3-D Mind

April 11th, 2006 Fred McVittie

The experience of being human seems to be intimately connected to the physics of the space in which that being feels itself to be embedded. There is an uncanny match between the formulation of space articulated in the axioms of naive physics, roughly approximating Cartesian/Newtonian physics, and the feeling of being.This feeling of being might be described as a sense that one’s body is a single object with a clear boundary, existing at a single location in an extended 3-dimensional space, a feeling which is also extended to the mind, and the feeling that one is a singular entity, reasonably whole and separated in space from other entities, exactly here, precisely now. Studies on the early development of knowledge in babies and children (Baillergeon, 1994; Spelke, 1998) seem to indicate that the cognitive and perceptual apparatus driving these feelings is hard-wired. We know, however, that this perception of space and being is inaccurate. We learn from particle physics that these solid bodies are mostly empty space, our materiality consisting only of widely separated energetic particles blinking randomly in and out of existence. We learn that space itself is not as it appears, but is n-dimensional, curved, and worm-infested. We know that matter and energy are interchangeable. We know that consciousness and intention does not precede action but rather follows it, like a slick politician riding the wave of public opinion (Libet 2004), and we are told that subjectivity itself is an ideological effect, our most phenomenologically real feeling of self constructed by the projections and pressures of culture (Althusser 1998).

The degree of correspondence between Newtonian/Cartesian space and the intuitive understanding of being-in-space as captured in the informal axioms of naive physics requires explanation. I am suggesting that this correspondence is an inevitable feature of the embodied nature of naive experience and the largely embodied nature of scientific enquiry up until the time of Newton and Descartes. When the unaided human sensory system is the primary tool for examining the world, the model of the world is likely to reflect the experienced model of being.

Althusser, L. (1998) “Ideology and ideological state apparatuses.” Eds. J. Rivkin & M. Ryan. Literary theory: An anthology. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1998. pp. 294-304.

Baillargeon, R. (1994). “How Do Infants Learn About the Physical World.” Current Direction is Psychological Science 3(5).

Libet, B. (2004). Mind time: the temporal factor in consciousness. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

Spelke, E. S. (1998). “Nativism, empiricism, and the origins of knowledge.” Infant Behavior and Development 21(2): 181.

And now I am taking my 3-D body to the bar….

Posted in Althusser, Baillergeon, Conference Abstract, Libet, Benjamin, Phenomenology, Space, Spelke, Elizabeth, Up | No Comments »

The Cybernetics of Mind

April 12th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Since I can’t get to all the presentations, I will be posting some of the more interesting (to me) sounding abstracts here verbatim. As follows:

Libet (2004) famously observed that the intention for carrying out an action, contrary to expectation, does not precede the initiation of that action, but actually follows slightly after it.The implication of this is that the conscious ‘willing’ of an action is an illusion and that the conscious mind is, in effect, a witness to the actions of the unconscious to which we attribute the illusion of control.This finding, if correct, has profound consequences on our notion of intention and of the concept of ‘free will’. A significant interpretation of Libet’s results is one in which it is proposed that the conscious mind, the ‘will’ if you like, whilst it may not be the originator of action, nevertheless has the right of veto. In other words, an action initiated by the unconscious, when presented to the conscious mind, may be blocked such that the action is not carried out.

It will be argued here that this identification and selection of action by the conscious mind, which may seem through this description as corresponding to a police action or a restraint, is unlikely to be experienced as such. Provided an appropriate action is initiated swiftly enough that the conscious mind can effectively say ‘yes’ to it (i.e. not exercise its right of veto) it is likely that the selection of right action and the avoidance of error is experienced as simply the flow of everyday life. This proposal will be developed through an extended visual metaphor in which consciousness is represented as the ’steersman’ of the ship of cognition, navigating an oceanic phenomenal universe of experience.

Libet, B. (2004). Mind time: the temporal factor in consciousness. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

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Swing through the Forest of the Free Won’t

May 23rd, 2007 Fred McVittie

The work of Libet et al (1979) shows that unconscious brain activity, referred to as the ‘readiness potential’ precedes conscious awareness when making decisions or initiating intentional actions. This seems to suggest that many of the decisions that we take, and that we seem to be making in the full light of consciousness, are actually a result of unconscious processes with the conscious mind only becoming aware of (and taking responsibility for) retrospectively. This has been used as a support for the piphenomenalist position on consciousness, that it is merely ‘the steam above the factory’, and not actually the integral part of cognition that it appears subjectively to be. This phenomenon shows itself in unusual pathological conditions such as Alien Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behaviour in which patients engage in unwilled actions spontaneously and uncontrollably, often rationalising their behaviour afterwards.

A significant implication of this finding is its apparent assault on the concept of ‘free will’; if we have no intentional control over our actions but are mere spectators of our own behaviour, confabulating a sense of agency post hoc, then we also have no ultimate moral or authorial responsibility for those actions. It has been suggested however, by Libet himself and others, that whilst we may not have free will as it is traditionally understood, we may have a ‘free won’t’. That is, that although we do not have total power to initiate action through intention and the will, we may have the right of veto, preventing the carrying out of certain unwilled actions and allowing other ‘willed’ actions to proceed.

A possible image of this would be to see the progress through our own experience as similar to a journey through a forest. Perhaps we are arboreal creatures in this forest and can move quickly through the densely packed trees by swinging from branch to branch. As we move we are constantly being presented with a multitude of possible alternative courses of action, this branch or that, and out of this range of options we must only select one. If we had free will we would carefully weigh up the alternatives and decide the ideal course, translating this choice into willed intention and finally action. Without free will, but with a fully functioning free won’t, we see the maze of branches as opportunities offered to us by the world and by the history of our passage so far. Presented with all of these possibilities we do not need to choose one, rather we reject most of these offers and accept only one, in all likelihood the one our momentum is carrying us toward. This process of winnowing out alternative actions in favour of a single one would, I assume, normally happen non-consciously. I am certainly not often aware of the decisions I am making every time I carry out an action. When I am walking my feet fall where they fall without any apparent decision on my part, I am typing these words without making any conscious decisions about which keys to press on the keyboard. At other times, however, I can feel the tug of these subjunctive behaviours; reaching into the fridge for a Coke I barely notice the can of Tango next to it yet I can feel my hand slow and waver slightly as the possibility of taking that one instead presents itself. When this happens I cannot say that I am really making a conscious decision and carefully selecting one alternative over another; it is more that I am witnessing the decision being made, and the process of this decision-making is a rejection of one alternative in favour of another. Free Won’t in action. At other times of course, I am presented with alternatives which require me to consider them consciously: which credit card to switch to, which mobile phone contract to opt for, which bike to buy. On these rare occasions I have the luxury of taking my time, weighing up the alternatives, and (apparently) making a decision in the full light of consciousness. I would like to think that at these times I am operating fully rationally and the decisions I make are carefully considered, although frankly I think this is doubtful. What is clear however, is that decision-making and the operation of the Free Won’t functions at a number of levels, from the totally non-conscious to the barely, or even completely conscious. When we swing through the trees of our experience sometimes we move quickly letting our hands fall where they will and without a second thought to why they choose this branch over that branch. At other times we may slow our progress and look around, assuring ourselves that we are heading in the right general direction. Sometimes we may feel clumsy and ungainly, not knowing which branch is the right one, changing our mind mid-flight, missing one branch and grabbing desperately for another and another, with none of them feeling right. At these times our progress is slow and our journey wandering and frustrating. At other times we fly quickly through the trees, following without conscious thought the path that meets the criteria set by our journey. The branch that falls most readily to hand is exactly the one we need and the possibility of grabbing at the alternatives never seems to come up. Everything is right and we feel an unproblematic sense of mastery. We are in the zone, we are flowing, we are going home.

Haggard, P. & Sukhvinder, S.O. Free Will and Free Won’t. American Scientist July-August 2004, p. 358-365 http://www.americanscientist.org/template/AssetDetail/assetid/34008/page/5

Libet (1979) -Libet B, Wright EW, Feinstein B, and Pearl DK: Subjective referral of the timing for a conscious sensory experience. Brain, 102 193-224.
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Bad Mojo

June 29th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In writing about the experience of ‘flow’, Cziksentmihalyi treats it entirely as a positive way of being, allowing optimal performance of the task in hand and apparently having no questionable consequences. What is not brought out is the fact that flow demands no particular moral or ethical alignment; it is as easy to enter the flow state when engaged in a dangerous, illegal, or immoral activity as it is when involved in the kinds of activities Cziksentmihalyi indicates. In fact, it may even by simpler to experience flow when behaving ‘badly’ than when doing the right thing. One possible interpretation of flow is that it involves the automatic following of subconscious prompts without the usual steering provided by consciousness. As we engage in an activity, at each moment a number of possible alternative courses of action present themselves and unconsciously we begin to prepare ourselves for carrying out one of these possible alternatives. The alternative which the unconscious mind chooses, and which is subsequently presented to consciousness for approval prior to its being actuated, is ideally the most appropriate for the task. When this is the case then the conscious mind does not exercise its right of veto and the action selected by the unconscious is carried out. If this process is repeated, with unconsciously chosen actions constantly being allowed to proceed without the intervention of consciousness, then the feeling is one of unrestrained mastery and control. Everything that we do feels right. Also, because the conscious mind is not playing the role of censor or monitor in this process it becomes less prominent as a part of our experience; there is a sense in which consciousness seems to slip away leaving only the activity, to which we are unproblematically connected.

It is clear from this process than the conscious right of veto, our ability to say ‘no’ to an action begun by the unconscious, is constitutive of the self-consciousness which marks normal awareness and which possibly prevents our entering the flow state. However, as noted above, there is no requirement within this process that this unself-conscious engrossment can only be achieved in ‘good’ behaviours. On the contrary, the conscious exercising of our ability to stop ourselves carrying out certain actions, the use of what Libet refers to as the ‘free won’t', is mostly clearly in evidence when the action is socially or morally unacceptable. When we feel a temptation to carry out some behaviour which we know (consciously) to be wrong, then we are presented with a choice. We can either carry out the action and embrace the feeling of unimpeded flow that it brings, or we can veto the action. Whilst this latter option may not bring the sense of well-being that Cziksentimahayi indicates, it could nevertheless be said that it is in these moments that we are the most conscious. It could even be suggested that ‘giving in’ to flow involves the dissolution of the very self-reflectiveness and responsibility that makes us human.

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