Consciousness: the explanatory gap

April 11th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Some of the papers on psychology and consciousness might be interesting. This from the abstracts:

This paper will build on work done by McGinn (1989) and others since, in identifying the explanatory gap that exists not between any proposed mechanism for consciousness and an adequate method for demonstrating the factual status of this proposal, but the gap between any such claim, however well authenticated, and the extent to which this explanation is experienced as ’satisfactory’. The philosopher of science JBS Haldane, speaking of certain aspects of 20^th century physics, famously remarked that ‘The universe may not only be queerer than we think, but queerer than we can think’.In making this remark, Haldane was not indicating that data could not be collected, hypotheses developed, tests carried out, and progress made in these difficult areas.Rather he was referring to the inherent difficulties in understanding the results of such processes in a way which was ’satisfactory’ or which had ‘intuitive appeal’. A significant amount of scientific knowledge that has accumulated in the last 100 years has been exactly of this nature, and it is an accepted fact of life that advanced theories in quantum science, astronomy, etc are likely to be non-visualisable, disembodied, and often counter-intuitive.Such theories and models Given this as a condition of advanced knowledge it seems extremely likely that any description of the mechanisms of consciousness are similarly disembodied.

McGinn, C. (1999). The mysterious flame: conscious minds in a material world. New York, Basic Books.

Haldane, J. B. S. (1927). Possible Worlds: And Other Essays. London, Chatto and Windus.

I was glad I made the effort to hear this one.

Posted in Conference Abstract, Consciousness, Haldane, J.B.S., Knowledge, McGinn, Colin, Philosophy, Physics | No Comments »

McGinn’s Space of the Mind

September 22nd, 2006 Fred McVittie

McGinn’s (1997) problems with relating an unextended consciousness to an extended physical world; res cogitans to res extensa, stem from an inherent dualism of his position, a dualism not of matter and mind but of a distinction between mind and the contents of mind. This dualism is, in turn, derived ultimately from the space metaphor which McGinn draws on to frame the concepts he uses. He interestingly uses the example of the mental image of a ‘yellow flash’ (presumably of light) to indicate that such thoughts do not have extension, and that therefore mind is similarly non-extended.

… it takes up no particular volume of space; it has no shape; it is not made up of spatially distributed parts; it has no spatial dimensionality; it is not solid.

However, this image, like all images of light, only makes sense within the context of a larger unspoken metaphor of space. In order for us to understand his reference to a yellow flash at all we have to conceive it as a spark of light, and like all such phenomena, real or imagined, light requires a source, a point in space from which to be emitted. It also usually requires an object on which to fall and most definately an empty space through which to radiate. Without the latter there simply is no light, the concept is incomplete and incoherent. In claiming that the image is unextended he is artificially limiting the parts of the metaphor which he claims as ‘mind’ to the yellow flash, ignoring the fact that the metaphor demands that the spatial entailments also must be considered as similarly constituting the mind. Not only the object at the centre of McGinn’s image, the yellow flash, is mind, but also the objects illuminated (the ‘contents of consciousness’) and the space within which light and objects exist.

McGinn, Colin.
1995. Consciousness and Space. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 220-30. Reprinted in Shear (1997).

Shear, Jonathan, ed.
1997. Explaining Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.1

Posted in Consciousness, McGinn, Colin, Metaphor, Mind, Space | No Comments »