we see the strike-through mark on a street sign we intuitively understand it as the removal, possibly even the forceful removal, of something. Some restraint that was previously placed on our behaviour is being cut away like a blade through the ropes of a captive, and when we see the sign we understand it partly (albeit unconsciously) in those terms. After chugging along at a frustratingly slow 30 mph we suddenly feel licensed to cut loose and put the pedal to the metal. For this reason, the ‘national speed limit applies’ sign is very often incorrectly referred to a the ‘no limit’ sign. Rather than reading it as the imposition of a particular (higher) speed limit it is intuitively interpreted as the removal of the speed limit which previously applied, with no substitute put in its place. This incorrect interpretation is completely reasonable given the contribution made to our understanding of the sign by the metaphorical action implied.

This type of iconic signifier, a mark which stands metaphorically for some important aspect of the idea, which allows for a relatively intuitive grasping of that idea, and which also, ideally, contributes appropriately to the understanding of that idea, is the type we are seeking for the distinctly abstract idea of the ultimate category or Everything.

The most common mark of any category is the bounded space, usually drawn as a circle.


This mark as representative of the general concept of ‘category’ is found in a wide number of contexts, but most evidently in mathematics, where it features in Venn diagrams, set theory, Spencer-Brown’s ‘primary algebra’ and other systems of Boundary Math, etc. It also appears less formally in organisational charts, mind-maps, and in the pictures on the back of cereal boxes showing which foods constitute the major food groups. In each case the line of the circle represents a boundary within which are to be found the members of the category, and outside of which is anything which does not belong to the category. The intuitive success of this image as a mark for the concept of a category is due to its ability to function as a visual metaphor or iconic signifier. Although it may, at first pass, appear as arbitrary and abstract as a number or letter, this mark is grounded in embodied experience in much the same way as the strike-through mark on street signs. It can be seen as minimally representative of a container into which we may be placed all the members of a particular category. With almost no imaginative effort it is easily recognisable as the bird’s eye view of a basket into which we put all of the apples, and out of which we throw all of the oranges. Or alternatively we can effortlessly see it as the fence which we use to corral all of the sheep and exclude all of the goats. The experience of dealing with such bounded spaces as containers (and perhaps less so corrals) in the routine of daily life has created in us an intuitive grasp of this form or ’schema’ which we can, and do, apply in our understanding of categories. The bounded space of the circle is a highly successful and practical mark of the general concept of the category, intuitively accessible through being grounded in embodied experience.

Returning to our search for a mark which represents the ultimate category, the mark of Everything, we need to ask ourselves whether the bounded space of the circle is up to the task. Immediately we see that it is not. As discussed above, the strength of the circle is that it represents not only a category which contains, but also one which excludes. We separate apples from oranges only partly by keeping the apples together in a basket, we also throw the oranges out of that basket into the space beyond. Similarly, the fencing off of sheep in a corral is effective only if we have a space outside that corral to chase the goats into. In other words, the circle as a mark of categorisation is also a mark of separation. There is an inside and an outside to the category represented by the circle just as there is an inside and an outside to any container. When we are trying to refer to the ultimate category, by definition, there can be no ‘outside’, and everything must be on the ‘inside’. (including, paradoxically, the very idea of an ultimate category itself, or ‘the set of all sets that contains itself’. The category of Everything must also contain the category of Everything). There is no space ‘beyond’ the boundary of Everything.

One possible way to resolve this problem, which might lead us to producing a satisfactory mark for the ultimate category is by looking again at the circle. As we have already found, the ability of the circle to serve as a visual metaphor for a category depends upon the existence of a space outside the boundary line which defines these entities which do not belong in the chosen category. So, for example, the space outside the apple barrel does not just contain oranges but also contains everything that is not an apple. The vast prairie beyond the corral where we keep our sheep is defined not only by the presence of a few goats, but also by the presence of everything else that is not a sheep; it is marked, in a way, by its total sheeplessness. In a very real sense, the space outside the barrel, the corral, or the mark of the circle, is itself a category, albeit one which is defined in the negative. Also, the space outside the boundary of the circle is immense, as it would need to be to contain everything in the entire Universe apart from apples, whilst the space inside the boundary is comparatively small. We could, therefore adopt some version of the circle as a mark for the ultimate category if we place our attention not on the interior space but on the exterior space. When we do this we find that Everything (apart from apples, say) is indeed contained by this space. The boundary line of the circle on the page still represents the outermost limits of this large space as it excludes all that is not contained in this almost-ultimate category of ‘Everything minus apples’.

We still do not have a mark for absolutely everything,but having got this far, the next step is very easy. We can simply define the contents of the ‘exterior’ space where the apples are more closely, drawing the line around Everything corresponding larger. When we enlarge the category of ‘Everything minus apples’ to include the skin of apples we find that less is left outside and the mark on the page shrinks.

The inclusion of pips and the juicy flesh of the apples again increases the size of the ‘Everything but’ category.

At this point, or almost point, we are one bite away from the ultimate act of inclusion and the realisation of the mark of Everything. We reach out and, taking hold of the core, we pull it into ourselves, consuming it in a final act of border-crossing. At this point, and now we really are at this point, nothing is left out, not even nothingness. There is no space except the space that Everything embraces and the line around everything becomes infinitely short, infinitely curved. And we can represent this with the mark at the end of this sentence.

Here it is again, in case you missed it that time

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Posted in All, Boundary, Mathematics, One, Symbol, Zero | No Comments »

Carrying Over of Beliefs

February 15th, 2008 Fred McVittie

The holding of a belief is a cognitive mechanism which allows us to carry out certain mental activities which, without that belief, would be either impossible or extremely resource intensive. If, each time we looked over the edge of a cliff, we had to assess the likelihood that stepping over the edge would result in our death, then we would be incapable of acting. The firm belief that we have in the inevitability that this action would lead to our death relieves us of this arduous assessment process and allows us to use our limited cognitive resources elsewhere.

This process is analogous to the mathematical technique of ‘carrying over’ when adding up large numbers. In this technique the numbers to be added are placed above one another and the columns of numbers formed are added one column of digits at a time starting with the units, then moving up to the tens, the hundreds, the thousands, and so on. When a column of digits adds up to a number larger than ten then the first part of this product is ‘carried over’ by being included in the next column of digits. When this next column of digits is then added the number which has been carried over is also added. The significance of this is that the number carried over is not usually checked at this point, it is simply taken as a fact of the mathematical technique. The number represents an element of the earlier calculation and is given the same status as the rest of the numbers in the column. In a sense, therefore, the number carried over is ‘believed’ to be a relevant and accurate part of the addition process, a belief which could in fact turn out to be fallacious if the previous addition was shown to be inaccurate. Such a fallacious belief would affect the total calculation resulting in an incorrect final answer.

This analogy serves to indicate the status of beliefs within the cumulative and interconnected processes of cognition. Given that we cannot fact check every single perception and conception, we must rely on the carrying over of beliefs from earlier parts of the thought process, or the history of our thought processes, if we are to function at all. When I see a tree in front of me I do not have sufficient cognitive resources to always confirm this perception using another sensory mode, nor can I always call on another person to confirm this perception. I am obliged to believe the evidence of my unalloyed and individual eyes. More abstractly, if I am to make sense of many of the complex and ephemeral experiences which typify human existence then the sheer number of beliefs which I would have to mobilise in order to live these experiences would far exceed my ability to confirm them ‘on the fly’. Again, I would be obliged to trust in the numbers carried forward from earlier parts of the calculation. I would have to use beliefs laid down earlier in my life, possibly in childhood, and possibly even laid down in the biochemistry of my being itself, just to get through the day.

I would anticipate that, if the aim of the establishment of beliefs is to minimise the drain on cognitive resources such that these resources can be spent on more life-supporting activities, then there would be a natural resistance to the revision of such beliefs. Going back over a calculation is an arduous and resource intensive process, and the earlier in the calculation an error is made the more effort would have to be spent having to correct it. By analogy, the earlier in one’s life, or in the life of one’s species, that a belief is laid down the more difficult it would be to muster the effort to go back and check the figures.

Posted in Belief, Cognition, Energy, Mathematics | No Comments »