Bad Mojo

June 29th, 2007 Fred McVittie Posted in Csikszentmihalyi, Mihalyi, Flow, Free will, Libet, Benjamin |

In writing about the experience of ‘flow’, Cziksentmihalyi treats it entirely as a positive way of being, allowing optimal performance of the task in hand and apparently having no questionable consequences. What is not brought out is the fact that flow demands no particular moral or ethical alignment; it is as easy to enter the flow state when engaged in a dangerous, illegal, or immoral activity as it is when involved in the kinds of activities Cziksentmihalyi indicates. In fact, it may even by simpler to experience flow when behaving ‘badly’ than when doing the right thing. One possible interpretation of flow is that it involves the automatic following of subconscious prompts without the usual steering provided by consciousness. As we engage in an activity, at each moment a number of possible alternative courses of action present themselves and unconsciously we begin to prepare ourselves for carrying out one of these possible alternatives. The alternative which the unconscious mind chooses, and which is subsequently presented to consciousness for approval prior to its being actuated, is ideally the most appropriate for the task. When this is the case then the conscious mind does not exercise its right of veto and the action selected by the unconscious is carried out. If this process is repeated, with unconsciously chosen actions constantly being allowed to proceed without the intervention of consciousness, then the feeling is one of unrestrained mastery and control. Everything that we do feels right. Also, because the conscious mind is not playing the role of censor or monitor in this process it becomes less prominent as a part of our experience; there is a sense in which consciousness seems to slip away leaving only the activity, to which we are unproblematically connected.

It is clear from this process than the conscious right of veto, our ability to say ‘no’ to an action begun by the unconscious, is constitutive of the self-consciousness which marks normal awareness and which possibly prevents our entering the flow state. However, as noted above, there is no requirement within this process that this unself-conscious engrossment can only be achieved in ‘good’ behaviours. On the contrary, the conscious exercising of our ability to stop ourselves carrying out certain actions, the use of what Libet refers to as the ‘free won’t', is mostly clearly in evidence when the action is socially or morally unacceptable. When we feel a temptation to carry out some behaviour which we know (consciously) to be wrong, then we are presented with a choice. We can either carry out the action and embrace the feeling of unimpeded flow that it brings, or we can veto the action. Whilst this latter option may not bring the sense of well-being that Cziksentimahayi indicates, it could nevertheless be said that it is in these moments that we are the most conscious. It could even be suggested that ‘giving in’ to flow involves the dissolution of the very self-reflectiveness and responsibility that makes us human.