Can a Brain be Creative, and would we know

April 19th, 2006 Fred McVittie Posted in Boden, Margaret, Conference Abstract, Consciousness, Creativity, Phenomenology, Story |

Last night’s paper (presented at midnight in a disused church for some reason!)


In ‘Can a robot be creative, and would we know’, Margeret Boden (in Ford, 1996) identifies two types of creativity, each associated with different domains. That which she calls ‘H-creativity’ (for Historical) is associated with actions and artifacts which have never been produced before anywhere (or at lease not anywhere in the culture). These artifacts are usually applauded as genuinely original; unique solutions to old problems, new scientific theories, patentable inventions, copyrightable artworks etc. What Boden refers to as ‘P-creativity’ (for Personal) is only creative in the limited domain of personal experience. Although the person carrying out the creative act may be doing it for the first time, the actions and artifacts produced already exist in the wider domain of culture. It follows from this that whilst all instances of H-creativity are also P-creative, the reverse is not true.

In this paper I propose a third level at which this process occurs, call it ‘C-creativity’, in which the ‘C’ stands for ‘Consciousness’, and which corresponds to the creative formation of new unities of phenomenal experience. Here the domain is that of working memory to which new sensory experiences are introduced with each passing moment.

Ongoing phenomenal consciousness, in this model, therefore parallels the ‘body of knowledge’ which makes up a domain within H-Creativity, and to the ‘body of personal experience’ which forms the domain within P-Creativity. Just as in these larger scales of creativity, C-creativity is a dynamic process and the body of consciousness it produces is constantly evolving, not in the sense often used by new age gurus etc. but in the routine flow of everyday awareness. To paraphrase Boden’s original question, not only would we know whether a brain can be creative, but knowing itself is a deeply creative act.

Possible neurological correlates of this process will be discussed and suggestions made concerning the implications of an evolving consciousness.

Ford, K. M., C. N. Glymour, et al. (1995). Android epistemology. Menlo Park Cambridge, Mass., AAAI Press; MIT Press.

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