I Hear What You Are Saying

October 18th, 2006 Fred McVittie Posted in Hearing, Knowledge, Metaphor, Sense |

The sensory modes which we use metaphorically to refer to different types of knowledge also correspond to different proximal relations in metaphorical space. Experience which we regard as producing ‘objective’ knowledge is thought of using visual metaphors which place the object of that knowledge at an imagined distance, separate from ourselves. When speaking of this knowledge we say ‘I see’. Experiences which we regard as producing ’subjective’ knowledge on the other hand is thought of using tactile metaphors which collapse any imagined distance between ourselves and the ‘object’ of that knowledge. These is no separation between the experience and ourselves and when we speak of this experience we say ‘I feel’.

Between these two types of knowledge production strategies these is a third corresponding to the sense of hearing. In this the boundaries of the subject and object are not clearly drawn, as they are in the visual mode, but are also not completely collapsed, as they are in the tactile mode. When we hear something there is a sense that the sound is not located only with the object making the sound, the sense object, but is also occupying the space around us, and possibly even the space inside us. The object emits the sound and that sound permeates space and self. This contrasts with the experience of visual sensing, in which the experience is located not only distant from ourselves but also entirely within the boundaries of the experience itself; we do not see an object as extending into space through the light reflecting off its surfaces (even though that is exactly what is happening; the objects are really ‘holes’ in the light). This ambiguous knowedge reveals itself in language through such expressions as ‘I hear what you are saying’, which we use to indicate that the experience being articulated is understood but not necessarily given objective status. We use this expression to mean that, whilst a fact may appear to be an objective fact to someone else, we experience it as having a significant subjective component.