The Evolutionary Economics of Subitization

June 1st, 2006 Fred McVittie

The ability of humans and most animals to innately recognise the numerosity of small numbers of objects , an ability usually referred to as subitizing, must have its origins in the evolution of perception and the psychology which supports it. This paper will argue that one possible source of such an adaptive pressure is the allocation of resources within social groups, and the need to balance the needs of the individual with the competing needs of others. Prior to the availability of a sophisticated system of numbering (which might be estimating or counting), it will be proposed that resources can be shared between two parties in ways involving three basic schema;

  • Uneven A (in which one party to the sharing receives zero)
  • Even (in which both parties to the sharing receive equal amounts)
  • Uneven B (in which one party to the sharing receives more than the other)

These schema can be represented as:

0|
0|0
0|00

It can be noted that all the variations of equal and unequal distribution can be represented by these three schema, and when these are reduced to groupings:

0
00
000

It is immediately evident whether such groupings lend themselves to a equal or unequal sharing schema. It follows from this that within social situations there would be an adaptive pressure to distinguish such groupings in order to manage the allocation of resources to meet the competing demands on those resources by individual need and the need of the other. Such an adaptive pressure would express itself in abstract terms as an innate ability to recognise these schema without counting or estimating, an ability corresponding to subitizing.

It may be noted in passing that this derivation also creates the concept of the zero, expressed as the absent term in distribution schema uneven A.

Posted in Economics, Evolution, Mathematics, Perception | No Comments »

Lost Embodiment

June 6th, 2006 Fred McVittie

It has been observed that people who lack the physical means to experience certain sensations or behaviours nevertheless use metaphors associated with these sensations or behaviours in their speech and, presumably, in their thinking. For example, those blind from birth still often make extensive use of sight-based metaphors such as ‘I see what you mean’ etc. This is presumably (after Lakoff) because the neurological substrate and organisation supporting the use of such metaphors, the various neural pathways associated with vision, are in place, even though they are not able to be used by the actual sensory mechanisms. The suggestion is therefore that it is possible for neural pathways to exist, forged by evolution, which an individual may have no sensory access to but which may still be used by their differently equipped ‘metaphorical body’.

This begs the question of whether there are other neurological pathways forged by evolutionary experience which we have lost access to, not as individuals by accident of birth or by injury, but collectively by other means. (Possible candidate methods for this pruning of sensory awareness are the selecting out of biological traits through evolutionary adaptation, and the suppression of such ‘talents’ through socialisation/acculturation). It may well be that, even though we no longer have direct sensory access to particular sensations or are able to enact certain behaviours we may still have the neurological capacity to comprehend, in an conceptually embodied way, such sensations and behaviours. If we do, then we should not expect such pathways to figure metaphorically in our language, since in all likelihood any abilities we may have lost undoubtedly predate language.

The questions are; does our brain come pre-loaded with antique software that no longer runs literally on our current body platform (because we are incapable of breathing underwater, etc), and if it does, how can we may use of it?

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‘Perennial Philosophy’ and Embodiment

July 3rd, 2006 Fred McVittie

The universality of embodiment inevitably produces a similar universality of conceptual and cognitive structure, both in terms of the phylogeny of the human species, and the ontogeny of the individual human. Shared evolutionary history has given us all the same mental toolkit. Introspective and intuitive methods of developing knowledge; ways of thinking which draw only on this toolkit; also therefore inevitably produces similar models for the organisation of that knowledge. This is most evidently true when considering models of the psyche, and the relationship of psyche to the rest of existence.

Introspective methods for considering the organisation of the psyche, whether this introspection take place within a scientific, religious, or philosophical context, have tended to postulate very similar organisational structures. Pundit and founder of ‘integral philosophy’ Ken Wilbur has mapped and charted these correlations in great detail, referring to the general similarity in psychic structure which emerges as evidence for what he calls the ‘Perennial Philosophy’ (1). Wilbur goes on to suggest that the degree of similarity between the numerous different models of psyche and world is indicative of some kind of absolute or archetypal truth, that the psyche really is constructed in the way these models suggest. However, another way of looking at this correlation is to consider such overlap an inevitable consequence of embodiment. Such models inevitably draw on familiar structures of organisation mapped metaphorically from physical embodied experience, utilising such features as levels/hierarchies, part/whole distinctions, nested categories, chains, gradients, and spectra. These concrete features, experienced sensorially and kinesthetically by our bodies and those of our genetic ancestors, form the metaphorical features which shape our cognition.

Wilber,Ken - A theory of everything : an integral vision for business, politics, science and spirituality. Shambhala Publications. 2000

Posted in Cognition, Embodiment, Evolution, Perennialism, Universals, Wilbur, Ken | No Comments »

Evolution, embodiment, mythology, philosophy

July 5th, 2006 Fred McVittie

These things we share:

  • shared evolutionary experience, which have given us all the same hands, eyes, and brains
  • shared ontogenic developmental experience, which has introduced us all to the same basic features of the world at the same rate
  • shared knowledge or propensities that we all seem to be born with
  • shared knowledge and practices we all seem to generate culturally, usually expressed as ‘human universals’
  • shared knowledge we all create about our experiences in the world, usually expressed as ‘folk science’
  • shared mythic structures, narratives, and archetypes
  • shared religious and philosophical frameworks, usually expressed as ‘ perennial philosophy’

It is quite likely that there is a relationship across these commonalities, that, for example, our ‘perennial philosophy’ is ultimately related to our shared evolutionary experience.

Posted in Embodiment, Evolution, Myth, Naive Physics, Perennialism | No Comments »

Universal Physics

July 17th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The development of the science of physics, particularly over the last 400 years, can be seen as the triumph of a particular approach to knowledge gathering. This approach disregards the position of the human being within the scientific process, and attempts to construct an objective position outside of incarnate humanity from which to regard the world. In order to achieve objectivity it is necessary to consciously abandon our embodiment as ‘medium sized objects moving at medium speed’ (Dawkins 2003), and embrace an organised scepticism toward the data of the senses and the common sense which these senses produce. This in turn has required an increasing reliance on the (apparently) disembodied language of mathematics . Alongside this evacuation of the human being from its privileged position at the heart of physics is the corresponding development of a set of protocols for the objective verification and falsification of knowledge, enshrined in the idealisations of the scientific method. This project, the construction of Rational Physics through mathematisation and scientification, has been astonishingly successful, and its creations and discoveries are truly awe inspiring. However, the creation of new conscious knowledge does not necessarily mean the erasure of the old, and even though the findings of physics are as close to factual as we are likely to get, they still may not get us ‘where we live’. Science may have abandoned the body at some point in the late 16th Century, but as functioning humans we still take it around with us everywhere we go. Also, whilst our consciousness may be able to engage with the mathematical abstractions of quantum theory and dark energy, our non-conscious cognition (and actually much of our conscious, in the form of covert metaphors) is still working with the tools provided by an embodied evolution.

Within the system of beliefs, biases, misconceptions, common sense, and generalisations that Brown (1991) identified as ‘Human Universals’ there are a subset which refer specifically to matter, energy, and their interactions. In any formal, rational system of knowledge constructed through the protocols of science, this subset of knowledge would be called ‘physics’. In the context of human universals, which operates without scientific protocols but only with the innate and accumulated knowledge that comes with embodiment, this subset could be referred to as ‘Universal Physics”, a set of general principles and theories about the way the world works that is held by all cultures, and that is a result of a common biology and a common evolutionary history. While Rational Physics is the physics of the disembodied universe of atoms, quarks, membranes, black holes, and quanta. Universal Physics (UP) is the physics of dreams, intuition, emotion, art, God, and human frailty.

(Note: The “Universal Physics” referred to here is in no way connected to that proposed by Ethan Skyler http://www.physicsnews1.com/ or of the ‘commonsense science’ of Barnes, Bergman, Collins and Lucas http://www.commonsensescience.org/ )

Brown, D. E. (1991). Human Universals. New York, McGraw-Hill.
Dawkins, R. and L. Menon (2003). A devil’s chaplain: selected essays. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Posted in Brown, D. E., Dawkins, Richard, Embodiment, Evolution, History, Mathematics, Metaphor, Physics, Universals | No Comments »

Evidence for Universal Physics

July 18th, 2006 Fred McVittie

If the theory of Universal Physics has any validity, we should see evidence of its existence across a range of disparate cultures. Given that all cultures are built upon the same basic template: an embodied evolutionary development and the day-to-day sharing of a common sensorimotor vehicle. Comparative anthropology and comparative religion has produced a body of data which suggests this is the case. Although these research domains have framed their observations differently, and may have focussed on different aspect of the data, there is a good match between the axioms of Universal Physics and some of the commonalities variously referred to as ‘perennial philosophy’, ‘archetypal myths’, ‘integral psychology’ etc.

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Universal Physics and Body-based Practice

July 19th, 2006 Fred McVittie

A range of body-based (or ‘bodymind’) practices have been developed in a wide range of different cultures which are reputed to improve health, effect healing of psychic or bodily disorders, optimise performance in various tasks, enhance spirituality, etc. These practices include yoga, taichi, reiki, acupuncture, etc. There is a considerable variation in the extent to which these practices use the body: some, yoga for example, require extensive, often arduous body disciplines, whilst others, zen meditation for instance, require very little exertion or ’skill’ at all. All of these practices, however, stress that the body and the mind are not discontinuous, and that these practices are effectively ‘psychophysical’, implementing both mental and corporeal processes inseparably. The apparent differences in levels of exertion or required skill level is therefore not significant, what is important is the beliefs and assumptions about how the psychophysiology which underpins these various practices actually works . It will be argued that common throughout these practices is reference to a set of universal axioms about the physical world, including the central role of the person in that world. These axioms are those of a kind of ‘Universal Physics’; a set of theories about the world held by all human cultures and produced by shared evolutionary history and shared biological incarnation.

Posted in Evolution, Performance, Physics, Training, Universals | No Comments »

Examples of Universal Physics

July 26th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The concept of a ‘Universal People’ put forward by Brown is based on the notion that all human beings share a common core of behaviours, perceptions, and concepts. This notion is derived from a large number of cross-cultural and anthropological studies and is widely assumed to result from a common evolutionary history and a shared embodiment, this embodiment also incorporating the organs of sense and cognition. Part of this shared universal cognition concerns commonly held interpretations of the behaviour of matter and energy; what in rational scientific terms would be called ‘physics’. Given this commonality, we should expect to see a set of correspondences across cultures, and possibly across times, between the models that different peoples use for this ‘universal physics’, and indeed this is what we find when we compare:

  • The pre-Newtonian paradigm in Western hermetic science
  • The paradigm informing Chinese Traditional Medicine
  • The paradigm implied by ‘Naive Physics’

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A Natural History of Innovation

September 4th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The ability to innovate, to produce novel behaviour, is primarily a human faculty. For the most part this ability has a clear use function; when combined with good critical and evaluative faculties the ability to produce new behaviour is how we solve problems, identify more efficient ways of satisfying needs, and gain an edge on competitors. For these reasons it is likely that this ability confers upon those who possess it a distinct adaptive advantage. In terms of evolutionary history, those members of a population who are able to think ‘creatively’ are more likely to survive and reproduce than those whose behaviours are bound to habit and instinct. Adaptive traits which confer a reproductive advantage on those who have such a trait tend to be manifest in the individual as an emotional and physical response experienced as pleasure. So, for example, the adaptive trait which allowed our ancestors to identify nutritious food is experienced as the pleasurable sensation we call ‘taste’. Similarly, sexual congress, which is self-evidently adaptive in that those who engage in it are those most likely to reproduce, and those who do not are unlikely to, is also accompanied by pleasure. These pleasures are both the bait and the signal for adaptive behaviour. In terms of creativity and innovation, if such a trait is adaptive we would expect it to also be accompanied by feelings of pleasure, and this is indeed the case. Surveys of artists, scientists, inventors and all other innovators demonstrate that the act of creation has its own intrinsic satisfactions and pleasures over and above whatever functional products may result from such acts.

Given that human beings are a pack animal, the innovations produced by one individual may benefit not only that individual but also other members of the community or group (other than direct competitors). Individuals in the group who were able to recognise and exploit the creativity of others could also profit from this creativity, gaining the same adaptive advantage and increasing the likelihood of their own survival and reproductive success. This suggests that in addition to the pleasures of creation itself, it is possible that evolutionary history may have conferred upon us an ability to recognise innovation and to experience pleasure from that recognition, again over and above whatever product may result from such creativity. Not only does being creative feel good, but watching the creativity of others feels good too.

The development of the arts since the end of the 19th century has been partly characterised by an almost obsessive demand for the new. And whilst this has undoubtedly been driven partly by a rampant consumerism and an increasingly profitably art industry, it is nevertheless likely that the appeal of innovative art lies not only in the ultimate market value of that art, or the status it confers, or in the traditional sensory channels of the aesthetic response. A significant appeal lies in what might be called the ‘aesthetics of innovation’.

Posted in Aesthetics, Art, Creativity, Evolution, History | No Comments »

Paradigm Shifts and Human Nature

September 10th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The periodic large-scale changes in the structure of knowledge which have come to be referred to as ‘paradigm shifts’ undoubtedly make significant changes to the organisation of culture and power, the technical and physical resources available, the philosophies discussed and taught in Universities etc etc. Do such apparently seismic shifts have any appreciable affect on those behaviours, attitudes, and actions that might be attributed to ‘universal human nature’? It seems likely that, since much of human nature is a result of the slow accretion of adaptive behaviour, that this will have a natural damping effect on any such rapid change. It is more likely that whilst large scale ‘paradigm shifts’ in human knowledge will affect the organisation of cultures, they will not affect the overall function of those cultures, which is to provide for the human needs of their members.

Posted in Evolution, History, Paradigm, Universals | No Comments »

Perennial Philosophy and Evolution

October 4th, 2006 Fred McVittie

It could be claimed that the concept of a ‘Perennial Philosophy’, as espoused by Huxley, Aurobindo, Wilbur etc, is bankrupt, that such a claim for a totalising theory is symptomatic of early 20th Century colonial approaches to knowledge and of positivistic, linear, Western approaches to truth. It could be claimed that this does not reflect the plurality of a global, multicultural, situated understanding of knowledge. However, this criticism is only valid if the claims of Perennial Philosophy are taken to represent an absolute truth about the physical world, it is not valid if Perennial Philosophy is taken to articulate and structure a set of human responses and human relationships to the world. Human responses are grounded in shared embodiment and shared evolutionary history, with common desires and universal propensities. Given this type of animal with this kind of mind and this kind of body in this kind of environment, this is the likely shape of the belief system they will produce.

It is important to note that the development of the complex structures of thought represented by Perennial Philosophy did not emerge fully-formed in the full light of consciousness by the rational deductive processes of sentient beings, detached from history and evolution. Rather these ’stories’ will have grown from simpler stories, actions, events, and beliefs, ultimately grounded in non-conscious, instrumental, emotionally tagged behaviour and perception; standing in a field and looking at the bowl of the sky overhead. Sleeping and waking, and the journeys of sleep, birth, and death.

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The Boundaries of Self: Part Two

November 5th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Setting the boundaries of the self at the limits of the body clearly has an adaptive advantage. To be self-absorbed or self-centered, limiting our identification to the purely somatic, is undoubtedly a good strategy for personal bodily survival in conditions where the body might be under threat. In more comfortable situations however, the drawing of the boundaries of the self rigidly within the limits of the skin may be less useful. There are many times when, for an organism to maximise the survival of its genes, it must identify not solely with its body but with others. In evolutionary history it is likely that organisms which were able to act as if their sense of self extended to their immediate family, i.e. those with whom they shared the most genetic material, were motivated to act in a way which ensured the optimal survival of that genetic material, even if the cost of such action was damage or destruction of that individual organism.

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The Boundaries of Self: Part Three

November 6th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Adaptive logic provides a relatively convincing narrative of how an individual organism, through the evolutionary necessity of optimising the survival of genetic material, might evolve an ability to set the boundaries of the self at the extents of the body, and also to be able to extend this boundary to include an enlarged community of organisms who share this genetic material. This extended self is not a product of rational conscious thought, and may not even be available to consciousness, but rather is experienced as an emotional and ontological fact. We do not only think it is a good idea to protect and look after the interests of our closest relatives, we also feel that as a desire and an imperative.

Given the current crisis that the environment seems to be in, the crisis of global climate change brought about be industrialisation and the pollution that accompanies that process, it would be useful if we were able to extend our sense of self to encompass not only our family but the entire ecosphere. If this were possible we would not only see the threat to the environment as a rational problem, we would also feel it as a personal crisis, a threat to our extended sense of self. We would be physically and psychically pained by the experience of leaving a light switched on unnecessarily, and would find it somatically necessary to defend the planet with as much vigor as we would show defending our own bodies from attack, or the bodies of our loved ones. Given, however, that in all of evolutionary history such a widening of the sense of self has never conferred any adaptive advantage, such feelings do not naturally exist. Without careful conscious effort we do not feel harm to the planet as harm to our selves.

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The Evolution of Attraction

November 15th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The various terms which cluster under the general heading of ‘attractiveness’, (charm, charisma, presence, etc.) and the related terms which are assumed to be causally linked to this attractiveness (power, beauty, leadership, authority, pathos, etc), refer to states of being in which the actions (and presumably inner states) of one entity have an attractive effect upon another. It is likely that these various actions evolved, at least partly, because of this attractive effect they produce and the concommitant adaptive value of such attractiveness. It would make sense for the gestures of pathos to be ‘attractive’ as they would then be likely to stimulate the person attracted to provide help. It would also make sense for the gestures of beauty to be ‘attractive’ as this would lead directly to mating success. It would make sense for the gestures of leadership to be attractive as this would give status gains to the leader (and, presumably, a direction to those attracted by such leaders.)

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Universal Feeling

December 1st, 2006 Fred McVittie

Some of the traits, affordances, abilities, and tendencies that humans display are not particular to a single individual, or to a specific culture, but are found in all cultures, and in most, if not all, individuals within those cultures. These are what Brown referred to as ‘Human Universals’. It is likely that the universality of these traits stems from combination of shared environmental conditions, shared evolutionary history, and a shared embodiment, (these factors are, of course, closely related). Given also that for most of that history we have been without consciousness, it seems likely that much of our non-conscious processing is similarly universal. These universals would not be something we are aware of, and may not have an overt visibility within culture, but would exist at the level of emotions, feelings, intuitions, and biases. Alternatively, it is similarly likely that there are responses, feelings, and behaviours which are part of all human nature, and which may be triggered by similar stimuli.

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Feeling Came First

December 2nd, 2006 Fred McVittie

Survival and the ability to thrive as an organism depends upon that organism’s ability to respond appropriately to opportunities or threats in the environment; to avoid noxious or threatening stimuli and to maximise contact with stimuli which offers protection, sustenance and (particularly) the opportunity to reproduce. These responses are still with us and are, in all likelihood, experienced in largely the same way as they have been experienced in the evolutionary past, as a set of felt responses. That is, the attraction we experience for a member of the opposite sex, or a delicious cake, or a warm fire on a cold evening, is not the result of an academic, rational, deliberative process in which the potential benefits of such attractions are carefully considered. Rather, these attractions are experienced as feelings, or as a sense of their intuitive rightness. Similarly, the urge to remove our hand from a hotplate, or to run at the sight of a lion, or our experience of disgust at the dirty fork we are given in a cafe are not the result of a weighing up of potential hazards against other possible factors, but are the immediate felt responses to the conditions. Our behaviour in relation to these stimuli is usually appropriate in the evolutionary sense that it will, most likely, confer a survival and reproductive advantage. This behaviour is not the result of conscious thought (a recent arrival on the evolutionary scene) but of the urgings of non-conscious processes which we experience as positive or negative feelings.

Posted in Emotion, Evolution, Feeling, Sense | No Comments »

Virtual Environments of the Mind

December 24th, 2006 Fred McVittie

What we choose to think about changes the way we feel. This is an obviousness, but it is worth looking at in more detail. The way we feel, our feelings, are the observable, experienced evidence of complex cognitive processes; processes which are non-rational, non-conscious, and multi-valent. The cognition which results in feelings is far more complex than that which is available to us consciously (1). This suggest that when we think of a certain idea, and this thinking makes us feel a certain way, the content of our conscious thoughts is causing changes to take place across the complex networks of non-conscious processing, resulting in certain emotionally-tagged, felt responses.

Remembering also that, ultimately, feelings and the cognitive processes of which they are a result, exist because they confer (or conferred in the past) some kind of survival and/or reproductive advantage to the organism experiencing those feelings; we feel pain when we put our hand on a hotplate because this feeling motivates the adaptively advantageous action of moving the hand. More complex feelings; love, jealousy, fear etc. confer similar advantages, but with more circuitous pathways between the stimulus, the feeling engendered by the stimulus, and an appropriate response. This implies that our ability to produce certain feelings by the action of dwelling on particular conscious thoughts effectively modifies what might be called the ‘virtual environment’ of our minds. This in turn causes an emotional response to be evoked which would be adaptively advantageous in that environment.

1. For an interesting explanation of this, see the gist or Fuzzy Trace theory of Reyna and Brainerd. Adv Child Dev Behav. 2001;28:41-100.

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Evolutionary Emotion

December 26th, 2006 Fred McVittie

In the evolutionary history of humanity, consciousness is a comparatively late arrival, appearing as a faculty only in the relatively recent phase of the evolution of life. Stuart Hameroff puts this date variously at between 1 and 200 million years ago (1). This suggests that, for the majority of the time that beings have been on Earth, they have relied on non-conscious mental processes for survival.

The development of the non-conscious mind, a mind we are still most certainly in possession of, therefore preceded the emergence of those conscious mental processes which are capable of self-reflection and reporting. It is likely that much of what we do is shaped by these adaptively established mechanisms of non-conscious thought. It is also likely that the motivation for much of what we do, which we experience as ‘feelings’, derives from this pre-conscious phase in the development of (human) life.

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/cambrian.html

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Genetic Remembering

December 29th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Although the ‘human genome’ is referred to in the media and popular press as if it were a single, universal component of all human beings, there is variation in this genome across different members of the human race; variation which accounts for the different ways in which the being of human is expressed by different individuals. Nevertheless, the percentage of common genetic material is well above 99% and it is this common material which gives us our similarities and, ultimately, accounts for the universalities which exist. We also have much in common, genetically, with non-human animals; with primates this percentage is also in the high 90’s. Even creatures with whom we may choose not to identify, lobsters or snakes for example, share over 50% of our DNA, and so can be considered distant relatives, and this also goes for every living thing on Earth.

The evolutionary process can be considered as a kind of remembering, in which the good ideas of past generations, i.e. those which confer a survival advantage, are passed on to future generations. These memories live on in our bodies in the form of opposable thumbs, thickened skin on the soles of our feet, binocular vision, etc. They also live on in our minds as drives, instincts, reflexive responses, and emotions. These psychic memories helped our ancestors to survive and they now form the basic architecture of our thoughts and actions.

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Unconscious Identities

December 31st, 2006 Fred McVittie

If we were to consider what the limits of our self were it is likely we would set these at the limits of our body, or possibly at the limits of our ‘personality’, perhaps listing a set of core properties which we felt best represented ourself. However, the limits of our self which we acknowledge consciously may differ from the limits set or utilised by non-conscious processes. Our sense of self can be thought of as that part of the world with which we identify, or put another way, the part of our experience which we identify with sets the location and boundary to our sense of self. The limits of this identification can vary according to circumstances, extending outward to include members of our family, tribe, culture, land etc. or contracting inward such that it is limited to parts of the individual psyche. It is likely that this feeling of identification is a product of adaptation: an animal that has such a relationship to its own body is clearly more likely to protect that body from harm. (In fact, it is probably more accurate to say that the feelings associated with the avoidance of harm and the seeking of pleasure result in the sense of identification). This adaptive advantage provided by identification also extends to those creatures who share genetic material, which may account for the feelings we have of identifying with a social group to which we feel a (genetic) affinity. It is likely that this wider identification, and indeed other levels of identification both wider and narrower, are in operation at all times, and for part of the non-conscious backdrop to our actions.

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Charisma as an Adaptive Behaviour

January 5th, 2007 Fred McVittie

We give attention to those events and entities which have most relevance to us. This is an evolutionary adaptation springing from the survival advantage conferred on those genes/organisms which are particular sensitive to these events, allowing the organism to respond to the event with behaviour which is appropriate. Advantageous behaviour may be positive, in which the organism recognises an opportunity for enhanced reproductive success or personal survival, or it may be negative, in which a threat or hazard is proactively recognised and avoided. These adaptive mechanisms, made complex and covert through social and biological history, underpin the mechanisms of attention management which we recognise today as ‘presence’, ‘beauty’, ‘charisma’, ‘celebrity’ etc.

Posted in Beauty, Charisma, Evolution | No Comments »

Stupid Malthus

February 6th, 2007 Fred McVittie

The law of the ’survival of the fittest’ applies to genes, not to individuals. Bearing in mind that the ‘body’ of a gene is distributed across a large number of individuals and is extended over eons of time, the survival or otherwise of a gene according to its fitness does not correspond to survival or otherwise of any particular human being. Also, bearing in mind that, in evolutionary terms, ’survival’ means staying alive long enough to reproduce, the difference in the survival potential of the fittest and the least fit individuals in a population is likely to be extremely small, far smaller than the variability in risk (and hence survival) shown by one individual within their lifetime. Malthus was completely wrong; when applied to individual human beings, or indeed any other creature, the survival of the fittest makes no sense whatsoever.

Posted in Evolution, Malthus, Thomas R. | No Comments »

Adaptive Thinking

March 14th, 2007 Fred McVittie

The evolutionary process contrives to ensure that what is good for us (or at least was good for our ancestors) produces feelings of pleasure, and what is not good for us produces feelings of displeasure. The feelings of pleasure experienced by humans when carrying out such activities as eating nourishing food, having sex, drinking potable water, coming inside to a warm house/cave on a cold day, is nature’s way of reinforcing activities which maximise our chances of survival and the survival of our genetic material. The fact that modern humans live under very different cultural conditions to our ancestors, and yet have largely the same cognitive apparatus, means that some of the pleasures and pains administered by these adaptive systems are now misapplied. The same mechanisms which rewarded our eating of healthy food continue to reward us for overeating, and for eating highly processed unhealthy (but still tasty) food. Ramachandran and others have suggested that this catalogue of pleasures and there misapplication might be extended into areas of cognition which ultimately lead to the aesthetic pleasures we experience through contemplating artworks. So, for example, the adaptively advantageous ability to recognise the shape of a tiger half-concealed in the undergrowth, a skill which would definately contribute to our chances of survival and should therefore be felt as pleasurable, becomes the aesthetic pleasure felt when looking at some abstract or semi-abstract artworks; the broken and indistinct patterns of colour and form are comprehended and made whole, and this cognitive action is rewarded with the pleasure of an aesthetic experience.

It is possible that the highly developed cognitive abilities which we seem to have are themselves the result of a self-reinforcing adaptive trait in which thinking itself is rewarded. Certainly, it would have been a distinct adaptive advantage for some of our ancestors to be able to take independent pieces of data, the location of game for example, and put them together into a coherent pattern, a migration path. A proto-human which was able to make this kind of cognitive leap would have an evolutionary advantage over those that did not, and therefore it is quite likely that such behaviour would become self-reinforcing through the association of pleasure with this type of pattern recognition. To put it crudely, thinking should feel nice, and the more complex the thought, the more extensive the pattern, the more pleasant it should feel. Evidence of this mechanism, as well as its misapplication in modern humans is found in the crossword puzzles and game shows which are in every newspaper and every TV channel. It may also be revealed in the AHA moment at the illumination stage of some creative processes, as well as the HA HA moment at the punch line of a joke, when a new formulation of ideas, a new thought pattern, is taken up by the listener. It may also underpin some of the pleasures associated with some artworks, particularly works of Conceptual Art in which there is conventional aesthetic stimulus, no direct appeal to the senses.

Posted in Aesthetics, Art, Cognition, Evolution | No Comments »

Bower Birds and the Cognitive Imperative

April 25th, 2007 Fred McVittie

The bower of the Bower Bird is an elaborate construction of twigs, leaves, and flowers, and is built by the males to act as an attractant for females. The action of constructing the bower is completely ‘instinctual’ in that bower birds raised without contact with other birds nevertheless adopt the behaviour without any sense of it being learned. If one were to ask a bower bird why it built the bower, or how it went about it, it wouldn’t know what you were talking about, and not only because it is a bird and has no language. It would not understand you because it would not be able to comprehend the distinction between itself and the action of building the bower. It would be the same as asking it how it went about growing feathers or pumping the blood around its body.

Clearly humans do not build bowers, or if we do it is a learned behaviour arising out of the social and cultural conditions of our individual development. Those rare individuals who have somehow missed the socialisation process, ‘feral’ children for example, show no signs of any complex architectural or sculptural instinct. However, humans do show an innate tendency toward the far more complex routines associated with cognitive behaviour. This has been identified by Newberg and D’Aquili and others, and sometimes referred to as the Cognitive Imperative.

The Cognitive Imperative, a ‘drive’ which impels us irresistably toward certain forms of thinking (both conscious and non-conscious) consists of a number of sub-routines which we apply to the stimuli provided by the senses. Again, pace Newberg and D’Aquili, we might refer to these sub-routines as ‘Cognitive Operators’ and they constitute the routine operations which transform multiform and discontinuous sense data into the coherent and unified experience of being and world. As with the bower bird, if we were to ask ourselves why or how we perform this amazing technical feat we would have great difficulty understanding the question, let alone framing an answer.

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Medium Sized Objects moving at Medium Speed

May 10th, 2007 Fred McVittie

We are, as Richard Dawkins memorably put it, ‘Medium sized objects moving at medium speed’. The scales at which all of creation operates stretches in size from the Planck length to the horizon of visible space, a scale of some 40 or so powers of magnitude, and as Joel Primack and Nancy Abrams relate in ‘The View from the Centre of the Universe’ , we occupy a tiny proportion of this scale somewhere in the middle. From an evolutionary perspective we have been medium sized objects for a very long time, since before we had an opposable thumb, since before we had language, since before we had consciousness, since before we had the complex unconscious we have today. We were medium sized objects moving at medium speed when our entire psychophysical repertoire was limited to flight or fight, breeding and eating. It is as medium sized objects that our being asserted itself such that our physiology, and indeed our psychology has designed itself to operate within that particular range and scale of operation, to solve problems and exploit opportunities offered within that range and scale. To our distant ancestors these problems would be ones of basic survival, of hunting, gathering, avoiding predators and identifying prey. Driven by the attractions of pleasure (nature’s reward for survival-enhancing behaviour) and the distress of pain (the stick that nature holds in her other hand), those of our ancestors who were best able to respond to these coaxings would be those who survived the longest, and therefore were most likely to leave their imprint in the genetic record.

The processes of evolution are contingent and conservative, and there is no place within its mechanism for wild experimentation and flights of fancy. Should nature occasionally have the urge to assert herself as revolutionary artist, the beautiful mutants that result from such bohemianism, less well equipped to solve the problems of medium sized objects moving at medium speed, never make it into the museum of natural history we carry in our genome. For this reason we have never evolved eyes capable of seeing into the heart of the atom, or into the reaches of outer space; in survival terms we have nothing to fear and nothing to gain from such extended sight. We can hear the roar of a lion and the wimpering of a potential next meal, but not the background hum of the universe. We can hold apples in our hands, and we can hold the hand of a lover, but have never had need to grasp a quark.

Posted in Dawkins, Richard, Evolution, Pain, Pleasure, Primack, J. & Adams, N. | No Comments »

Stampeding Wildebeest

May 26th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Our ability to exercise our imagination to ‘body forth the form of things unknown’ is probably rooted in the adaptive capacity to predict the consequence of actions. For our ancestors, the creature who was able to imagine that the herd of stampeding wildebeest in the distance would soon be stampeding over the ground on which it stood, had a greater likelihood of survival that the one who lacked this imagination. The routine processes of evolution would thereafter ensure that creatures developed who had this imaginative capacity. Our own abilities to countenance subjunctive worlds and fictional events seems likely to be an extension of these powers, although the imagination of humans has taken particular and peculiar flight with the development of other human traits including language, mathematics, science, and art.

The human imagination now seems to be a place where we live most of our lives; when our eyes are not fixed on the blinding mirage of the future, they are looking around at the parallel universes of the past. We extend ourselves forward along the timeline to plan our retirement and death, and backward to relive, or reinvent, the past. In our imagination we are surrounded by stampeding wildebeest all of the time.

The poet’s eye, in fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
Such tricks hath strong imagination,
That if it would but apprehend some joy,
It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
Or in the night, imagining some fear,
How easy is a bush supposed a bear!

A Midsummer Night’s Dream
Act V Scene I

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Newtonian Being

May 26th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Given that our imagination was formed as part of an evolutionary process ‘designed’ to assist the survival of medium sized objects moving at medium speed, it is likely that our imagination is limited to the sensory range appropriate to that scale of object. For our remote ancestors, whilst there would be an adaptive advantage to imagining the approach of a tiger or imagining that the outside world continues to exist when you close your eyes, there would be no advantage to imagining sub-atomic particles, a spherical Earth, or Black Holes. Given also that human history is too short to have allowed major evolutionary changes to have taken place in either the body or the mind, our imaginations are still operating within that range. We have the imagination of medium sized objects, and the paradigms and cosmologies of that imagination correspond to that scale of being, a scale of being which is largely Newtonian and Cartesian.

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Mind at Large

May 29th, 2007 Fred McVittie

To paraphrase Einstein, the strange thing about the mind is that we can understand it. Here we are, with mental capacities forged by evolution to solve the basic problems of hunting and gathering, and yet we claim to be able to have an understanding of the most ineffable concept imaginable, the font of all perception and conception, the metaprogrammer, Nasrudin’s Donkey. Perhaps, in this context, ‘understanding’ should be interpreted not as an act of uncovering and revealing, but as an act of construction or creation. Our understanding of Mind is inevitably organised and limited by our access to it, an access provided by the senses and the sensory processing systems. To this extent, if the term ‘Mind’ means anything at all, it might as well stand for some single general principle, the ‘mind-at-large’, and what we think of as our individual minds and viewpoints is the product of limited access by the creative senses. Just as there is only one space and our bodies are the constructions of material processes which articulate a particular region of that space.

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The Pleasures of Thinking

May 30th, 2007 Fred McVittie

The ‘cognitive imperative’ drives the mind to fabricate a coherent model of the world from the disparate, unconnected, and often conflicting signals caught by the senses. This imperative is the phenomenological equivalent of ‘perceptual binding’ in which we perceive the world as a unified, multi-sensory whole; we experience the bird on the branch singing its song, we do not experience bird, branch, and song as distinct from each other (unless we choose to). The cognitive imperative is not an emotionless, machinic process however, rather we experience its operation as patterns of positive and negative stress, pleasures and discomforts. It feels good to see connections and relationships between different sensory input, and it can feel challengingly irritating to notice discontinuites or incongruities in the smooth surface of experience. The removal of these stresses and the maximisation of positive feelings was presumably evolution’s way of shaping mental and physical behaviour which was (and is) adaptive, and would aid in our survival and the likelihood of our reproducing. These stresses and pleasures are nature’s way of keeping us thinking, because thinking aids survival.

Posted in Cognition, Evolution, Perception | No Comments »

Middling

June 25th, 2007 Fred McVittie

We live at the centre of our own experience. We are reminded of this fact every time we stand in a field or on a beach and look around. Surrounding us is a disc of land and sea, with ourselves as the axis of this disc. Our earliest conscious memories, or rather, the memories which became part of our consciousness, and our earliest experiences which have left no trace in consciousness but nevertheless live on in our unconscious, contain the image of this disc. And in the longer and more ancient narrative of the human species, this experience of finding ourselves standing at the centre of a circle with the world laid our around us, diminishing with distance, has been felt by every single one of our ancestors, and lies at the heart of our consciousness and of our selves.

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Calculating the Volume of a Hypercube

July 2nd, 2007 Fred McVittie

Imagine a point on the wall in front of you.

Imagine that point extending laterally to a length of about 2 metres. You are imagining a line of 2 metres.

Imagine this line extended upward into a second spatial dimension. Imagine it extending to a height of about 2 metres. You are visualising a square of 4 square metres.

Imagine this figure extended outward into a third spatial dimension. Imagine it protruding from the board about 2 metres. You are visualising a cube of 8 cubic metres.

Imagine this figure extended into a fourth spatial dimension. Imagine it protruding into that dimension about 2 metres. Are you imagining that? Can you imagine that? I can’t.

Although some may claim to be able to visualise such a four dimensional hypercube, I am sceptical about this claim. There is no adaptive reason why we would possess this ability, and the parsimony of evolutionary necessity suggests that this ability would not persist if it did somehow emerge. We are adapted to function in a physical world appropriate to our size, and do not have the physical or mental affordances to manipulate extra-dimensional entities. Just as our fingers are not equipped to handle atoms and molecules directly, so our minds are not equipped to handle concepts beyond the ken of medium sized objects moving at medium speed.

Interestingly, although this shape may be beyond our sensorial imagination, we can ‘imagine’ this hypercube mathematically. Knowing its measurements we can calculate with some degree of certainty what the ‘quadratic volume’ of this unimaginable object might be. Following the logic of the progression from a one-dimensional line to a two-dimensional square and to a three-dimensional cube, in which at each stage we have calculated the length, area, or cubic volume by multiplying the extensions in each dimension together (2 x 2 x 2 etc), so we can calculate the hypervolume in quadratic metres by adding this extension to our multiplication. We can say that the volume of this inconceivable shape is

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Eyes of Meat

July 5th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Bettenson, in Early Christian Fathers (1969: pp.70-71), citing Irenaeus, cites the composition of humankind (man) as consisting of three elements. These are flesh, soul, and spirit. In this formulation, flesh is the material body, spirit is the ineffable unified absolute, possibly identified with God, and soul is the individualising entity placed midway between flesh and spirit. Soul is therefore connected to the Absolute Unity of Being represented by spirit, but is also connected to the earth-bound and limited vehicle of embodiment and the flesh.

A modern interpretation of this trinity might play out the various parts in terms of body, mind, and world. In this revisiting, the flesh of the body is acknowledged as possessing certain affordances, certain sensorimotor means of accessing, exploring, and processing the data of the world. This body (including the physical brain) is the product of an evolutionary history and of an ongoing imperative to operate as a ‘medium sized object moving at medium speed’, and as such it has developed a range of abilities appropriate to that imperative.

The world, to the extent that we are able to say anything at all about it, exists not only within the limits of the senses but also far outside of those limits. Whilst the comprehensible scale at which the body operates is medium sized, say within a scale that runs from ants to mountains, the scale of the world (or universe) stretches from the Planck length to the limits of cosmic expansion. Similar extensions of scale beyond the range of human ken exist in all dimensions of sensory experience, and indeed outside of sensory experience completely, and in many ways define the distinction between body and world. Also, the extent to which the body can know the world is not only limited by the affordances of the body, but is also partly constructed by those affordances. Kant claimed that space and time, for example, were not properties of the world at large, but were frameworks which were placed upon the world by our attempts to understand it. This idea of a negotiated relationship between self and world finds full fruition in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics. Whatever world is then, it is certain that only a tiny portion of it is directly available to human sensory engagement. We may no longer refer to the entirety of this great disembodied unknowable as God, but there is still a sense that the world is that which is beyond the boundaries of the self in every sense.

Lying between these two concepts, the materially limited instrumental body and incomprehensibly disembodied world, is the mind: an interface between the mechanism of knowing and the source of all knowledge. With one foot in the animal kingdom and the other in the plenum of angels, the mind stares into the ineffable void with eyes made of meat. The ideas and feelings which make humankind what it is, our lauded consciousness, must be a product of this confabulatory poise.

Bettenson, Henry. - Early Christian Fathers. Oxford University Press. 1969.

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All that Rises

August 16th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Transcribed from HERE.

There’s a short story called ‘All that rises must converge’, by Flannery O’Conner and the title of this story is taken from Teilhard De Chardin, who was a Jesuit priest and paleontologist, albeit somewhat controversial in both areas. De Chardin was the guy who came up with the ‘Omega Point’ which is the theory that at some point in the future our evolution… it is a model of directed evolution or teleological evolution that we are somehow evolving toward some point at which we become singular and God-like. It is not a popular theory, and not a good theory, but it is interesting. This idea that he had that ‘all that rises must converge’, as well as being a beautiful phrase, but, I think is also quite interesting in relation to some of the ideas to do with the image schema of knowledge to do with our understanding of different types of knowledge, and a map of our epistemology being based on embodied experience, and in many cases that means visual experience, it is to do with visual awareness, visual consciousness of the world. What I have also mentioned is how various entailments of that schema, of that selection of metaphors map onto or organise our understanding of different types of knowledge and the different scales at which knowledge operates at etc. One I have spoken about before is the entailment of height, so when we want to indicate that we have access to greater knowledge we often use a height metaphor because elevated positions, be it the top of hills, in crow’s nests, standing on the shoulders of giants etc are the positions from which we can see more and tend to be metaphors which extend across so the position from which we know more tends to be an elevated position, in the ascendant. I think this idea that De Chardin is putting forward here, this idea that all that rises must converge is a related way of saying this. One imagines oneself rising into the air one also imagines oneself having access to greater and greater swathes of knowledge… I have this image in my mind of lots of people standing in this field where I am standing now and we all rise together, and as we rise our shared vision extends and it is almost as if we are moving together as these various planes in this field triangulate upwards. So the sense in which that all that rises must converge is a (very idiosyncratic) application of this spatial metaphor, and particularly the height entailment of it. That as one ascends one has access to greater knowledge; that the totality of knowledge becomes arrayed out underneath oneself and one becomes the focal point, the unique focal point from which one might view all of knowledge and if everyone was to go through a similar ascension process all would eventually arrive at that focal point, so there we would all be, all rising together, all converging on this unique focal point.

Posted in Chardin, Teilhard de, Evolution, Religion, Spirituality, Up | No Comments »

God is from the Future

August 17th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Richard Dawkins is correct in his pointing out that ‘intelligent design’ fails because it does not account for the design of the designer. I.D. and Creationist accounts of the development of (human) life are obviously nonsense, but the less radical theis postulation that evolution is somehow facilitated or even overseen by some kind of intelligent creator is also doomed to failure. It is obvious that intelligence, particularly the kind of super-intelligence we might be in such awe of as to call ‘divine’, can only reasonably be considered as produced by an evolutionary process, not be its producer. If there is a God, He/She/It exists at the end of the life, not at the beginning. (If there are processes by which highly complex structures such as organisms can be produced other than evolution we have yet to discover any.)

Let us imagine that biological evolution has not yet reached any kind of end point (how could it?). Let us also imagine that such biological evolution also includes the evolution of consciousness and the kind of extended phenotypic evolution again put forward by Dawkins. As (human) evolution continues into the future, more and more cognitive faculties are ratcheted into place and the definition of a human being starts to extend beyond the skin to include cultural artifacts and tools, and also to overlap such that the boundary between one ‘individual’ and another becomes less clear. It is likely that in 1000 years time, assuming our species lives that long, our consciousness of, and ability to control, vast areas of experience will be greatly developed. We may routinely imagine the world in radically different ways than we are currently able to countenance, and will be able to live in that imagination as successfully as we now live in our imagination of a spherical world orbiting a class 2 star. Maybe we will be able to see matter and energy as Einstein saw it, or space as Minkowski. Maybe our understanding of time will owe more to Kant than to Eddington. That we will feel the entirety of time as a single extended specious moment with ourselves both as active participants in it and as its constructors and organisers. I am using the term ‘we’ because at this point in the narrative of the future maybe we will regard each other as phenotypical extensions of a single self, and we will indentify not with the parcels of flesh that we do now, but with the tissue culture that unites us as one. Maybe this identification will even embrace other entities: animals, plants, inanimate matter. Maybe I, you, everyone and everything will be a single all-embracing ‘we’ that is experienced with the same ontological certainty with which we now hold ourselves to be self-evident. In the distance of time the mechanisms of evolution may incrementally lead to the development of an entity, call it and captitalise it as ‘We’, that lives in all time and all space and sees no separation between itself and everything. We see the fall of the sparrow and desire in the hearts of men. We is the Omega with the power to also be the Alpha. Maybe the future will be the past and when we are truly We and We is everything, everywhere, everywhen, then we may be of a mind to recapitulate. Finnegan begin again. A tongue returning to a broken tooth. A fish going back to its spawning ground. A bird settling on a branch.

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Dawkin’s Misfiring Gun

August 18th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In ‘The God Delusion’ Dawkins refers to the application of adaptive behaviour out of context as ‘misfirings’, so, for example, heterosexual desire is part of the evolutionary logic of reproduction and therefore adaptive. When this desire is felt for partners who are infertile, or taking contraception, ore who are of the same sex, these desires cannot serve adaptive reproductive ends and are therefore misplaced and the behaviour constitutes a misfiring. This almost unavoidably carries something of a perjorative implication (although Dawkins probably does not intend it to so do). Those acts which are designated as misfirings, and the feelings which motivate them, when measured against the yardstick of evolutionary history (and futurology) in this way are bound to be regarded as inferior to behaviour which more accurately follow the script and progress the narrative. This phrasing of certain behaviours as misfirings presents an interesting metaphor. It sets up an interpretation of variant sexual behaviour as the result of the shaky hand of some Darwinian Eros aiming the arrows of lust at procreative partners but sometimes mistakenly firing them into ‘unsuitable’ targets. Alternatively, it presents the mechanism of evolution as faulty, going off half cocked and taking out the wrong hit. However open-minded and liberal the intent, there are strong suggestions of a naturalistic appeal to rightness and wrongness in the language and the entailments of the metaphor. To fire at the ‘correct’ target is right, to fire at another target is wrong.

It may also be the case that this metaphor of firing and misfiring might detract from an important feature of the evolutionary process: the fact that, in order to work at all, evolutionary transmission of information must contain a certain amount of ‘noise’. A perfectly accurate copying of the structure of a replicator forbids the possibility of any evolution at all taking place. Without variation nothing changes. Furthermore, there is not way of knowing in advance which variations will prove useful in the future. It may seem self-evident that some features such as improved eyesight will be adaptive, but this certainty is only evident in retrospect and would not be the case in, for example, a cave-dwelling animal that spent all its time in darkness.

Some features which provide long term adaptive benefit are not immediately obvious but instead seem to exist as random behaviour or accidental add-ons. Stephen Jay Gould has referred to some such features as ’spandrels’ and cites certain aspects of our biology, including our large brains, as candidates. These features initially emerge either to fulfill a relatively trivial function and are then brought into service to provide a more mission-critical role, so the human thumb, which allows us to grasp branches can also allow us to hold a pen, or they may develop as a kind of side-effect of other processes. Walking upright may have initially have served the purpose of allowing our ancestors to see greater distances, but it had the side-effect of freeing up our hands, which might then be used for manipulating the environment, tool use etc. In all cases these spandrels either started out performing some other function and were then utilised for something completely different, or began as apparently pointless adjuncts to the real business of evolution, mistaken misapplied junk activity; what Dawkins might call a ‘misfiring’.

I have no doubt that Dawkins does not intend to construct an image of evolution in which the lessons of our biological past are transmitted into the bodies of future generations through the barrel of a gun, even if the bullet is such a pleasant projectile as that which explodes from the love gun of sexual desire. And if this prose appears too purple it merely indicates that the language of ‘misfirings’ plays into an intuition about targets and relationship to success and failure, winners and losers, worthy and unworthy, right and wrong. It also misrepresents the fuzziness of the genetic transmission process.

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Standing in a River near Lyon

August 18th, 2007 Fred McVittie

I am imagining myself as a hunter gatherer living by my wits in a land which is now Africa, perhaps where Chad would be found today. Actually, a hunter gatherer is too evolved a person to serve the needs of this imagination, For this exercise I need less wits and more intuition: a Neanderthal living near modern day Lyon perhaps, or maybe Australopithecus sitting by a fire on the site that the Sydney Opera House now occupies. The world I am in is one punctuated and organised by rhythms of danger and safety, and the qualities of dangerousness and safeness appear in every experience I have, with every entity, action, and object having more or less of each. So important are these features to my survival, that they are the first features I notice in any encounter. Before an experience has shape or form or colour, it has the this quality first. In fact, it may never occur to me that experiences can be unwoven into such aspects as shape or colour; these tricks of reduction and analysis are ones that will only be developed by generations far downstream from where I stand in the river of life. For me here now there is only the experience and the pattern of danger and safety which give it meaning. This pattern appears in me and is the cause of my running, and shaking, and shouting. It freezes me at the sight of a leopard and propels my hand toward the sweet fruit on the low-hanging branches of the trees. Or rather, this pattern is me; it is pleasure and pain and the variegated admixtures which scatter from the mixing of these primaries. It is the source of my typing these words across the centuries

I am on the land where Lyon now stands, and am experiencing the world through the body and senses of the Neanderthal in me. All this experience, which I cannot separate but my distant descendant can, is becoming me through different routes. Different kinds of information (which is not information about experience, but is experience) seems to take different forms depending on its route. Some meaningful information comes in through my eyes (I know this because when my eyes are covered the information flow is staunched), and other information comes in through my ears. Still more information awakes in my nostrils and on my tongue, and some appears on the surface of my skin and in the movements of my limbs. All of these doors into (and out of) my experience are open to the pattern and all may be a source of joy and fear.

There is a regularity in the pattern which further organises my world, and this regularity seems to be in step with the different ways in which the information of the world becomes me: which route is taken and which ’sense’ is activated. Some sources of information are more urgent than others, proclaiming their pleasure and pain, their potential for danger and their promise of safety, in a way which is impossible to ignore.

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Self-centeredness – not a bad thing

August 28th, 2007 Fred McVittie

That we all have a ’self’ is an obviousness barely worth rehearsing, and presumably, the development of a self-concept was a valuable trait at some point in our evolutionary history. The self-concept may have evolved to allow us to feel positive and negative emotions beyond the simple pleasure/pain responses of the body. Even in the absence of complex reasoning skills or even of consciousness, feeling a sense of ownership or love for one’s body would allow the possessor of this trait to act in ways which supported the preservation and health of that body. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the common feeling that we are, or have, a ’self’, usually located within but definitely attached to, the body, finds its origins in such an adaptation.

If this (or something like it) is the case, then it is only by habit and history that our concept of self is identified with the skin you (and I) are in. The self-concept could, and possibly should, be a movable feast, capable of distribution and extension away from its corporeal birthplace, and it may be that such movement of the boundaries and location of the self is already taking place. Empathy, altruism, and compassion for others involve the recognition of (part of) one’s self in another person.

We are used to thinking of self-centeredness as a bad thing, and presumably it would be if the location of the self was fixed and bounded by the body. But if the self is motile, then placing my-self-that-is-you at the centre of the universe is no bad thing. An even grander ambition would be to place my-self-that-is-the-universe at the centre.

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Evolution: The Hand of God

September 2nd, 2007 Fred McVittie

All life is like the fingers of one hand. Some fingers are longer and more flexible than others, and if I had to lose one of my fingers, through unwise yakusa gang membership for example, I would rather it was my left little finger than the one that I use the type this I. It may be that in the far distant future, creatures that were once human have hands with fingers of equal length and equal dexterity, and this may well be an improvement, and if this comes to pass, then presumably it will be through the workings of evolution and the natural selection of genes for such fingers. This does not mean that the fingers of my hand that grasps a pen, or types these words are in competition with each other. There is no ’survival of the fittest finger’ initiative at work beyond my wrist with calls for the euthanasia of defective digits. No Malthusian programme in which middle and index fingers band together to rid the hand of the runtish pinky, lest it spread its kind throughout the body. No ethnic cleansing of the grotesquely mutated and obviously troublesome thumb, see how it opposes everything? No, my hand works as well as it can as a unity and if the hands of my distant descendents are radically different from mine it will not be through anything I, or my fingers, do now.

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Popeye was Wrong

September 25th, 2007 Fred McVittie

I am not all that I am (whoever says it). I am also what I was through all the periods of material astrogeny, chemical collation, human evolution, personal history, and physical momentum; from the most remote part of my past when I parted company with my fellows in the big bang, to the most recent moment just before my finger typed the letter ‘e’ at the end of this sentence. I am also all that I will be, from whatever shape the world makes my most distant descendents in the most remote of futures, to the shape my hand anticipates just before it makes contact with the cup I will reach for when this sentence is complete and which I am already feeling the pull of.

If I want to have a full life, I have to look after my whole extended family of selves, the people and non-human entities I was then, those I will be, and that which I am now, and now, and now.

Posted in All, Evolution, Science, Self, Time | No Comments »

Evolution, Embodiment, Perennialism

September 25th, 2007 Fred McVittie

  1. All humanity has a common evolutionary history, facing largely the same challenges and finding the same opportunities.
  2. Our common evolutionary history is expressed in the genome.
  3. Our evolutionary history, and the genomic record of this ancestry, is echoed in our common embodiment.
  4. Our common embodiment includes all of the mechanisms of sensation and of mind
  5. The commonality of our physical and cognitive embodiment is echoed in the wide range of identical features found in all human cultures, the ‘human universals’.
  6. The commonality of cultural, embodied, genomic, and evolutionary experience is echoed in the common philosophies and mysticisms of Folk Science and Perennialism.

For example, the universal cognitive process which allows us to conceive of categories, based on the common embodied conceptual metaphor of the container, leads inexorably to the idea of a universal category. The universal category, the conceptual vessel in which everything is contained, is one possible formulation of a monotheistic deity, as is found in Plato and the neo-Platonist philosophers of the early Christian church.

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Beside a River near Lyon

October 1st, 2007 Fred McVittie

You are standing beside a river in what is now Lyon, on ground which is now part of a country called France. But this is not now, this is then. You are a tottering biped doing what you can to get along, but without anything we would remotely think of as consciousness, or at least not human consciousness.

There is something slightly odd about you that distinguishes you from the rest of your band, not a radical mutation, no massively rewritten central nervous system, just a slightly different emphasis to the way you react to your environment. If the other members of your band were capable of language, which of course they are not, and if they referred to each other by nicknames, which of course they don’t, they would call you by a name that meant ‘that nervous guy who makes mistakes all the time.’ And this description would appear, on the face of it, to be accurate. When you walk through the forest and the wind blows a branch above your head, just for a moment you don’t see it as a branch but as a predator steadying itself for the attack. And when the light dapples through the trees in the early evening those two gaps in the leaves look to you, for a split second, not like innocent sunlight, but the eyes of a vicious big cat reflecting the last gleams of the dying day. The sound of the grass crackling as it cools in the night sound too much like the snuffling of animals, or the hissing of enemies outside your hut to let you rest until you have checked again that everything is safe.

If these were the only mistakes you made, the others might have called you by a name that means ‘the paranoid one’, but your confusions travel in other directions also. The red wing of a bird in a branch momentarily fills you with hope as you mistake it for a ripe pomegranate. A moment of lust accompanies your apprehension of a gazelle for the brief second that you mistake it for a beautiful and graceful female of your own species. Yes, you are undoubtedly ‘the guy who makes mistakes all the time’.

Strangely enough, despite the fact that you make more errors than any other creature around, you are also oldest the member of your band, so these mistakes cannot be fatal. And since you have many females and many many offspring your constant errors have not prevented you from spreading your seed. In fact, although the young you have sired seem to be similarly afflicted by this odd trait of mistaking one thing for another, few of them have died so far. It is almost as if, by seeing opportunities and threats where none exist, you have improved their chances of survival. It is almost as if seeing one thing as something else has given your offspring an evolutionary advantage over the others.

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Existential Zugzwang

October 5th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Borges writes about the infinite library of Babel, in which all possible volumes are contained All combinations of characters are combined in the books of this library, so all arguments are made, all thoughts expressed, all narratives told and retold. This universal library, which seems at first fist to be pregnant with promise, is a dystopian vision however. The sheer number of books is so vast and the overwhelming preponderance of books which contain only gibberish, or untranslatable cryptographs, or which are written in dead languages, means that the chances of locating a text which is even readable, let alone useful, approaches zero. The librarians of this hellish repository have long since lost faith in ever finding meaning in their universe of books; they are a dying breed, prone to suicide and existential angst.

There is no evidence that such conditions afflict artists in this world, at least notyet. And this is despite the fact that creative practices have been compared to the wanderings one might make within a space similar to the library of Babel, as indeed has the natural creative processes of evolution and adaptation. Dawkins notes that ’searching for something within a sufficiently large conceptual space is indistinguishable from creation’. By inference, artistic creation is a kind of searching through the conceptual space of all possible artworks, with the work of the artist being akin to that of an explorer or colonist; each innovation a beachhead, each artwork a landmark, each genre a new found land.

A significant difference between the aimless wanderings of the librarians of Babel and the evolutionary perigrinations of the natural world is that whilst the former are cursed to go without map and compass, the evolutionary journey of exploration is significantly guided. Every step that life has taken has been accompanied by the ‘warmer, warmer’ whispering of the environment, such that these steps never lead to random and meaningless places, which is the curse of Babel. Evolution never lets any creature evolve to a location in conceptual space where it makes no sense; there are no existential zugzwangs in the natural library of possibilities. This is not to say, of course, that individual beings are not doomed to die, possibly alone and unloved. Not is it suggested that evolution has any kind of ultimate goal, there is no equivalent in evolution of the divine book at the centre of the library of Babel that Borges describes as ‘a great circular book, whose spine is continuous and which follows the complete circle of the walls.’ Each step in evolutionary history falls on the spot which is appropriate at that moment. The journey is always at an end, each point is the centre and the end of creation as it exists at that moment.

The travels of the artist through conceptual space does not fall neatly into either of these schema. The individual artist is neither doomed to a lifetime of unguided search, which would entail the relentless production of random artifacts. nor is there an environmental voice calling forth these artifacts by winnowing each step and thought.

‘From a computational point of view, evolution is simply a special kind of search algorithm. Some argue that for evolution to be considered creative, it must traverse its search spaces in a creative manner, i.e. it must be innovative or efficient in its search. Exhaustive search and random search are examples of noncreative techniques. Evolutionary algorithms are good examples of creative search.’
http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/P.Bentley/BEC6.pdf

Posted in Art, Borges, Jorge Louis, Centre, Creativity, Evolution, Space, Writing | No Comments »

The Matter Delusion

October 8th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In the talk that Richard Dawkins presented as part of the Tedtalks series in 2006 he referred to physical matter as a ‘convenient fiction’. Our experience of the apparently solid table in front of us and the apparently solid wall around us is, he claims, a product of our brains interpreting the relationship between our (middle sized) bodies and the (middle sized) objects of the world. Physics determines that the relationship between two medium sized objects is generally one of non-penetrability, we cannot routinely walk through walls or pass our hand through the surface of a table. If we wish to avoid repeatedly banging into walls and other matter then the survival imperative of an evolutionarily determined brain requires that interpretation of this relationship dramatises this non-penetrability. We see and feel walls and similar objects as ‘hard’. This general principle applies to all substances, resulting in the various grades of hardness and softness we encounter without a second thought to their provenance. All matter, in this understanding, is a story told to us by our brain so that we might better navigate the world of the medium-sized.

This seems straightforward enough; ‘the world is’, to paraphrase JBS Haldane, ‘queerer than we can suppose without making up imaginary entities like solid matter’. This raises the question of what the ontological difference might be between the convenient fiction of matter and the equally fictional (although possibly less convenient) god? Why is believing in god a delusion whereas believing in matter is simple common sense? A posting on the Richard Dawkins website forum noted that the distinction is not between god and matter, but between god and the experience of matter that we call ‘hardness’. Whilst this refinement does shift both entities more clearly into the realm of abstractions, it does not explain the very different attitude we have to these concepts. ‘Hardness’ is one of a range of human interpretations of the properties of the universe; it is qualia familiar as common sense to (apparently) everyone and hardwired from birth. God, on the other hand, whilst it is also a human interpretation of the workings of the universe, and whilst some variation of the god concept seems to be a human universal and therefore also approaches the status of common sense, possibly even hardwired, seems to be less resistant to disbelief. Although god, as a concept, in some cases ‘won’t go away’, the presence of atheists in the world (and even in foxholes) demonstrates that he, she, or it can indeed be banished by an act of educated will. As Dawkins goes on to mention in the same presentation, the most determined efforts my Major Albert N. Stubblebine of US Military Intelligence failed to dissolve the hardness of matter by a similar act of will. A failure of organised disbelief that caused him to repeated crash into the wall he was trying to walk through.

These two delusional entities, the hardness of matter and being of god, may mark two points on a continuum of embodied imagination in which the impact of the delusion is felt to greater or lesser extents. The hardness of matter is felt at the surface of the body, the being of god, if it is felt at all, is felt in the mind. Both feelings are, in a sense, interpretations. ‘Hardness’ is an interpretation by the sensorimotor system of certain enduring and consistent laws of physics related specifically to the properties of substances; god seems to be an interpretation of a supposed unification of the big questions of life, the universe, and everything.

Posted in Dawkins, Richard, Evolution, God, Haldane, J.B.S., Sense, Substance | No Comments »

Seeing Is Seeing As

October 11th, 2007 Fred McVittie

All perception relies upon the mechanisms of the mind/brain to interpret stimuli and construct a meaningful image appropriate to that stimuli. The words ‘meaningful’ and ‘appropriate’ here signify the ancient archeology of thought in which meaning and appropriateness refer specifically to survival; the buzzing cloud of atoms is perceived as a tree, that is, as a hard, climbable, object, because that is the most useful way for medium sized predators like ourselves to regard it. In other words, ’seeing’ is never neutral but is always the result of an interpretive process in which the historically salient features of the scene are presented in ways which dramatises that salience. We do not simply see the tree, we see … as the tree.

The three dots here indicate that I cannot find a suitable object for the sentence. I do not want to write ‘we see the tree as the tree’, as that would simply avoid the issue, nor do I want to say ‘we see the cloud of atoms as the tree’, since we obviously have no access at all to the atomic behaviour of the world. Besides which I would have to accept that I myself, the ’seer’ in the story, am a similar cloud of atoms, which would make any description even more removed. The closest I can come to imagining this perception is to consider that, since the tree and myself are equally engaged in the act of seeing, (even though only I am able to narrate that act), then the seeing emerges jointly from that engagement. (And here I am endebted to Max Velmans and his notion of ‘reflexive monism’). This joint act of seeing creates the circumstances of the as.

Posted in Evolution, Perception, Salience, Sense, Tree | No Comments »

The God Paradigm

October 17th, 2007 Fred McVittie

The ‘God Hypothesis’ which Dawkins puts forward in ‘The God Delusion’ is not, strictly speaking, a hypothesis at all. A hypothesis is a statement from which experiments might be directly derived, the results of which support or nullify that hypothesis. No such experiment can be produced from the general concept of a God. God could, however, be considered a paradigm from which other, more functional hypotheses can be derived. In this, the God Paradigm would be essentially no different from the Big Bang paradigm: both have a certain explanatory power but neither can be tested directly. A significant difference of course, is that the Big Bang paradigm can be used to generate hypotheses which are in turn fully testable and falsifiable. The results of such experiments can never prove or disprove the reality of the paradigm, but they can lend support to its validity as an explanatory structure. The search for the existence of background microwave radiation (COBE) was one such hypothesis which, when found to be valid, supported the Big Bang paradigm. A theist who argued that the presence of such radiation does not prove that the Big Bang happened is completely correct, as paradigms can only be supported, not proven. However, as such supporting evidence increases, as it has in the case of evolutionary theory, then the onus is on the dissenter to provide a better paradigm supported by better, properly supporting hypotheses. The God paradigm does not have a good record in generating functional hypotheses, and to the extent that it has, these have tended to be null and therefore fail to support the overall paradigm of a divine entity.

There are two hallmarks of a really good paradigm particularly a large-scale ‘cosmological’ paradigm that explains pretty much everything. Firstly, it has to provide a satisfying, easily grasped ‘big picture’. Secondly, it should be capable of generating many statements or hypotheses that can be tested. The God Paradigm, depending on which version you look to, has a record of being excellent at fulfulling the first requirement, as evidenced by the millions of people worldwide who not only grasp it but hold onto it in the teeth of quite amazing adversity. The second requirement, that it offers testable hypotheses, is less well covered, and to the extent that it is, has not performed well. The deist God, who lit the blue touch paper of the Cosmos and then stood well back, is completely inaccessible, and makes no moves, mysterious or otherwise, that might leave tracks in the experimental record. (This is the God for cop-outs in my opinion). Some other Gods, that of Roman Catholicism for example, are much more amenable to hypothesising, since He does intervene in the ways of the world. Miracles and intercessionary prayer are perfectly testable hypotheses which, if demonstrated as valid, would lend support to the God Paradigm. Such support would not constitute proof, of course, for the same reason that the results of COBE don’t prove the Big Bang paradigm. You could demonstrate the existence of miraculous cures and crying statues from now until Doomsday, and that would still not prove the existence of God, but would only lend support to the God Paradigm, an explanatory structure that, however well supported, would always be tentative, always open to doubt, always ready to be swallowed up by the next, even more encompassing big picture. The fact that these hypotheses have not been validated means that they do not provide such support, and the GP, for many of us, is just too weak to take seriously. However, lack of support does not mean disproof, and the God Paradigm, whilst it remains devastatingly unsupported, to the point that it is probably a hazard to passers-by, is as valid as it ever was. It just seems such a shame that so many people invest in this catastrophically weak idea of a divine being, an entity incapable of pulling of the simplest testable miracle, when there are so many other paradigms around which have awe-inspiring explanatory power and in their complexity and elegance make Chartes and Canterbury look like Birmingham Bullring (on a bad day).

Posted in Atheism, Dawkins, Richard, Evolution, God, Paradigm, Religion, Science | No Comments »

Evolution, Consciousness, Morality

October 19th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In an debate at Georgetown Univeristy, Christopher Hitchens refutes the claim that morality requires religious underpinnings to provide a basis for its authority by pointing to the possible evolutionary advantages of moral and altruistic behaviour and interpersonal cooperation. This refutation and alternative explanation has also been made by Dawkins and others. Whilst this explanation may be valid, it is unnecessary for a justification or explanation of moral action and leans toward a naturalistic interpretation (c.f. Naturalist Fallacy), which itself contains dangers. Elsewhere in the same debate Hitchens makes the important point that consciousness is humankind’s greatest gift, and it is this consciousness which allows the rational thought and coherent understanding which he rightly applauds. The fact that we are capable of conscious thought, a faculty extended and rendered material through spoken language and written text, allows us uniquely as a species to formulate concepts, including moral concepts, which do not rely solely on primate instincts. Steven Pinker makes a related point in ‘How the Mind Works’ where he notes that, whilst his genes may be coded for reproduction, if he should choose not to have children then his genes can ‘jump in the lake’. This refusal to follow the genetic script is a feature of consciousness and not only allows decisions to be made about reproduction but also to make moral and ethical choices. A morality grounded only in the body of our primate ancestors and not our own 21st Century conscious bodies forces us to support moral ‘realities’ such as the ‘hate your enemies’ script which Hitchens cites and appears to concur with.

This discontinuity between the lauding of rational conscious thought on the one hand and an appeal to a naturalistic, non-conscious, genetic account of morality on the other is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates an inconsistant approach to the treatment of complex human concepts, regarding conscious moral decisions as originating in the bronze-age body and equally complex conscious decisions, in logic for example, as a product of modern consciousness. Secondly, it denies the possibility of cultural moral development: that through education, learning, research, exchange, improved social conditions etc, we might work collectively to formulate codes of moral conduct that do not consign us to a life of primate politics and the naturalistic imperative of ‘hate your enemy’ and similar repulsive laws of nature. (Here I am reminded of the excellent talk by Andy Thompson at the AAI 2007 conference in Washington, D.C. in which he notes the phenomenon of the ‘lethal raid’ as a example of adaptive collective male violence, present in primates and in humans. The difference that makes a difference is that we have a choice whether to continue with this behaviour, and this choice is a consciously-made. Such a choice is an example of the conscious development of morality in spite of the genetic script, rather than as a consequence of it.)

As Pinker has pointed out elsewhere, whatever problems we face today, it is undeniable that from a moral perspective enormous strides have been taken in the last few centuries. Genocide, torture, and brutality have been part of the normal fabric of the human condition throughout most of history, and it is only recently that such things have caused any significant level of moral outrage. It is only just beyond the horizon of living memory that such sports as bear-baiting and cat-burning were completely normal, and today anyone engaged in these activities would suffer severe moral censure. We can only put these changes down to the operation of rational social processes engaged in by conscious agents, not by the functioning of any genetic script.

This is not to deny the calling of the voices from our primate past. We are all the children of violent, scared, painfully young ancestors, and this historical nature is undoubtedly imprinted in our genes. However, we do have the option to tell these genes also to jump in the lake, or at the very least to put them on hold until we really need them. I am reminded of the famous line from the film ‘The African Queen’ spoken by Katherine Hepburn to Humphrey Bogart. ‘Nature, Mr Allnut, is what we are put in the world to rise above.’

Posted in Consciousness, Evolution, Morality | No Comments »

Spirituality and Self-identification

October 28th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Spirituality and self-identification

We embrace ’spirituality’ (both religious and secular) because of our identification with levels of being which exceed our ability to literally understand them. We have the brains of hunter gatherers, tuned by evolution to match the survival needs of medium sized, sexually-reproducing, omnivorous mammals living in an Earth environment of 200,000 years ago. Our conscious cognition, miracle of software engineering which it undoubtedly is, is similarly matched to the demands of that environment and the nature of that body. Having conscious awareness is the great adaptive trick which we, uniquely in all likelihood, developed, and which gave us the advantages that allowed us to spread to successfully.

This is not to say, of course, that the contents of our cognition is limited to that of hunter gatherers. Obviously we can think about pretty much anything, but the mechanisms we use to carry out this thinking: the symbols and grammar of thinking, is largely unchanged. We think modern thoughts with stone-age brains.

One feature of cognition which manifests itself most prominently in consciousness is an awareness of self. Whatever else we might be thinking about it is usual that that thinking is oriented in relation to a self-concept. We not only are conscious of the environment and the sensory impact of that environment on our bodies, we also continually posit our own presence within that environment, even though we may not be aware of the fact. Wherever we go and whatever we do we take our selves along, the consistent figure in a changing landscape (or vice versa). There is a persistent and compelling ‘feeling of being’ at the centre of our experience that we refer to as a ’self’ and which we call ‘I’. The actual nature of this ‘Mind’s I’ as Dennett and Hofstadter called it is not easy to describe, as evidenced by the many descriptions of the I provided by psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and metaphysics. For most if us it is also experienced not having a single ontology, but as varying widely in scale, location, and consistency.

It seems likely that an early version of the I or self-concept, one which presumably is still available to us today, is one which is associated with and defined by the body and sensorimotor system. For the evolutionary narrative referred to above to make sense, then the adaptive success of a conscious embodied entity would require that such consciousness be initially of the body. The first contents of consciousness must have been of pain and pleasure, and the first self must have laughed and cried and probably little else.

Clearly we are not only conscious in this way now, and our identification with our bodies, whilst hugely significant, is not the whole story. Although the first self was built within the body and mapped onto that body seamlessly, the boundaries of the self no longer begin or end at the surface of the skin or within the confines of the senses. We routinely feel our selves to be ‘inside’ our bodies, looking out through our eyes and driving our limbs like children playing a video game. Sometimes this order is reversed and we feel our bodies are driving the I inside us and we are the unwilling passengers on the body’s careering path through the forests of desire and fear. Wherever we place the control, this dualism of ghost and machine has no basis in neurological fact but is nevertheless a human universal concept. We seem to be what Paul Bloom refers to as ‘natural born dualists’.

Conversely to this ‘inner I’ image, we often feel that our boundaries extend beyond their embodiment in an individual organism. The pain of others is often felt viscerally as our pain, particularly if that other is a close family member. When our team scores the winning goal we ourselves (sic) feel elevated by this triumph. When our country goes to war we (usually) experience it as personal, (and the extent that we do not is the extent to which our leaders have failed to steer our attachments in the direction of the desired conflict). Some individuals even claim to be able to identify with the entirety of the planetary ecosystem, experiencing damage to the Earth as a personal attack which may require an equally personal response, even if that response risks the safety of their own body. This would be an unthinkably contrary act if the old self, built by evolution for the better protection of the individual body, was all we had, but who can say, when pollution and climate change threaten the integrity of the planet, that such an expansive version of the self is wrong.

Whether one identifies one’s self with one’s body, with a smaller location within the body, or with an extended space, formation, or entity outside of the body, the mental tools that we use to conceive of this self remain the same as they have been since consciousness first emerged. As noted above, the basic symbols and grammar of though are those of the body and the senses; the body of a medium-sized mammal moving at medium speed. It is remarkable that with such clunky Newtonian tools we are able to conceive such elaborate and counter-intuitive versions of what a self can be. This is particularly true given that the rules and laws of the world our there with which we might identify often do not behave in ways we are used to.

In many cases, the physics of the world are radically different to the physics of the body, and therefore to the intuitive physics of thought. We may know that the universe is 11, 12, or 23 dimensional but we frame this knowledge in way which are remorselessly 3D. We may know that subatomic particles are ‘really’ probability functions with no specific and determinable location, yet we know this with a mind that is Aristotelean in its understanding of matter as stuff that exists at a single definite place and time.

When we identify ourselves with entities or phenomena which are beyond the ken of our embodiment, as we must when we extend our selves beyond the scale of, say, a mountain, or contract our selves inwards beyond the size of, say, a grain of sand, then that entity, that self, is operating outside the range of human physics and unsurprisingly feels a little weird. If we do attempt such a radical act of self enlargement or self diminution we may feel less solid in our certainties, less concrete in our understanding. We may feel that the world that we have become is less like the hard matter of material experience and more fluid, more flowing and penetrating and turbulent. We may even find that this evanescent feeling of being that I am is less firm than water even, that our self is melted into air and ether and has acquired the volatility of some rare and noble gas. At this point we may use the language of the ethereal to describe our self. Spreading and diffusing like oxygen on the moon, our self is everywhere infinitely expanded, infinitely thin and clear. At this point we have moved beyond gas and become, as mystics might say, spirit.

The phenomenological experience of being human allows, if not demands, that our awareness of our self is often applied to entities which are not simply embodied in the individual human organism. This ability to identify the self with ever larger and more encompassing areas of space and time has proved so interesting and entertaining that numerous practical methods have been developed for the encouragement of these ways of being. These traditionally include meditation, prayer etc, but also now may include technological and applied modern philosophical practices.

Posted in Evolution, Identification, Physics, Self, Spirituality | No Comments »

Selfishness and Altruism

November 5th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Although it would probably be ideal if we could strive for enlightenment with no thought for the benefits it might bring such as pleasant bodily feelings, better mental and physical health etc. it would be a rare human indeed who could avoid the lure of such motivations. Our ancient biology and habitual self-centredness cannot fail to seek out the personal advantages that may be gained from any action, and the path of enlightenment is no different. However worthy and impersonal the goal, it is written in the fabric of our psyche that such evidently altruistic acts as, for example, training to be a doctor or social worker, entering divine ministry, even martyrdom for the most noble cause, makes us imagine how we ourselves might benefit individually from these career choices. Fame, wealth, and the promise of eternity in paradise are just some of the gains to be had, and it is the presence of these possible gains within our motivation which make us waver. It is a natural human tendency to find such ’selfish’ reasons to go there. ‘What’s in it for me’ is the knee-jerk response of a part of the brain which served us well in the evolutionary past and still calls to us when we are considering any course of action. So when such thoughts arise we may worry if we are doing this altruistic act not for its own sake but for the wrong reasons of personal gain.

We may feel that for an act to be truly selfless there should be no possibility of personal gain to be had from it and no trace of selfishness in out minds, and if there is then we should not proceed. It would be a great tragedy if all the great and good of history, Ghandhi, Mandela, Jesus, Mohammed etc. had come to this conclusion, since each and every one of them must unavoidably have felt the stirrings of personal profit and saw the possibility of their own elevation, if not in this world then in the next.

This feeling of impropriety also arises when pursuing enlightenment, however much we tell ourselves rationally that there is a ‘higher’ purpose to the quest, inexpressible in the language of the fallen. And no matter how we tell ourselves that any personal benefits that may accrue are transitory and not the thing itself (and there is no guarantee that any such benefits will actually emerge) we can still sense the persistent eye of our ego looking out of our being, an eye firmly fixed on the main chance and looking after number one. Since such self-centredness is inevitable and unavoidable we should not see it as a contamination of our pure motives, or as a reason not to continue on the road. Instead we should perhaps acknowledge the existence of this eye. After all, it served us well in our evolutionary past and without it looking after our bodies when danger was behind every bush we would not be here today thinking about ‘higher’ things at all. When we were at our most mortal, it was there for us and kept us safe, and it would be churlish and ungrateful for us to disown it now, like a soldier from an unpopular war. When we needed it, it was there, and the least we can do is to look upon it kindly and with the compassion and understanding it deserves. It no longer stands alone at the vanguard of our existence, and when we hear its voice in our head we do not have to answer its call.

Look after your old self like an elderly relative; sometimes it says wise things and sometimes it calls your Senegalese neighbours ‘darkies’. Without it you would not exist. You are an adult. Make up your own mind.

Posted in Altruism, Centre, Enlightenment, Evolution, Self | No Comments »

Before and After Physics

November 21st, 2007 Fred McVittie

Some of the ideas behind (and in front of, and to the side of, and pervading the space between and inside) this work concern consciousness, evolution, and the interplay of feeling and knowing and being. These are big ideas, and are worthy of the attention of brains bigger than the ones possessed by we humans; we ‘medium sized mammals moving at medium speed’, to paraphrase Richard Dawkins. Since these stone-age hunter-gatherer brains are all we have, and since we are bound by the Cognitive Imperative hard-coded into our DNA to restlessly pursue the thought fox, however elusive and imaginary it might be, so the lure of the big idea draws us impossibly beyond the physics of our embodiment. There before us is the light of the moon, and our studies points like a finger in its direction, and if we must mix metaphors to approach that light, then so be it. Here are some shadows; a tree, a rock, words fading on a wall. Some are almost realisable as objects and can be easily seen and touched, some seem objective but are really only collections of words. Other collections of words make no pretense of objectivity but flow between the fingers uncontained, and all around is the white space, glowing and vibrant and eyeless.

Posted in Art, Consciousness, Evolution, Knowledge, Rock, Sense | No Comments »

Ego vs. Gene - An Evolutionary Account of the Divided Self

November 22nd, 2007 Fred McVittie

The struggle between the ego and the ‘authentic self’ is equivalent to the competing demands of the gene and the (social) organism. The gene has an existence which is extended over the lifetime of many generations of organisms and its survival is tied to this multi-generational existence. It is therefore concerned with its replication in the next generation of organisms, and exerts its influence through desires and repulsions experienced by those organisms. The organism itself, existing within not only an environmental but also a social context, has a lifetime only of its own biological embodiment. Its concern is therefore tied to this life and this body, and the preservation of life and body in the face of threats and opportunities. Face must be preserved, identity must be maintained, consciousness must be applauded.

Posted in Conference Abstract, Embodiment, Evolution, Self | No Comments »

Existential Self and Evolutionary Individuation

November 26th, 2007 Fred McVittie

The modern human self has (at least) four different layers of being. Three of these are identified as:

The Symbolic Self
The Objective Self
The Subjective Self(1)

To these may be appended the additional, more ‘basic’ layer of the existential self. This layer of self-identification acknowledges the self as occupying a state of ‘being’, which might be simply the physical and material substrate of the body, inextricably connected to the equally material substrate of the wider environment.

It seems that the evolutionary narrative, as far as it relates to human beings, is one of increased distinction and individuation. The postulated ‘Existential self’ is clearly undivided from the physical environment of which it is a part. The Subjective Self has autopoeitic functions which construct fluctuating boundaries and resistances corresponding with the body of the organism, but there is no sense that this distinction is any more than, say, the distinction between a whirlpool and the water in which is turns. The Objective Self is further distinguished such that it becomes possible for the organism to recognise itself, thereby creating something of a closed loop of being and knowing. The whirlpool has an image of itself as a whirlpool, separate from that water. The ape recognising its own face in a mirror establishes a distinction in which it sees itself ‘out there’ in the world yet separate from that world. The subjective feeling of being is embodied in a permanent object from which all else is excluded.

1. Sedikides, C. and J. J. Skowronski (1997). “The Symbolic Self in Evolutionary Context.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 1(1): 80-102.

Posted in Evolution, Objectivity, Sedikides, C. and J. J. Skowronski, Self, Subjective, Symbol | No Comments »

Evolutionary Psychology

December 1st, 2007 Fred McVittie

It is a tenet of evolutionary psychology, and indeed of evolutionary processes more generally, that organisms acquire what characteristics they have through the slow machinations of natural selection. The form of an animal, mind and body, today is the result of the challenges its ancestors faced yesterday. Inevitably there will always be something of a lag in this process, evolution is slow and the relatively rapid changes which can take place in the environment can easily outstrip the rate of modification in the genome which equips organisms for success in that environment. Also, even if the rate of change within the environment was relatively slow it would always be the case that organisms were, in general, somewhat behind that rate of change. Evolutionary adaptation is inherently a conservative, parsimonious process, and adaptive pressure will not be exerted unless there is a compelling need since a perfect degree of fit between organism and environment is not necessary. Provided an organism is well-enough adapted such that it will outperform its competitors then it will survive. This is reminiscent of the old joke;

Two trappers are camping in the forest of the Canadian wilderness when suddenly they see a huge grizzly bear charging across the clearing toward them. One immediately gets up and starts to run; the other stoops down and puts on his trainers. “Don’t waste time putting your trainers on”, the first one shouts, “we’ll probably not outrun it anyway”. “I don’t have to outrun the bear”, the second one replies, “I just have to outrun you.”

This ‘good enough’ criteria which marks adaptive evolution is also demonstrated by the existence of physical and cognitive features which, whilst they may have served some useful function in the past, no longer do so. The human appendix, for example, or human toes, or the dewclaw of a dog, or the vestigial eyes of some cave-dwelling fish which live in the total absence of light. The parsimony of evolution means that such relics tend to persist despite their apparent uselessness simply because, since their continued existence does not decrease the organisms chances of survival, there is no adaptive pressure forcing their removal from the genome.

Posted in Evolution, Psychology | No Comments »

Adaptive Consciousness and Evolutionary Lag

December 1st, 2007 Fred McVittie

It is a tenet of evolutionary psychology, and indeed of evolutionary processes more generally, that organisms acquire what characteristics they have through the slow machinations of natural selection. The form of an animal, mind and body, today is the result of the challenges its ancestors faced yesterday. Inevitably there will always be something of a lag in this process, evolution is slow and the relatively rapid changes which can take place in the environment can easily outstrip the rate of modification in the genome which equips organisms for success in that environment. Also, even if the rate of change within the environment was relatively slow it would always be the case that organisms were, in general, somewhat behind that rate of change. Evolutionary adaptation is inherently a conservative, parsimonious process, and adaptive pressure will not be exerted unless there is a compelling need since a perfect degree of fit between organism and environment is not necessary. Provided an organism is well-enough adapted such that it will outperform its competitors then it will survive. This is reminiscent of the old joke;

Two trappers are camping in the forest of the Canadian wilderness when suddenly they see a huge grizzly bear charging across the clearing toward them. One immediately gets up and starts to run; the other stoops down and puts on his trainers. “Don’t waste time putting your trainers on”, the first one shouts, “we’ll probably not outrun it anyway”. “I don’t have to outrun the bear”, the second one replies, “I just have to outrun you.”

This ‘good enough’ criteria which marks adaptive evolution is also demonstrated by the existence of physical and cognitive features which, whilst they may have served some useful function in the past, no longer do so. The human appendix, for example, or human toes, or the dewclaw of a dog, or the vestigial eyes of some cave-dwelling fish which live in the total absence of light. The parsimony of evolution means that such relics tend to persist despite their apparent uselessness simply because, since their continued existence does not decrease the organisms chances of survival, there is no adaptive pressure forcing their removal from the genome. Cognitive features which may parallel these (and the behaviour which stems from these features) include: the ‘lethal raid’, promiscuity amongst males, fear of snakes and spiders, and hostility to out-group individuals. Like the appendix or the toes, these instincts and behaviours likely served our ancestors well in the past, and aided in their chances of survival in the environmental conditions occupied by those ancestors (including the social and inter-species environment). In the modern world however, these traits, whilst rarely self-destructive, usually serve no useful function, and it is only evolutionary inertia and parsimony which allows them to persist at all.

The evolutionary lag which marks the passage of the genome through its changing embodiment in a changing environment, means that the body/mind is always one step behind the world in which it is embedded, and in all likelihood always has been. As we have the brains and bodies of stone-age hunter-gatherers, so presumably did our hominid ancestors live with the handicaps of pre-hominid brains, bodies, and behaviours. Our Neanderthal cousins had the body hair and sloping brow of their tree-dwelling forefathers, who in turn may have had some of the cold-blooded instincts passed down unwanted but uneradicated from their own reptilian kin.

It may even be the case that these traces of adaptive history persist beyond the range of such convenient paleontological divisions. This history may be more like a script which exists not in neat, hermetic chapters, but as a holistic narrative which is simultaneously active in the present. Or alternatively, we might regard this history as the laying down of innumerable layers of physical and cognitive organisation, all of which comprise our current sense of being, not only the last 100,000 years or so. The occasional claims of evolutionary psychology that our present behaviour, our sociobiology, is explainable in terms of stone-age beings in an information-age world, ignores the fact that we have been many other things before we were hunter-gatherers in the Great Rift Valley of present day Africa. Isolating that moment of our evolutionary history is certainly revealing and has useful explanatory power, but it also misses the bigger picture.

Also missing from this picture is any suggestion of ‘what next?’ Of course it is unscientific to speculate beyond the data and we cannot guess what the future holds with any degree of certainty. The future is, as Steven Vizinczey put it in The Rules of Chaos, ‘a blinding mirage’. Nevertheless, if we can at least tentatively accept that whatever our mind is like now it is probably slightly out of step with how it would be if it were somehow ideally wedded to the social and physical environment of today, then we should be able to consider what kind of mind we should have. Furthermore, to the extent that we are able to control our minds, if only to the minimal extent of deciding what to consciously put in through reading and other experiences, then we should be able to modify our consciousness to correspond better to the world around us.

Posted in Consciousness, Evolution, History, Psychology | No Comments »

Adaptive Attention

December 4th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Studies by Spelke and Baillargeon have established that babies and very young children look longer at events and objects which are unusual than at those which are behaving ‘normally’. This finding is used extensively to investigate what expectations about the world are hard-wired into the human brain and which are the results of acculturation. It has been found, for example, that babies look longer at events which seem to contradict the permanence of material object (in contrast to earlier experiments by Piaget), implying that the basic heuristic ‘objects persist’ is present at birth. Other findings suggest that such elements of knowledge as (Newtonian) gravity, inertia, momentum, agency, and energy conservation also appear to be built into the repertoire of innate human understanding. (This particular cluster of ‘facts’ seems further to underpin the Innate, Naive, or Folk Physics described by Smith, Hayes, etc).

The success of this experimental method depends upon the fact that babies pay greater attention to events that seem to contradict such ‘facts’. This behaviour, in which the unusual and the unexpected is awarded greater attentional resources that the usual and the expected itself requires some explanation. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology it is perhaps inevitable that, given the existence of any kind of innate or default model of the world, then an animal which was able to quickly detect variations from this model would have greater survival potential. After all, it tends to be the unusual events of the world that kill you, or conversely, provide rare opportunities for enhanced survival possibilities.

This tendency to be attracted toward and to pay preferential attention to unusual stimuli not only plays out within the field of visual attention (although given the massive processing power awarded by the brain to the visual system it is undoubtedly dominant). Unusual sounds, or combinations of sounds, attract the attention of babies also, as do irregular and unpredictable patterns of touch, e.g. tickling. It may be that the ‘invisible’ or ‘default’ actions, sights and sounds, those rhythms and patterns which do not demand attention reflect some aspects of the natural environment which our ancestors recognised non-consciously as unthreatening; the low murmur of a calm sea, the regular creak of breeze-blown trees, the predictable movement of clouds across the sky. Events which varied from these patterns would indicate the presence of unpredictability and possible threat; the faster rhythms and discontinuities of storm-blown trees, the crashing of a high sea, the dysrhythmia that signals agency and human or animal intentionality.

It would seem logical that, in addition to attracting and holding the attention of the senses literally, through the extended capture of eye-gaze direction for example, unusual stimuli would attract and hold the attention of mind; a kind of metaphorical gaze in which cognition is ‘focussed’ or ‘concentrated’ upon some non-standard aspect of the environment. Difference, and what Bateson (1979) refers to as ‘news of difference’, should be one of the most long-standing occupants of mind and consciousness.

Posted in Attention, Baillergeon, Bateson, Gregory, Consciousness, Evolution, Naive Physics, Physics, Spelke, Elizabeth | No Comments »

Problem-finding and the Feeling of Meaning

December 6th, 2007 Fred McVittie

There is some evidence to suggest that there is a universal human need to engage in cognitive behaviour which exceeds the demands of the immediate situation. Rather than simply being limited to responding to the ‘problems’ posed by the environment, humans also engage in active ‘problem finding’, (what Newberg and D’Aquili refer to as the ‘cognitive imperative’). This excessive cognition, which undoubtedly conferred adaptive advantages upon our ancestors, most likely underpins such human traits as; worrying about what might happen at some unspecified point in the future, finding fault with situations and the behaviours of others, and more positively, inventing solutions to potential problems before they arise, and all forms of creativity. The reach or ambition of this tendency does not seem be confined to the realm of potential opportunities and threats to the physical body or the immediate community, but extends to the construction of problems which have no direct impact on the material body at all. These include such worrisome conundrums as ‘why is there something rather than nothing?, ‘What happens after you die?’, and ‘Why is there evil in the world?’. The fact that these and related problems underpin most religious and philosophical practices, and the fact that such practices are found in all cultures throughout all of human history, demonstrates the omnipresence of such superhuman problem-finding tendencies. An interesting facet of this is that possessing the solutions to such problems, if such solutions did exist, (which is unlikely), would confer no survival advantage on individual, group, or species, other than relief from the burden of the problem itself. Having the answer to the question of what happens after a person dies would have almost zero impact on the ability of that person to stay alive, which is, after all, the ultimate goal of adaptive evolution. Such knowledge, were it available, would however provide relief from worrying about the problem, presumably freeing up attentional resources for more pressing concerns. Beyond this circular purpose, the big problems appear to have no function whatsoever. This is not to say that they should not be asked of course; addressing, or at least operating in the presence of, such questions is hugely enjoyable and entertaining, and the feelings associated with their possible solution are some of the most profound and overwhelming available to human beings. It is such feelings that we associate with meaning and purpose, and our attachment to the significance of such felt knowledge is at the heart of the human condition. One might almost say that these feelings and pleasures are addictive, so determinedly do we hang onto their source, the apparent solution to the big problems.

Posted in Evolution, Feeling, Problem, Religion, Science | No Comments »

Practical and Factual Reality

December 8th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society biologist and anthropologist David Sloan Wilson makes a case for the persistence of religious behaviour in post-enlightenment cultures. Framed within a larger theoretical framework which argues for the existence and power of group selection, Sloane-Wilson makes the claim that, in evolutionarily adaptive terms, the ability of humans to construct rational, evidence-based models of reality does not necessarily confer any survival advantage. He makes the distinction between two types of ‘realism’, factual realism which is a product of rational (scientific) enquiry, and practical realism which is a ‘good enough’ interpretation of experience, providing heuristics for behaviour and belief without recourse to evidence or analysis. Citing this distinction in relation to the likely relative survival of groups of organisms, particularly humans, he claims that:

If there is a trade-off between the two forms of realism, such that our
beliefs can become more adaptive only by becoming factually less true, then
factual realism will be the loser every time. … Factual realists detached
from practical reality were not among our ancestors. It is the person who
elevates factual truth above practical truth who must be accused of mental
weakness from an evolutionary perspective. (Wilson 2003, p.228)

This is evidenced in relation to religious belief which, he says, provides examples of just such practical realities. In terms of the survival of a group it may be beneficial if most or all members of that group have, for example, a belief in an afterlife. Such a belief would allow individuals to martyr themselves, confident that their life would not simply end on the battlefield. An army of soldiers imbued with this belief, if faced with an army of atheists who have the rational belief that death marks the absolute end of individual existence, are far more likely to fight to the death, and therefore to enhance the survival potential of their group. Over the eons of human evolution, such selective processes would tend to favour the maintenance of belief in practical reality even when such a reality is found to have no basis in fact.

Posted in Atheism, Evolution, Religion, Science | No Comments »

Why Art Won’t Go Away

December 10th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Much has been written recently about the persistence of religious belief in cultures and societies which otherwise seem to operate on entirely rational principles. Edward Slingerland, Daniel Dennett, and others at the Beyond Belief 2007 Conference all remarked on the unwillingness of religious belief to politely relinquish its hold on the hearts and minds of millions of otherwise reasonable people across the world. It is odd that superstitions and practices which only make any sort of sense in a pre-scientific, pre-enlightenment world, nevertheless show no signs of disappearing. Something like religion and its associated rituals seems to have been around for as long as humans have walked the Earth, and it could be said that they represent reasonable responses to an uncertain world; good first guesses at understanding and controlling. In the modern world, when systems of producing, testing, and sharing knowledge are so much more effective and predictive it is nothing short of remarkable that so many are invested in a form of knowing which is untestable, incoherent, anachronistic, and in many cases actively toxic. A number of suggestions have been made why religious belief continues to outstay its welcome in the human psyche, most of which draw upon either the social functions that it serves outwith the specific metaphysical promises it might make (a point first made by Durkheim but reiterated many times since), or on the evolutionary history of human condition which may ‘hard-wire’ us for this tendency to believe in gods and spirits. An example of the latter is the work of Newberg and D’Aquili on what they refer to as ‘The Mystical Mind’ in the book of that name, and also in ‘Why God Won’t Go Away’ which posits a mechanism linking ‘brain science and the biology of belief’. Such theories suggest that religiosity is not something which can be wished away, but is something we will have to recognise as an innate human process. (This makes no claim for or against the existence of God of course, it simply demonstrates that there are other explanations for why we might believe in a deity regardless of the truth status of that belief). Also, the existence or non-existence of the fact of God or other tenets of religious faith does not necessarily render such faith useless. As Dennett points out in the presentation noted above, there may be very good adaptive reasons for belief in a deity. He makes the hypothetical case of a battle between two armies, the Gold Army and the Silver Army. The Gold Army firmly believe that they have God on their side and that if they are slain in battle then their soul will go to join the legion of heroes in an eternal afterlife. The Silver Army, on the other hand, are an army of economists, who are able to do highly effective cost benefit analyses of the various strategies available, and are expert at calculating the relative values of different combatants. Dennett poses the question, ‘Which army would you rather have fighting for you and your cause?’ Most of us, he claims, would intuitively choose the Gold Army, for the very good reason that in a life or death situation they would probably win. This provides an example of a plausible narrative of why religiosity and its accompanying worldview might enhance the survival prospects of those groups or communities who tend to hold those beliefs over those who do not.

A similar exposition may be possible for the persistence of art as a phenomenon in cultures for which it seems to have no obvious purpose. Whatever function art served in the past it is by no means clear what function is serves at this point in our history. We could, of course, talk about it in terms of the social and economic opportunities it provides, bringing together people in safe and pleasant situations where they can discuss and negotiate shared values etc, but these are secondary features which are not directly related to the experience of art itself, the ‘aesthetic response’ if you like. This special feature of art has a hold over us which, whilst distinctly different to religious faith, is similarly compelling and irrational. Despite the annual round of criticism at the Turner Prize short list; despite endless tabloid jeering and broadsheet hand-wringing about elitism in the arts; despite art’s obvious excesses and abcesses, most recently exemplified in Damian Hirst’s diamond encrusted skull (coincidentally titled ‘For the Love of God’), Art is clearly not going away. This requires explanation.

Posted in Art, Evolution, God, Religion | No Comments »

The Space Between the Stars

December 26th, 2007 Fred McVittie

There is an interesting tendency within evolutionary psychology to treat the human condition as partly determined by the fact that our embodied self seems to be straddling two distinct phases in history. We have the brains and bodies of pre-industrial, illiterate, stateless, stone-age hunter-gatherers, but these bodies are embedded in an industrial, literate, society with well developed state institutions. The apparent disparity or mismatch between these two phases is held to account for some of the anachronistic feelings and behaviours that we indulge in today including religion, tribalism, and racism. These phenomena are seen as either appropriate survival techniques for pre-industrial social animals, or as early attempts to respond to the uncertainties of existence when life was, as Hobbes described it, ‘nasty, brutish, and short’. This disparity between our stone-age psychobiology and our information-age environment is also used to explain the difficulties we have in accepting newer ideas such as quantum theory, evolution, and relativity. These theories, since they would have served no useful purpose to our pre-industrial ancestors, do not figure in the structure of our consciousness and are therefore not intuitively obvious or ‘graspable’. It is only through the often deeply counter-intuitive tools and procedures of scientific enquiry that such concepts are able to be generated or discovered. It may be that our attempts to explain the complexities of nature using the rough and ready tools of intuitive commonsense has been a contributor to the construction of false beliefs and myths. The universe, as JBS Haldane put it, may be ‘queerer than we can suppose’, and our tendency to operate within the limits of our suppositions causes us to make errors when dealing with phenomena beyond human scale.

Whilst it is undoubtedly correct that such a gap exists between the mechanisms of mind and the phenomena that we try to investigate with those mechanisms, this simple division into two phases, then and now, pre-industrial and post-industrial, may be just too simple. Unless we strongly favour a model of evolution which is punctuated to an extraordinarily high degree, with long periods during which very little change took place, allowing time for a relatively distinct psychobiology to form, then we have to acknowledge that our ancestry contains more than hunter-gatherers. We would have to recognise that our history also contains traces of earlier lifeforms, and that the shadow of these ancestors also falls across today’s world. In addition to a phylogeny associated with tribal hunter-gatherers we also have, in the symphony of our thoughts and actions, echoes of apes which foraged in small family groups, solitary tree-dwelling marsupials, amphibians, aquatic ocean-dwellers, bottom-feeders, nematodes, slime moulds, unicellular bacteria, free-floating chemical soups, clay crystals, chemical compounds, elements, atoms, stardust, and the space between the stars.

Posted in Evolution, History, Life, Space, Time | No Comments »

A Gene’s Eye View

January 30th, 2008 Fred McVittie

It has been estimated that the human genome contains around 24.000 different protein-encoding genes, which are the key carriers of the information which constitutes the ‘recipe’ for human life. This number is considerably less than was originally estimated and demonstrated the versatility and combinatorial power of these relatively few building blocks.

Of these 24,000, the vast majority are found in all human beings, with only a few minor variants effecting the genetic differences between individuals and groups. The amount of genetic information shared by every person on Earth is around 99.99%. In addition to this, the majority of this gene pool is not only flowing through humans but also through the phylogeny of animals and non-animal lifeforms; primates share somewhere in the region of 97% of our genes, lobsters and spiders around 70%, bananas between 50 and 60%, and yeast has about 30% of its genes in common with our own.

In addition to the genes found only in humans, there must be many more which code for non-human features of other lifeforms; the wings of birds and insects, the carapace of a tortoise, the compound eye of fly, the spinneret of a spider. Let’s say that the total number of genes found everywhere in the any kind of lifeform at any one time in history is 100,000.

It is reckoned that there are between 1.4 and 1.5 million named species of lifeform on the planet, but this number reflects only a small percentage of the actual number, which has been estimated in excess of 10 million. In addition, the division of life into species is not an exact science and does not reflect the distribution and multiplicity of genetic orderings that actually take place, or the changes that have occurred in that ordering in the past. The 100,000 characters in the total gene pool have been assembled into many more sentences than any of these numbers suggest. So this comparatively small number of genes is spread out across a vast spectrum of animal and plant life, each gene threading its way across species boundaries, sometimes spanning the globe and taking up residence everywhere and in everything, and sometimes confining itself to small niches of existence. The cell wall is a physical structure found in almost all lifeforms, and the gene sequence which contributes to the formation of this structure covers the globe. One vast pulsing gene being whose natural environment is the body of every living thing on the planet. The gene sequences for less distributed or more ideosyncratic features, opposable thumbs, toxic skin, night vision, consciousness, occupy only limited regions within this living landscape. Sometimes these tiny communites of genetic expression take hold within their environment, spill out of their niche, and spread through the time and space of the living world.

Posted in Evolution, Genetics, Space, Time | No Comments »

Mind Brain Physics

February 16th, 2008 Fred McVittie

The account provided by neuroscience for how the brain performs the many functions it does are complex to an incredible degree. What’s more, many of the processes and mechanisms that are cited in these explanations are not only difficult to understand but are effectively impossible to understand in a literal embodied way. For example, it is distinctly possible that quantum mechanical processes are involved, if Penrose and Hammeroff are to be believed, in which case this part of the cognitive process is beyond our intuitive grasp.

The likelihood of the brain’s functioning being non-comprehensible in this literal way is not routinely regarded as a problem for science, as we have strategies for gaining knowledge about even the most non-intuitive systems. Confirmation of this can be found in the success of quantum physics more generally, which provides enormous explanatory power despite its reliance on mathematics for the conveyance of these explanations, rather than the flesh and blood language of intuitive common sense. Investigation of the brain therefore uses all of the tools of modern science, and is not restricted by the limitations of our embodied understanding.

Explanations of the mind, however, seem unable to transcend this limitation. All models of the mind seem locked into a requirement that explanations for mental function (as opposed to brain function) be intuitively evident and available to routine comprehension. This is perhaps inevitable since, given that the (conscious) mind is a product of evolutionary forces aimed at maximising the survival potential of medium-sized social mammals moving at medium speed (to paraphrase Dawkins), the ability of that mind to represent the world, including itself, would only need to address those concerns. Since our ability to intuitively apprehend anything is constrained by this precondition, any model of mind we feel intuitively satisfied with would be similarly constrained. We should expect that models of mind be easily visualisable, and probably follow laws of physics which correspond to Naive or Folk Physics or some version of the Newtonian. What’s more, it is likely that the mind itself, again for good evolutionary reasons, functions in a way which corresponds to this embodied paradigm. If the mind is an organ (or set of organs) produced by evolution which represents and allows for an effective engagement with a largely Newtonian world, then that mind, as part of the world, would need to be similarly Newtonian in structure.

Posted in Brain, Cognition, Consciousness, Embodiment, Evolution, Mind, Naive Physics, Neuroscience | No Comments »

Why Up Feels Good

March 21st, 2008 Fred McVittie

Returning to the theme of height as an entailment of the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, I would like to offer an alternative to this explanation of the origin of the GOOD IS UP metaphor which has particular relevance to our overall understanding. In addition to the ‘high’ value implicit in a pile of desirable goods that achieves such height there is also the possible value conferred by placing oneself in a high place. It is a routine experience available to all of us that standing on high ground allows one to see further than standing on low ground, and there is undoubtedly a certain pleasure associated with this kind of elevated looking. To offer a view out across an expanse of land or sea; to look at distant mountains and clear to the horizon is every house-buyer and estate agent’s dream. Everyone wants a room with a view and our coastlines are dotted with pay-per-view telescopes to further service those desires. Presumably, for our ancestors vying for survival on the plains of West Africa, having the sense to find high ground, or the topmost branch of a tree, would grant enormous survival advantages. Up there one can see the approach of predators and the gathering clouds of an approaching storm. The wildebeest are visible from up here whereas to those less fortunate primates on the ground they may as well not exist at all. In such circumstances, nature would be remiss if it did not reward those of our forebears who rose to the occasion by making being-at-the-top feel good. It seems quite likely that the lingering liking we all have for the house on the hill, the cliff-top hotel, the sea-view and the top bunk is a remnant of those times when, for purely practical reasons, UP IS GOOD. It also seems reasonable to imagine that, if we needed a dimension to measure relative values of abstract concepts, then the height dimension would serve very well. Being able to see farther than other men not only confers a literal survival advantage, experienced aesthetically as pleasure, but the metaphorical elevation of oneself such that one might look out over an extended field of knowledge mirrors this embodied and experienced sense. Desire for the acquisition of knowledge, the ‘cognitive imperative’ as Newberg and D’Aquili call it, drives us up the tree. It is the great human survival trick, the equivalent of the bower bird’s nest and the beaver’s dam, and the gaining of knowledge is regarded as a high (sic) value activity. From this it follows that those metaphorical positions occupied by individuals who have access to enhanced knowledge would similarly be regarded as high value. In this analysis UP IS GOOD because, as an entailment of the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor, UP is the place where the really valuable seeing, and hence valuable knowing, takes place.

Posted in Dimension, Evolution, Feeling, Metaphor, Sense, Up | No Comments »