The Cybernetics of Mind
April 12th, 2006 Fred McVittie Posted in Conference Abstract, Consciousness, Free will, Libet, Benjamin, Metaphor, Time |
Since I can’t get to all the presentations, I will be posting some of the more interesting (to me) sounding abstracts here verbatim. As follows:
Libet (2004) famously observed that the intention for carrying out an action, contrary to expectation, does not precede the initiation of that action, but actually follows slightly after it.The implication of this is that the conscious ‘willing’ of an action is an illusion and that the conscious mind is, in effect, a witness to the actions of the unconscious to which we attribute the illusion of control.This finding, if correct, has profound consequences on our notion of intention and of the concept of ‘free will’. A significant interpretation of Libet’s results is one in which it is proposed that the conscious mind, the ‘will’ if you like, whilst it may not be the originator of action, nevertheless has the right of veto. In other words, an action initiated by the unconscious, when presented to the conscious mind, may be blocked such that the action is not carried out.
It will be argued here that this identification and selection of action by the conscious mind, which may seem through this description as corresponding to a police action or a restraint, is unlikely to be experienced as such. Provided an appropriate action is initiated swiftly enough that the conscious mind can effectively say ‘yes’ to it (i.e. not exercise its right of veto) it is likely that the selection of right action and the avoidance of error is experienced as simply the flow of everyday life. This proposal will be developed through an extended visual metaphor in which consciousness is represented as the ’steersman’ of the ship of cognition, navigating an oceanic phenomenal universe of experience.
Libet, B. (2004). Mind time: the temporal factor in consciousness. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.