Essence Metaphors

May 29th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Folk theories of categories, combined with the fact that human beings seem to be ‘natural born dualists’ (Bloom) results in the concept of the essence, an intangible defining property which gives an entity its unique identity. Because this concept of an essence is inherently ineffable and abstract (not to mention objectively non-existent) it can only be conceptualised through the application of metaphors sourced from the concrete domain of lived and embodied experience. The dominant metaphors for the ontology and location of the essence are;

  • light
  • liquid
  • void
  • centre
  • interior (of the body)

References to the body often combine these metaphors or their entailments.

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Poetic Dualism

July 6th, 2006 Fred McVittie

Despite the best attempts by philosophy and science to deny the dualism which is such a part of folk science, a tendency unfairly attributed to Descartes, but actually deeply entrenched in the human psyche, such dualism still dominates much debate. As Paul Bloom suggests, we may be ‘natural born dualists’. Efforts to collapse this duality, whether it be termed as a duality of mind and body, or brain and mind, or matter and spirit, have tended not to provide an integrated model, but simply to deny the existence of one or other of the terms.

Part of the distinction between these terms, and which is used in the suppression of supporters of the one by supporters of the other, is the language which is used to talk about the concepts which form each part of the dualism. There is a perceived difference in the type of discourse which represents the brain, for example, and that which represents the mind. The former is objective, noumenal, scientific, whereas the latter is subjective, phenomenal, poetic.

Recent developments in the study of cognition, however, suggests that this distinction is largely unsupportable.Work carried out by Lakoff, Johnson, etc indicates that the only epistemological distinction to be made is between concepts which are concrete and those which are abstract, not between those concepts which are objective and those which are subjective. Concrete concepts are those which are directly available to the senses, which have tangible and physical attributes. Abstract concepts, which make up most of our thoughts and language, are not available to the senses and can therefore only be represented in cognition through a process of metaphorical mapping.Given that most conceptualisation about both the brain and the mind is necessarily abstract, the mind not being directly available to the senses, then all discourses on the subject of the mind are necessarily structured through metaphor.

Any integration between discourses, if such integration is desirable, must start with a recognition that both objective and subjective discourses around abstract concepts are ultimately poetic.

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Space and Dualism

September 11th, 2006 Fred McVittie

As Bloom (2005) says, we are all ‘Descartes Babies’, or ‘natural born dualists’, believing in spite of the evidence in some kind of ineffable soul, spark, or spirit to contrast with the material body and physical world. However, we can only conceptualise this soul through through the meagre (but powerful) tools provided by evolution, which includes an inability to conceive of abstraction except through the use of embodied metaphor. As Lakoff et al demonstrate, we understand the abstract in terms of the concrete. Since the mind is pehaps the ultimate abstraction; we can only conceive of it by analogy to embodied experience. In other words, whilst our naive psychology may provide the experience of a cartesian duality, we can only think of the ’spiritual’ component of this duality in terms of the physical, the Res Cogitans in terms of the Res Extensa.

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Being Telepresent

January 7th, 2007 Fred McVittie

In order to optimise one’s performance of an activity it is useful to increase the extent to which one is (subjectively) ‘present’, i.e. ‘in the moment’. One strategy for aiding in this process is to re-establish the relationship between self and body such that the automaticity of embodiment is avoided. This involves an initial distancing of oneself from the body through the identification of self with some core, non-corporeal entity such as ‘essence’, ’soul’, ‘core self’ etc, followed by a conscious and whole-hearted re-inhabiting of the body and the senses. Through this process one becomes effectively telepresent in one’s own body. This technique draws upon the intuitive dualism noted by Bloom in ‘Descartes Baby’ in which he notes that the conceptual separation of self and body, however much it may be denied by science and decried by much philosophy, is nevertheless a part of the human condition of consciousness.

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Body Mind Consciousness

June 1st, 2007 Fred McVittie

We are used to considering the world of experience as intuitively divided into two parts. We are, as Paul Bloom notes, ‘natural born dualists’, an observation given some neurological support in the idea/mechanism of the ‘binary operator’ of Newberg and D’Aquili, one of the automatic world-ordering processes which are responsible for the cognitive sense we make of the world. In the case of the binary operator, the sense-making is that of a division into the various binaries of this/that, figure/ground, self/other etc. One of the primary divisions, perhaps the primary division, associated with Descartes is the binary distinction between matter and spirit, res extensa and res cogitans, which in more modern parlance we might express as a distinction between body and mind, or possibly even brain and mind, cognition and consciousness.

In many ways this distinction is institutionalised in the separation of science and religion, rational atheism and intuitive spirituality. These two areas of thought are often radically separate and often incompatible, an incompatibility which too often manifests as conflict, denial, or distancing, as in the conceiving of these realms as ‘non-overlapping magisteria’ (Gould, 1997). Even when the incompatability between science and religion is minimised, as in the moves by the Dalai Lama toward neuroscience and by the Templeton Foundation to support religiously oriented scientific research, there is always a sense that this hand-holding is tentative and could be withdrawn at any point.

One possible shift that has taken place recently is the construction of areas of knowledge which are as inaccessible to science as ’spiritual’ matters but do not have the religious trappings or the cultural and institutional baggage. Consciousness studies is probably the best example of this domain. Although some may deny it, Consciousness Studies contains at its heart a ‘hard problem’ (Chalmers) whcih is that we simply cannot imagine what a satisfactory explanation of consciousness might be. Whatever it is, a description of it will always fall short of our experience of it. Whilst it is clearly evident that the study of consciousness has relationships to material science, particularly neuroscience and psychology, there is no evidence that science will empty the concept and unweave that particular rainbow. The relationships between (some areas of) Consciousness Studies and the other physical sciences is multivalent and parallels those developed between religion and science. As with religion, some scientists would deny that consciousness exists at all, while others would deny that the ‘hard problem’ exists (which amounts to the same thing). Conversely, some who study consciousness would point to the role of cognition and awareness in the construction of reality, questioning the objectivity of the science. Still other go for the hand-holding approach and look to the fringes of science for areas o overlap: to quantum physics, chaos, complexity, feeling a similar sense of wierdness emanating from these theories as they feel when thinking about consciousness and assuming a connection where there is only correspondence. A kind of awe-struck doctrine of signatures.

The development of Consciousness Studies as a domain of the unknowable is an interesting and significant development. It may be the first area of study, outside of religious practices, in which the object of study is truly ineffable and is, by some at least, acknowledged to be ineffable from the outset. In breaking the binary of matter/spirit by introducing itself as a third term, consciousness opens up the possibility of other areas of the unknowable becoming available, and also of a redefinition of some existing areas of practice as unknowable but still credible areas of study. I anticipate that much contemporary science, political thought, linguistics, and philosophy could easily make this shift.

Posted in Bloom, Paul, Chalmers, David, Consciousness, D'Aquili, Eugene, Descartes, Rene, Neuroscience | No Comments »

Empty the World into Yourself

July 3rd, 2007 Fred McVittie

The work of Korzybski on General Semantics is one source for the linguistic/psychological exercise referred to as ‘e-prime’. In e-prime one adopts a way of speaking in which the verb ‘to be’ is consciously suppressed, forcing one to use circumlocutions in order to express ideas and share observations which would otherwise use that verb. From personal experience, I can say that the long term adopting of this way of speaking does undoubtedly have an effect on thought and ultimately on worldview.

A possible interpretation of the reasons for the effectiveness of this strategy in offering alternative ways of being is that it contributes toward a breakdown of the habitual dualism which characterises modern thought and individual philosophy. Our routine existence is dominated by a sense, largely unspoken, that experience is divided into two parts, the object of that experience, which is detached, external and ‘over there’, and the subject of that experience,which is personal, hidden, and ‘inside’. This duality is often spoken of in terms of ’self’ and ‘other’, and is probably formed at a very early age. As Paul Bloom notes in ‘Descartes Baby’, we may all be ‘natural born dualists‘.

An aspect of the natural dualism which is so familiar to us is that, both conceptually and linguistically, we talk about the world in two different ways, one which is grounded in objective properties, and one which is grounded in subjective perceptions. When we are striving for a sense of objectivity we talk about the objects of the world in terms of the properties they possess independent of our perceptions. So for example we might say that the leaves of this tree are green, suggesting that there are some objects in the world, call them leaves, existing independently of ourselves, and these objects possess a property which we can identify as greenness. Alternatively, if we are not trying to achieve this objectivity we might say instead that the leaves on the tree appear green to me. This subtle difference relocates the property of greenness back where it belongs, inside the body of the perceiver. This relocation has been effected by the suppression of the verb ‘to be’ which is present in the first sentence but absent in the second. Being is transformed in ’seeming’.

The wholesale use of this technique eventually deprivileges the conceptual framework supporting dualism in favour of a monist understanding in which all experience, ‘external’ and ‘internal’, ‘over there’ and ‘in here’, is suffused with a single sense of active awareness.

This sense of awareness grounded in perception rather than in a putative set of objective properties also has implications for the self-perception of conscious awareness. When applied to an understanding of self one is obliged to interpret self-awareness not as an experience of human being but of human seeming.

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