Carrying Over of Beliefs
February 15th, 2008 Fred McVittie Posted in Belief, Cognition, Energy, Mathematics |
The holding of a belief is a cognitive mechanism which allows us to carry out certain mental activities which, without that belief, would be either impossible or extremely resource intensive. If, each time we looked over the edge of a cliff, we had to assess the likelihood that stepping over the edge would result in our death, then we would be incapable of acting. The firm belief that we have in the inevitability that this action would lead to our death relieves us of this arduous assessment process and allows us to use our limited cognitive resources elsewhere.
This process is analogous to the mathematical technique of ‘carrying over’ when adding up large numbers. In this technique the numbers to be added are placed above one another and the columns of numbers formed are added one column of digits at a time starting with the units, then moving up to the tens, the hundreds, the thousands, and so on. When a column of digits adds up to a number larger than ten then the first part of this product is ‘carried over’ by being included in the next column of digits. When this next column of digits is then added the number which has been carried over is also added. The significance of this is that the number carried over is not usually checked at this point, it is simply taken as a fact of the mathematical technique. The number represents an element of the earlier calculation and is given the same status as the rest of the numbers in the column. In a sense, therefore, the number carried over is ‘believed’ to be a relevant and accurate part of the addition process, a belief which could in fact turn out to be fallacious if the previous addition was shown to be inaccurate. Such a fallacious belief would affect the total calculation resulting in an incorrect final answer.
This analogy serves to indicate the status of beliefs within the cumulative and interconnected processes of cognition. Given that we cannot fact check every single perception and conception, we must rely on the carrying over of beliefs from earlier parts of the thought process, or the history of our thought processes, if we are to function at all. When I see a tree in front of me I do not have sufficient cognitive resources to always confirm this perception using another sensory mode, nor can I always call on another person to confirm this perception. I am obliged to believe the evidence of my unalloyed and individual eyes. More abstractly, if I am to make sense of many of the complex and ephemeral experiences which typify human existence then the sheer number of beliefs which I would have to mobilise in order to live these experiences would far exceed my ability to confirm them ‘on the fly’. Again, I would be obliged to trust in the numbers carried forward from earlier parts of the calculation. I would have to use beliefs laid down earlier in my life, possibly in childhood, and possibly even laid down in the biochemistry of my being itself, just to get through the day.
I would anticipate that, if the aim of the establishment of beliefs is to minimise the drain on cognitive resources such that these resources can be spent on more life-supporting activities, then there would be a natural resistance to the revision of such beliefs. Going back over a calculation is an arduous and resource intensive process, and the earlier in the calculation an error is made the more effort would have to be spent having to correct it. By analogy, the earlier in one’s life, or in the life of one’s species, that a belief is laid down the more difficult it would be to muster the effort to go back and check the figures.