Feelings aren’t Facts

October 21st, 2006 Fred McVittie Posted in Abstract, Metaphor, Objectivity, Seeing, Sense, Smell, Taste, Touch |

We come to know and understand abstract concepts through the metaphorical application of non-abstract embodied concepts. These concepts, which are entirely familiar and concrete, and include such things as physical objects, journeys, containers, etc., are organised ‘naturally’ into different sensory modes; those which are apprehended visually, aurally, kinaesthetically, gustatory, olfactorily, and as tactile experience. Therefore our understanding of abstract concepts is likely to be similarly organised into different metaphorical sensory modes. There is certainly an apparent order to the way we use language to articulate different types of abstract concepts; those which we regard as objective (e.g. justice, truth, etc) tend to be described using visual metaphors, whereas those which are thought of as subjective (love, hate, etc) are often spoken of using metaphors of touch. Abstract concepts which are objectified through the use of visual metaphor are awarded the status usually attributed to objects; permanence, boundedness, etc, whereas those which are not objectified in this way but are understood using tactile metaphors are regarded as ‘feelings’, and as everyone knows, feelings aren’t facts.