Attention Shoppers: Everybody Please Rise

April 13th, 2006 Fred McVittie

A spectator has the unique power to wield attention. The ability to capture and hold the attention of spectators is a desirable skill for any performer to have, and is part of a raft of skills and tools utilised by performers which collectively result in ’stage presence’.

In discussing attention, it is inevitable that a number of metaphors are revealed. On the one hand attention is something that is caught, that can be attracted, that can be riveted, that can be held or grabbed. If we are not careful attention can wander, it can drift off, it can be all over the place, in which case you may have to call attention to yourself. On the other hand attention is like currency, it has the economy of a limited resource, you can give it, lose it, steal it. You can divide it or give it fully, compete for it, you can pay attention to somebody, maybe in return for something.

From the point of view of cognitive linguistics, when we use these metaphors we are not simply making poetic allusions in place of more symbolically structured knowledge or transcendent reason. Rather in using these and related metaphors to describe the performance event we are relating the formal structure of thinking itself. From this perspective, almost all thinking is metaphorical and these metaphors (which ultimately are sourced from bodily experience) overlap and inter-relate to form what we think of as bodies of knowledge. This paper will use the cognitive linguistic approach developed by Lakoff and Johnson and others to excavate the metaphors and image schemas associated with attention in relation to performance. Particular attention (sic) will be given to the use of metaphors used in performer training as a possible means of empowering the performer and developing stage presence.

Posted in Attention, Cognitive Linguistics, Conference Abstract, Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Performance, Presence, Schema | No Comments »

The Kinesiology of Intuitive Listening

June 28th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Acts of organised intuition, such as are routinely attributed to such practices as psychotherapy and counselling, as well as creative practice and problem solving, routinely contain a phase referred to as ‘listening’ (1). This use of an embodied metaphor to describe an abstract concept, in this case the physical sense of listening standing in for the mental state of intuitive ’sensing’, is in line with the conceptual metaphor theories of Lakoff, Johnson and others. The cognitive concept of listening provides the image schema which structures the concept.

The close relationship between the physical schemata of the body and the image schemata which structure cognition suggests that the functioning of these metaphorical organs can be enhanced by engaging the body in specific behaviours. Intuitive listening, for example, can be enhanced by paying attention to the kinesiological or proprioceptive accompaniments to the act of normal auditory listening. Typically, active auditory listening is accompanied by specific postural and somatic realignments; eye gaze direction, head tilt, breath control, etc. Adopting these postures, either physically or imaginatively with the metaphorical body, can enhance or facilitate intuitive listening.

Petitmengin-Peugeot, C. (1999). “The Intuitive Experience.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(2-3): 43-77.

Posted in Hearing, Intuition, Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Metaphor, Petitmengin-Peugeot, C., Proprioception, Schema | No Comments »

Disgusting Girls (and Ron Athey)

June 29th, 2006 Fred McVittie

One of the presentations today included some footage of a Ron Athey piece, which some people in the audience were clearly having problems with. It is interesting to note what people do when they are disgusted by something. There was a lot of squirming. According to the conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson and others, a possible reason why they/we were doing this is because of a process of cognitive metaphor creation. The mind effectively maps the structure of the physical and emotional response from the concrete concept of something pathogenically disgusting like a toxic substance onto the abstact concept of ‘deviant’ sexuality, such that we get ‘DEVIANT’ SEXUALITY IS A TOXIC SUBSTANCE. The details of the behavior which follows, lip curling (as if at a bitter taste), nose wrinkling (as if at a bad smell), and mouth gape (in preparation for vomiting) are metaphorical projections from the concrete concept onto the abstract concept enacted as a physical schema or performance.

Another revealing feature of the disgust reflex is that, once learnt through embodied experience with real TOXIC SUBSTANCES, the behaviour is then available not only for unconscious metaphorical mapping onto abstract concepts (as in the case of the Ron Athey video) but as an intentional gestalt performance which can be consciously activated to indicate moral or ethical disgust. An interesting example of this from my own experience is observing my children, both boys, metaphorically mapping GIRLS ARE A TOXIC SUBSTANCE. Before the age of around 6 this mapping did not exist, but from 6 onward the presence of a girl stimulated all aspects of the disgust reflex indicated above. From the age of around 12 however, this physical schema has become more of a conscious performance which is activated only in certain contexts (when they are with their friends), and which is clearly in competition with other physical schema presumably appropriate to metaphors such as GIRLS ARE RARE AND UNUSUAL OBJECTS, and even GIRLS ARE PEOPLE.

Posted in Art, Gesture, Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Metaphor, Performance, Schema, Story | No Comments »

Poetic Dualism

July 6th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Despite the best attempts by philosophy and science to deny the dualism which is such a part of folk science, a tendency unfairly attributed to Descartes, but actually deeply entrenched in the human psyche, such dualism still dominates much debate. As Paul Bloom suggests, we may be ‘natural born dualists’. Efforts to collapse this duality, whether it be termed as a duality of mind and body, or brain and mind, or matter and spirit, have tended not to provide an integrated model, but simply to deny the existence of one or other of the terms.

Part of the distinction between these terms, and which is used in the suppression of supporters of the one by supporters of the other, is the language which is used to talk about the concepts which form each part of the dualism. There is a perceived difference in the type of discourse which represents the brain, for example, and that which represents the mind. The former is objective, noumenal, scientific, whereas the latter is subjective, phenomenal, poetic.

Recent developments in the study of cognition, however, suggests that this distinction is largely unsupportable.Work carried out by Lakoff, Johnson, etc indicates that the only epistemological distinction to be made is between concepts which are concrete and those which are abstract, not between those concepts which are objective and those which are subjective. Concrete concepts are those which are directly available to the senses, which have tangible and physical attributes. Abstract concepts, which make up most of our thoughts and language, are not available to the senses and can therefore only be represented in cognition through a process of metaphorical mapping.Given that most conceptualisation about both the brain and the mind is necessarily abstract, the mind not being directly available to the senses, then all discourses on the subject of the mind are necessarily structured through metaphor.

Any integration between discourses, if such integration is desirable, must start with a recognition that both objective and subjective discourses around abstract concepts are ultimately poetic.

Posted in Bloom, Paul, Brain, Dualism, Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Metaphor, Mind, Poetics | No Comments »

Sight, Touch, Object, Subject

October 17th, 2006 Fred McVittie

We tend to use different forms of speech to articulate different types of knowledge, and an observable regularity in these differences is the sensory mode that is referred to within this articulation. As has been noted, objective knowledge (or facts that we wish to express as if they were objective) tend to expressed using the language of vision; we say ‘I see’ to indicate this kind of interpersonal objective understanding. Knowledge or facts that we wish to express as more personal to us tend to be articulated by referring to other sensory modes, particularly the sense of touch. When we want to describe our experience ’subjectively’, without making any claims to shared experience, we say ‘I feel’, or we refer more generally to our ‘feelings’. If some experience has an emotional impact upon us we may say that we have been ‘touched’. This distinction between an objectification of knowledge using visual metaphors and a ’subjectification’ of knowledge using tactile metaphors suggests that three cognitive strategies are at work in the organisation of experience.

  1. Firstly, that we are structuring our knowledge, or turning experience into knowledge, using the logic of the body. Knowledge about the world is not represented abstractly but is achieved by drawing on body-based metaphors. (See Lakoff & Johnson 1989 etc,)
  2. Secondly, that part of this metaphor involves the use of the different sensory modes; sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch. Each sensory mode indicates a different inflection placed on experience which in turn becomes a slightly different form of knowledge, (’seeing’ a fact is different to ‘feeling’ a fact).
  3. Thirdly, there is a set of correspondences, which may or may not be significant, between the sensory mode, the form of knowledge this sensory mode produces, and the the metaphorical proximity of the experience producing that knowledge to the person having that experience. Vision is a distinctly distancing sense; its objects are inevitably ‘over there’, separate and and some remove from ourselves. Touch, on the other hand, implies a complete collapse of spatial separation. To be touched we have to be in intimate contact with the thing touched, to the extent that it may not make sense to think of that thing as an ‘object’ in quite the same way. A touched thing is pressed against our skin and is (can be) felt almost as part of ourselves.

Posted in Conference Abstract, Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Object | No Comments »

Image Schema List

April 17th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Lists of image schemas

While Johnson provided an initial list of image schemas in The Body in the Mind (p. 126), his diagrams for them are scattered throughout his book and he only diagrammed a portion of those image schemas he listed. In his work, Lakoff also used several additional schemas.

Johnson 1987:

Spatial motion group

Containment
Path
Source-Path-Goal
Blockage
Center-Periphery
Cycle
Cyclic Climax

Force Group

Compulsion
Counterforce
Diversion
Removal of Restraint
Enablement
Attraction
Link
Scale

Balance Group

Axis Balance
Point Balance
Twin-Pan Balance
Equilibrium

Listed but unsketched and undiscussed in Johnson

Contact
Surface
Full-Empty
Merging
Matching
Near-Far
Mass-Count
Iteration
Object
Splitting
Part-Whole
Superimposition
Process
Collection

Additional schemas discussed in Lakoff 1987:

Spatial group

Above
Across
Covering
Contact
Vertical Orientation
Length (extended trajector)

Transformational group

Linear path from moving object (one dimensional trajector)
Path to endpoint (endpoint focus)
Path to object mass (path covering)
Multiplex to mass (possibly the same as Johnson’s undefined Mass-Count)
Reflexive (both part-whole and temporally different reflexives)
Rotation

Image schemas proposed and discussed by others:

Rough-smooth/Bumpy-smooth (Rohrer; Johnson and Rohrer)

Posted in Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Schema | No Comments »

Visual Processing of Information

August 18th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Much information accessed via the senses is processed by the visual centres of the brain, even when the information itself is not primarily visual. For this reason we might speak of the ‘visual processing of information’, rather than simply the ‘processing of visual information’. The latter implies a method of treating data which is neutral with regard to its origin in any particular sensory mode and a distinction in the data itself according to those origins, whereas the former acknowledges that, whatever sensory channel information may arrive from it is essentially of the same type. It is the way of processing this information which renders it ‘visual’ ‘auditory’ etc. (This is confirmed by the experience of synaesthetics). An example of this is when we conceive of temperature as being ‘high’ or ‘low’, in which instance we are treating sensory information which is purely tactile by mapping it onto an imaginary visual space, almost as if we are looking at a graph of temperature or the rising and falling of liquid in a thermometer. It might be said that this is purely a metaphor and is of no relevance to brain science, however, as demonstrated by Lakoff and Johnson, such use of metaphor is the stuff of cognition, not simply the poetic icing on the cake. Metaphors are instantiated in the networks of the brain such that when talking about temperature as being ‘high’ we are effectively utilising visual networks, and it is this supervenient use which underpins the metaphor.

Posted in Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Metaphor, Sense, Space, Supervenience, Synaesthesia | No Comments »

Visual Processing of Information

August 18th, 2007 Fred McVittie

Much information accessed via the senses is processed by the visual centres of the brain, even when the information itself is not primarily visual. For this reason we might speak of the ‘visual processing of information’, rather than simply the ‘processing of visual information’. The latter implies a method of treating data which is neutral with regard to its origin in any particular sensory mode and a distinction in the data itself according to those origins, whereas the former acknowledges that, whatever sensory channel information may arrive from it is essentially of the same type. It is the way of processing this information which renders it ‘visual’ ‘auditory’ etc. (This is confirmed by the experience of synaesthetics). An example of this is when we conceive of temperature as being ‘high’ or ‘low’, in which instance we are treating sensory information which is purely tactile by mapping it onto an imaginary visual space, almost as if we are looking at a graph of temperature or the rising and falling of liquid in a thermometer. It might be said that this is purely a metaphor and is of no relevance to brain science, however, as demonstrated by Lakoff and Johnson, such use of metaphor is the stuff of cognition, not simply the poetic icing on the cake. Metaphors are instantiated in the networks of the brain such that when talking about temperature as being ‘high’ we are effectively utilising visual networks, and it is this supervenient use which underpins the metaphor.

Posted in Information, Johnson, Mark, Lakoff, George, Metaphor | No Comments »

God of the Gaps (in embodied knowledge)

September 16th, 2007 Fred McVittie

The ‘God of the Gaps’ argument critiques certain approaches to theism on the grounds that, if we use God as an explanation for all those phenomena that we do not understand, then as our understanding increases, inevitably God decreases. Presumably then, the hypothetical end point to such inevitable progression of knowledge would be an epistemological universe in which no space was left in which God might hide. Even if knowledge is never total, as it surely will never be, this understanding of God is still problematic as it presents an image of a deity which is in a state of progressive decline. Every new article of information, from the most robust and powerful scientific theory to the simplest new fact acquired through routine acts of perception constitutes an amputation of the limb of God. For this reason the ‘God of the Gaps’ description of a deity has been roundly criticised as both a failure of the scientific imagination and an insult to the Almighty.

Having said that, a case could be made for a different kind of God of the Gaps, if we understand these gaps not to be in knowledge, but in our ability to conceptual this knowledge in a way was directly embodied.

The extensive work done in the field of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Embodied Cognition points to the importance of our embodiment in our ability to make sense of ideas and to structure concepts. The outcome of such research suggests that whilst we are easily able to conceptualise concepts which have direct sensory impact (medium sized objects, forces, substances, schema etc) when we wish to think about anything which is beyond the horizon of our bodily experience we have to use indirect methods. Chief among these methods is the systematic and consistent use of metaphor, such that we think of concepts which are abstract in terms of others which are concrete. We commonly think of love for example, as a journey, or of anger as heat in a sealed container. (These examples are from Lakoff and Johnson’s excellent introduction to these ideas ‘Metaphors We Live By’). Outside the relatively narrow domain of direct embodied experience is all the really interesting stuff of science, philosophy, politics, culture, and religion. Most of these practices, it can be demonstrated, are concerned with abstractions, and therefore the currency of their debates is metaphor and imagination.

In terms of science, As Stephen Jones points out in ‘Physics and Metaphor’ many of the most robust and elegant theories of science are understood only through acts of imagination. The concept of the origin of the universe in a Big Bang is one such example of this. Whatever event took place that triggered the subsequent creation of all that we see around us today clearly was not Big and did not go Bang. Yet this image of a kind of explosion is a useful image around which to structure our understanding of something that we simply are not adaptively equipped to understand literally. This does not mean that something that we call the Big Bang didn’t happen, it simply means that we are too stupid to understand it without drawing a picture of it, rather like the scene in Mad Max: Beyond the Thunderdome, where a bunch of post-apocalyptic children try to tell each other what television was using only cargo-cult materials of sticks and leaves. The big difference that makes a difference between Mad Max and Georges Lemaître (an early proponent of the BBT) is that Lemaitre tested his imaginary explosion against the data of other ideas and theories.

This example, of the organised application of imagination to fill a significant gap in embodied knowledge, is typical of the way that science works, and indeed is also typical of the way that non-scientific gaps are filled. When I talk to my kids about what they will do in the future, the question a career often comes up, but if I am honest I have absolutely no idea what a career is. It has no smell, taste, or visible substance, and I can’t hear it or touch it. In fact I have to admit that there is a huge gap in my ability to think literally about their career. This doesn’t seem to stop me thinking about it though, and I do, and the way I do it is through the (largely unconscious) use of metaphor. If I look closely at how I am thinking I would say that I imagine their careers as something like the flight of an arrow, curving gently upward to arrive at a desired target, and I try not to imagine them as careering out of control, like a driverless vehicle, a danger to themselves and passers-by alike. Without some kind of image like this I don’t see how I could conceive of something like ‘a career’ at all.

Which brings me, finally, to the God of the Gaps. Given that much of what we say and think is outside embodiable range, and is therefore in this realm of the metaphorical and the imaginary (up to 90% by some estimates), this means that our thoughts are entirely dominated by the imagination and it is not some freaky little playground in the corner of our brains where only fairies and artists hang out. It also means, at noted earlier, that any idea which is even remotely interesting is probably suffused with imagination, if not constructed of it entirely. If I was a theist, which I am not thank Richard, I would definitely want my God to be at least as wild as the Big Bang, if not more so, which would definitely put Him in imagination territory.
The bottom line with any conceptual metaphor and any imaginary entity yielded by that metaphor is how well it functions. The Big Bang metaphor works really well to cohere data and observations into a single big picture. The flight path of the arrow that (I hope) traces my kids’ career also helps them organise and plan their actions. I am quite happy to believe in an imaginary God; at least to the extent that I believe in the Big Bang or a Career Plan. I can see some potential value in this kind of God of the Gaps, a complex, coherent anthropomorphic metaphor which helps to give form to certain aspects of the universe that are beyond my embodiment. If someone can show me what the function of this particular imaginary entity is, ideally someone who does not misunderstand science and the imagination to such an extent that they insist that God is real, .I’d be happy to consider believing in it, (although I would probably draw the line at worship).

Posted in God, Johnson, Mark, Jones, Stephen, Lakoff, George, Lemaitre, Georges, Metaphor | No Comments »

Emotion and Cognition

October 4th, 2007 Fred McVittie

There is no cognition without emotion, even though we are often unaware of the emotional aspects of our thinking’. (Johnson, M. 2007. p.9)


Johnson, M. (2007). The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding. University of Chicago Press. London.

Posted in Aesthetics, Cognition, Emotion, Johnson, Mark | No Comments »